# Community Staking Module **URL:** \ **Category:** Proposals\ **Created:** [November 9, 2023, 11:33am UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/community-staking-module/5917 "2023-11-09T11:33:44Z")\ **Posts on this page:** 1\ **Showing post:** 137
**Author:** ![Mol\_Eliza](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/research.lido.fi/mol_eliza/32/3617_2.png) [@Mol\_Eliza](https://research.lido.fi/u/Mol_Eliza)\ **Post date:** [June 16, 2025, 3:38pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/community-staking-module/5917/137 "2025-06-16T15:38:27Z")
# Proposal: Values for CSM v2 parameters Incredible CSM v2 features were recently [introduced](https://research.lido.fi/t/community-staking-module/5917/90) to the community. Today, I want to suggest and bring to public discussion possible approaches and values for [different parameters](https://github.com/lidofinance/community-staking-module/blob/v2.0.pre-audit-1/src/CSParametersRegistry.sol) affecting the module and CSM Operators (both Permissionless and Identified Community Stakers) The gist of the suggested approach is: - Provide more beneficial values for Identified Community Stakers, given a lower level of risk and intention to incentivize the growth of the staking community. In particular, suggesting a priority queue for the first 10 validators, ensuring a sufficient starting level for any actor considering joining CSM. - Provide a reasonable level of validator performance risk mitigation for the protocol and stakers, assuming up to a 10% level of CSM share. - Limiting the possible effect on protocol APR by 0.2% (ex., 3%-\>2.99% APR) with [PerformanceLeeway](https://docs.lido.fi/staking-modules/csm/rewards#performance-oracle) for a rare but not entirely impossible case of underperformance on a massive scale; - Limiting the possible effect on protocol APR by 3.25% (ex., 3% → 2.9% APR) with the [Bad Performance Strikes system](https://hackmd.io/lNbm8UnvREWi90iqLBhXWg?both#Bad-performance-strikes26) for the case of an intentional malicious attack on the protocol, capturing a significant size of CSM; _While still keeping the performance requirements at a level achievable by anyone willing to participate, with the share of validators getting strikes based on being from 5% (for Identified Community Stakers) to 10% (for Permissionless Stakers). As per the suggestion, it’s still required to get a minimum of three strikes for one validator for ejection, which seems like a reasonable indication and timeframe for Node Operators to identify and fix any potential issues_ - Create a disincentivization for malicious or operational errors that affect the protocol, while keeping penalties material but still reasonable and completely avoidable for Node Operators willing to comply with protocol rules. | Parameter | Short description | Permissionless participants | Identified Community Stakers | | --- | --- | --- | --- | | **PerformanceCoefficients** | Coefficients used to calculate the Node Operator’s performance based on the validators’ effectiveness in performing duties, namely: attestation, proposing blocks, and sync committee participation | C\_{a} = \frac{54}{64}, C\_{b} = \frac{8}{64}, C\_{s}= \frac{2}{64} | C\_{a} = \frac{54}{60}, C\_{b} = \frac{4}{60}, C\_{s}= \frac{2}{60} | | **PerformanceLeeway** | Difference in performance with the average network leading to a bad performance strike for the validator | 3% | 5% for the first 150 validators, 3% for the rest | | **StrikesLifetime** | Number of the Performance Oracle frames during which the accumulated number of strikes is calculated | 6 Oracle fames | 6 Oracle fames | | **StrikesThreshold** | A number of strikes required for the permissionless validator ejection | 3 | 4 | | **BadPerformancePenatly** | A penalty for the validator that was ejected due to strikes accumulated for bad performance | 0.258 ETH | 0.172 ETH | | **ElRewardsStealingFine** | Additional penalty for the confirmed and settled EL stealing incident | 0.1 ETH | 0.05 ETH | | **AllowedExitDelay** | Allowed time to exit a validator after being requested by VEBO | 4 days | 5 days | | **ExitDelayPenalty** | Penalty for not exiting a validator after requested by VEBO | 0.1 ETH | 0.05 ETH | | **KeyRemovalCharge** | A charge to prevent “queue stuffing” with keys people never intend to use | 0.02 ETH | 0.01 ETH | | **PriorityQueueMaxDeposits** | Priority in deposits for a limited number of validators | - | 10 keys | | **QueuePriority** | Index of the priority queue | 5 (lowest priority) | 0 (top priority) | | **MaxWithdrawalRequestFee** | A limit on the TW fee compensation | 0.1 ETH | 0.1 ETH | The detailed approach and values are available [here](https://docs.google.com/document/d/1JaORgFBOFCqexPFjycANxw-JleUzYlNzuQ4zP-PyUzc/edit?tab=t.0) --- _[View the full topic](https://research.lido.fi/t/community-staking-module/5917)._