# Introducing NO Bonding and Increasing Stakeholder Incentive Alignment

**URL:** <https://research.lido.fi/t/introducing-no-bonding-and-increasing-stakeholder-incentive-alignment/4847>\
**Category:** Proposals\
**Created:** [June 15, 2023, 1:30am UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/introducing-no-bonding-and-increasing-stakeholder-incentive-alignment/4847 "2023-06-15T01:30:55Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 2

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**Author:** ![dapplion](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/research.lido.fi/dapplion/32/2031_2.png) [@dapplion](https://research.lido.fi/u/dapplion)\
**Post date:** [June 15, 2023, 8:09am UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/introducing-no-bonding-and-increasing-stakeholder-incentive-alignment/4847/2 "2023-06-15T08:09:20Z")

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My quick 2 cents, I may do a longer one latter. I agree with Hasu’s point [Proposal: Introducing $LDO Staking - #25 by Hasu](https://research.lido.fi/t/proposal-introducing-ldo-staking/4636/25) of LIDO attracting a quality NO’s set partly thanks to the low friction. I tend to agree that _some_ bonding would be positive, but I’m not sure if it compensates it negative externalities. Note that if a meaningful bond was required I don’t think client teams could afford to stay in the set.

Posting a small bond on the range of fractions of a percent addresses the most recent incident yes. But it may be woefully insufficient for future events. If the entire key set of an NO is slashed, the penalty ranges from a min of 3.12% (since bellatrix) to 100% of offending stake.

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