# LDO+stETH dual governance

**URL:** <https://research.lido.fi/t/ldo-steth-dual-governance/2382>\
**Category:** Proposals\
**Created:** [June 10, 2022, 1:55pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/ldo-steth-dual-governance/2382 "2022-06-10T13:55:56Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 35

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**Author:** ![vsh](https://avatars.discourse-cdn.com/v4/letter/v/b19c9b/32.png) [@vsh](https://research.lido.fi/u/vsh)\
**Post date:** [June 21, 2022, 7:06am UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/ldo-steth-dual-governance/2382/35 "2022-06-21T07:06:22Z")

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Nothing in ve-model solves the principal-agent problem between LDO stakeholders and stETH holders. If anything, it exacebrates them by explicitely embracing short-term vote bribing. It’s got its flaws and benefits, but I don’t think discussion of them in this proposal would be fruitful because it’s completely orthogonal to the main thing here.

Principal-agent problem can be solved by reducing agent’s (in that case LDO holders) power or by increasing principal’s power. Reducing LDO power is a great goal, but unachievable until Ethereum ossifies enough. Hence, if we are to do anything with principal-agent problem at all, we are left with empowering stETH holders in some way.

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