# Emergency rotation of compromised Chorus One oracle

**URL:** https://research.lido.fi/t/emergency-rotation-of-compromised-chorus-one-oracle/10037
**Category:** Proposals
**Created:** [May 11, 2025, 9:56am UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/emergency-rotation-of-compromised-chorus-one-oracle/10037 "2025-05-11T09:56:03Z")
**Posts on this page:** 1
**Showing post:** 6

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### Author: ![PGov](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/research.lido.fi/pgov/32/4894_2.png) [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [May 11, 2025, 12:25pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/emergency-rotation-of-compromised-chorus-one-oracle/10037/6 "2025-05-11T12:25:34Z")

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Rotating the single compromised key immediately while the rest of the 5/9 quorum stays intact preserves continuity of reporting and keeps stakers fully protected. Want to call out that the team’s thorough checks (all other eight oracles, software integrity, no wider Chorus One infrastructure issues) give confidence that this was an isolated hot-wallet leak rather than an ongoing breach. Ccommitting to a full post-mortem all show a mature, security-first response. No red flags here—this is exactly how a robust oracle set should handle an unexpected key compromise.

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