# PGov Delegate Thread
**URL:** https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232
**Category:** Delegate Platform
**Created:** [August 28, 2024, 7:05pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232 "2024-08-28T19:05:56Z")
**Posts on this page:** 20
**Page:** 1
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [August 28, 2024, 7:05pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/1 "2024-08-28T19:05:56Z")
### PGov Delegate Platform
Address: PGov.eth / `0x3FB19771947072629C8EEE7995a2eF23B72d4C8A`
Contact Information: @PGovTeam on Twitter
**Introduction:**
Hello Everyone! We are a team of dedicated governance enthusiasts who have been in the crypto governance space for over three years. Our team were some of the first members involved in defi governance and we want to apply what we have learned over here to Lido. We believe this community has some of the strongest and most intelligent community members and we’re grateful to be along for the journey!
**Core Values:**
- Growth: Our decisions are primarily focused on the growth of the protocol. This often results in how to spend money efficiently, but even more importantly and objecting for unreasonable spends and knowing when to vote no.
- Transparency: Clear communication with votes and explanations of reasoning, and an equivalent demand for proposals to do the same. Too often we see thousands, if not millions, being rolled up together and glossed over during proposals.
- Accountability: Too often once a decision is done, having proper accountability becomes an afterthought. Whether it’s a DAO promise or a grant or a new program, once a DAO votes something in, we forget about it. Our goal with PGov is to both continue to check in on these decisions as well as ensure that there are proper channels set up to ensure accountability.
**Public Acceptance:** We are committed to the code of conduct, mission, and respective values
**Disclosures:** We are delegates across other Defi protocols. Team members hold a combined ~$50k work of LDO.
---
### Author:  [@Jenya\_K](https://research.lido.fi/u/Jenya_K)
#### Post date: [August 29, 2024, 8:51am UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/2 "2024-08-29T08:51:32Z")
Welcome to the platform. Just a heads-up—the application deadline for participation in the rally was August 25th (details [here](https://research.lido.fi/t/establish-a-public-delegate-platform-and-delegate-incentivization-program/7858/33)), so your profiles won’t be included in the UI presented list of delegates or other rally materials. However, this doesn’t prevent you from participating in the Delegate Incentivisation Program if you meet the criteria, and it certainly doesn’t block you from being a public delegate on the platform!
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [October 3, 2024, 4:19pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/3 "2024-10-03T16:19:00Z")
**[Increase the Proposal Threshold for Snapshot](https://snapshot.org/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x185d0f90a82fd60c292bd6af34c136556859cc168b373cdf9c769b26f8e42b7b)**
We voted **Increase threshold to 15,000 LDO** : This threshold makes sense as the DAO grows. Increasing the threshold to this should prevent possible spam in the future.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [October 17, 2024, 3:16pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/4 "2024-10-17T15:16:28Z")
**[Should the Lido DAO recognize the wstETH bridge endpoints on Zircuit as canonical?
](https://snapshot.org/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xac55c2cd8610c3b72cb769cec6b97891b5880f2f1f458eda2eb17218332cef6f)
[Lido Community Staking Module Mainnet Release Setup
](https://snapshot.org/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xd0d7bfd68f2241524dbb14ae6fe0e8414b9fe3e0dcfc50641a8d28f0067d6693)
[Change Easy Track limits for PML & ATC
](https://snapshot.org/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x44bc7db53129ab4048c7f6f5cdc03407ec73444cbb5976c9579cb19bd3b57f7e)
[Lido Alliance application: Bolt
](https://snapshot.org/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x2676108832842e60ca27aa7060b9ca6c09c6d2a9fe308b0ee0decc7a6728e137)
[Integrate CSM into the Decentralized Validator Vault
](https://snapshot.org/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xcfb3473f8b91f368cc90218823d490c2a75ef4849bd76e000941d46b263f129c)**
We voted **In Favor** : We see no issues on these votes the forum discourse has been fully positive as well.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [November 2, 2024, 4:46pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/6 "2024-11-02T16:46:34Z")
Confirming PGov.eth at address: 0x3FB19771947072629C8EEE7995a2eF23B72d4C8A.
Thanks @Jenya_K
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [February 15, 2025, 10:08pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/7 "2025-02-15T22:08:16Z")
**[Should Solstice continue in the Curated set following the acquisition of Bridgetower?](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x93baeaa1b3e3ed31df27dc5dbbb729cc562d6766513b01ef59ec8f362d45edd5)**
**[Should Attestant continue in the Curated set following the acquisition by Bitwise?](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x58fc14fac3bcdf65c7b9dd871ec555da8c2ff6387b9a443ddf5fce5f41d4db91)**
We voted **In Favor for both** : Solstice Staking AG’s acquisition of Bridgetower and Attestant’s acquisition by Bitwise does not introduce any operational changes, as the same team will continue managing the validators on the same infrastructure in the same geographic area. Supporting this proposal allows for continuity and stability and maintains trusted operator performance.
**[Establishment of Lido Labs BORG Foundation as a Lido-DAO-Adjacent Foundation](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xdf648307e68415e7b5cf96c6afbabd696c1731839f4b4a7cf5cb7efbc44ee9d6)**
**[Establishment of Lido Ecosystem BORG Foundation as a Lido-DAO-Adjacent Foundation](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x7f72f12d72643c20cd0455c603d344050248e75ed1074c8391fae4c30f09ca15)**
We voted **In Favor for both** : We think supporting the establishment of the Lido Labs BORG Foundation and the Lido Ecosystem BORG Foundation strengthens Lido DAO’s governance by creating a structured, transparent, and accountable entity dedicated to research, development, and operational oversight. This framework ensures better compliance, contributor protection, and alignment with Lido DAO’s long-term goals while maintaining decentralized administration.
**[LEGO: Proposal to replace Tim Beiko with Eric Siu and update council members rotation rules](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x2acd7e052fc5ac2513509f5023975451f69fd488628577fedf369c3da97bef6a)**
We voted **In Favor** : This allows for a smooth transition by replacing Tim Beiko with Eric Siu, whose expertise in Ethereum ecosystem coordination aligns well with LEGO’s objectives. Additionally, granting the council the ability to manage future member rotations without requiring a Snapshot vote streamlines governance, reducing administrative overhead; which we are also in support of.
**[Transition Community Staking Module to Permissionless Phase](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/183)**
We voted **In Favor** : These on chain operations to execute some of the DAO’s snapshot votes make sense and we have no complaints.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [March 19, 2025, 5:25pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/8 "2025-03-19T17:25:39Z")
**[Lido DAO Ops Multisigs Policy 2.0](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x48e552d0dab3d49f72f8618302a68be56afbdfef0d0e7bcf9f73588335d2842b)**
We voted **Adopt Multisig Policy** : Updated and revised policy for wallet operations to reflect current best practices makes sense, including ability to incorporate additional recommendations to the team to further enhance security.
**[SSV Lido Module Proposal](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x97e858cf28d8287bf268948e71e98bcd7b5b96a75f596260d0c614185b2ef237)**
We voted **Approve** : We support this initiative, as the module significantly enhances Lido’s infrastructure by introducing a permissionless pathway for Node Operators, reducing barriers to entry through fractional bonding and simplified operations. The proposed implementation timeline is conservative, featuring a testnet deployment in Q2 2025 and a comprehensive review process prior to mainnet integration.
**[MEV-Boost Relay Allowed List management via Easy Track](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xf1074ec134595ba8ba6f802c5e505fda32e6ab93e9763d1e43001f439241b7c9)**
We voted **For** : This proposal introduces three specialized EVM script factories designed to streamline the existing cumbersome process of updating the relay list. By entrusting management responsibilities to the EVM Script Executor, the proposal increases transparency and promotes greater participation from LDO tokenholders in relay governance.
**[[EGG] Lido Labs BORG Foundation Grant Funding Request (Apr-Dec 2025)](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xb58527a05581849b3890ff226fa30f2b5e19f7742fe8f4f94e6c953fe0055c0e)**
**[[EGG] Lido Ecosystem BORG Foundation Grant Funding Request (Apr-Dec 2025)](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x90e2f9926e37867d2ef319a8ef7a0257bb5695086b64b88b43b43f00959a0047)**
We voted **For** & **For** : After reviewing the funding proposal along with extensive forum responses and discussions, we support both of these grant requests through December 2025. This comprehensive funding package directly advances multiple GOOSE-2 objectives, particularly in protocol development, governance improvement, and Ethereum decentralization and both are reasonable budgets.
**[Ensuring Compatibility with Ethereum’s Pectra Upgrade](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xb6559f0cdb1164ae5d63769827c4a275805bd944392a17b60cf51ddc54429dc6)**
We voted **Support the Proposal** : No major concerns here as these are all needed in order to effectively support the future Pectra upgrade for the DAO.
**[Vote #184](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/184)**
We voted **Yes** : This proposal enhances governance accessibility by extending the main voting phase to 72 hours and the objection phase to 48 hours, providing participants with additional time to engage in governance decisions. The revised GateSeal protection, now extended from 6 to 11 days, has undergone thorough auditing. Additionally, the introduction of new Easy Track Factories for Lido Ecosystem and Lido Labs streamlines funding processes with sensible quarterly limits ($5M and $18M respectively), reducing administrative overhead while maintaining oversight.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [April 2, 2025, 6:30pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/9 "2025-04-02T18:30:16Z")
**[Re-endorsement of wstETH on Starknet](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xf752b2dbc9cf8693abf01b29938d7f7e0dd7e1ebe088583fd61da7641b870a36)**
We voted **Against** : We are currently opposed to re-endorsing wstETH on Starknet due to concerns over the Starknet Foundation’s delayed disclosure and handling of a prior incident, which resulted in the wstETH token on Starknet becoming irreversibly ownerless and non-upgradeable. This misalignment with Lido’s bridging guidelines led to the initial offboarding of wstETH from Starknet. Despite the completion of a migration to a new wstETH token and a proposal for re-endorsement, we agree with the Network Expansion Committee (NEC)'s decision to not proceed at this time, citing the need for better alignment in security culture and incident response practices.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [April 22, 2025, 11:36pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/10 "2025-04-22T23:36:00Z")
**[Increasing LOL Easy Track Limits to align with Grant Requests](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x3ecd09e4c0f22d25c711ca5777c49c22d144385b85dd7f696ca6cc66cc0ca157)**
We voted **For** : We support the proposal to increase the ET limits for the LOL multisig as it more efficiently streamlines operational capabilities. The current ET limit of 2,100 stETH per quarter restricts the Foundation’s ability to access the full $8.5 million grant allocated for the second half of 2025. Adjusting the ET limits enhances also the security framework by providing a comfortable buffer above anticipated expenditures, as emphasized by the DAO Ops team.
**[CSM: stakeShareLimit and keyRemovalCharge parameters adjustment](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xcd1c1a051888efd495d97458ae9fa4fe5198616eb3d92a71d3352d9f25e79c4e)**
We voted **For** : We support the proposal to reduce the `keyRemovalCharge` parameter in the CSM from 0.05 ETH to 0.02 ETH, as it reflects current Ethereum network conditions and maintains the module’s safety mechanisms. This adjustment prevents unnecessary financial burdens on NOs and promotes efficient participation in the CSM. Furthermore, this change can be regularly updated and we think it makes sense to decrease it to this for the time being.
**[Lido Alliance application: Twyne](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xc67103e65d8bb4e088ddb89e0a7654fa56db5f0162f5870fca41c5dabd937f11)**
We voted **For** : We support the proposal to onboard Twyne into the Lido Alliance due to its innovative approach to enhancing stETH utility within the DeFi ecosystem. Twyne’s credit delegation protocol allows stETH holders to delegate their unused borrowing capacity, unlocking additional yield opportunities and enabling more flexible lending strategies. By integrating with existing lending markets like Euler, Twyne offers a modular solution that preserves capital efficiency while introducing new avenues for stETH utilization. A valid concern we considerd is that Twyne is still quite early in the development stage. As the protocol is not yet live, there is limited data on its performance, user adoption, and security robustness. A note going forward, is that it is crucial for the DAO to monitor Twyne’s progress closely and ensure that all security measures are thoroughly implemented.
**[Extend Delegate Incentivization Program through 2025](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x2533d8d3903d94daa4de16ef7abf957441439e7867962ce8709a375479f417de)**
We voted **For** : We support this proposal as it has shown to increase active participation and improve the quality of discussions and feedback. The pilot program successfully brought new actors into governance, with over 24 million LDO delegated to public delegates. The continuation and refinement of this program are essential for sustaining robust and resilient governance within the Lido ecosystem, and we are especially grateful, as we started participating around this time!
**[Vote #185](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/185)**
We voted **For** : This vote ensures compatibility with Ethereum’s Pectra Fork as was prior approved on Snapshot. Our reasoning still is the same:
> [@PGov](#):
>
> No major concerns here as these are all needed in order to effectively support the future Pectra upgrade for the DAO.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [May 11, 2025, 12:28pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/11 "2025-05-11T12:28:05Z")
**[Vote #186](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/186)**
We voted **Yes** : Rotating the single compromised key immediately while the rest of the 5/9 quorum stays intact preserves continuity of reporting and keeps stakers fully protected. No reason to not do so if there are issues possibly detected.
> [@Emergency rotation of compromised Chorus One oracle](https://research.lido.fi/t/emergency-rotation-of-compromised-chorus-one-oracle/10037/6):
>
> Rotating the single compromised key immediately while the rest of the 5/9 quorum stays intact preserves continuity of reporting and keeps stakers fully protected. Want to call out that the team’s thorough checks (all other eight oracles, software integrity, no wider Chorus One infrastructure issues) give confidence that this was an isolated hot-wallet leak rather than an ongoing breach. Ccommitting to a full post-mortem all show a mature, security-first response. No red flags here—this is exactly how a robust oracle set should handle an unexpected key compromise.
**[Vote #187](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/187)**
We voted **Yes** : Voting to confirm and on chain execute in these prior snapshot votes that we voted Yes for.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [May 22, 2025, 12:05pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/12 "2025-05-22T12:05:19Z")
**[LIP-28: Dual Governance — Implementation, Parameters, Committees](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x26a66c9b91ff46aeac74b6f6714467993edc6840a8f292fb5c1366fc44dec2a6)**
We voted **Yes** : Nothing much to say here that hasn’t already been said; we are very excited to dual governance to get implemented and up and running asap!
**[Establishment of the Auxiliary Proposer Mechanisms Committee](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xf7630cd2bfe47e892f8293cd68be277fefc33ba19f43c756747fe1113456ac4b)**
We voted **For** : We’re in favor of establishing the APM Committee because it brings a much-needed, structured team to focus on adding to the rapid innovation for APMs, setting clear evaluation criteria, and ensuring unanimous, transparent decision-making.
**[Community Staking Module v2. Architecture and Fee Structure](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xf7b718e7807f763ba826735781145dd06b79b0228b37b74a22dd5ac252e03c40)**
We voted **For** : This module v2 creates a more modular, permissioned-permissionless hybrid staking framework, and allows for broadened operator inclusion while maintaining protocol integrity and decentralization. We are in favor!
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [June 24, 2025, 9:58pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/13 "2025-06-24T21:58:38Z")
**[Vote #188](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/188)**
We voted **Yes** : Voting to confirm and on chain execute in these prior snapshot votes that we voted Yes for.
**[DVT Integration Guidelines for the Curated Module Node Operators](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x15cdcb4881d85d48e363bcc449cabfc26b627ac395e2515d65d6637453c35ab3)**
We voted **Approve** : Performance data shows Lido’s own Simple DVT Module and large external Obol + SSV clusters consistently beating network-wide effectiveness and uptime, confirming that DVT is mature enough for Curated-set use. The proposal limits intra-operator DVT to the lesser of 1,000 keys or 20% of an operator’s validators, mandates a test-net dress-rehearsal, and notes that Lido’s 6,500 stETH cover fund comfortably backs any residual slashing risk. Additionally, notable players like Stakin, InfStones, Chainlayer, Sigma Prime, Ebunker and Simply Staking all endorse the guidelines. We see no good reasons to vote no.
**[Decision on Kyber Network’s position in the Oracle Set: rotate to Caliber or remove and change the quorum](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xdc208507ca0f659c7f9e38056288aedb7610816ea4020ca751c3422434780de8)**
We voted **Rotate Kyber Network to Caliber** : Handing the slot to Caliber preserves institutional know-how from Kyber team and prevents any gap in the nine-member oracle quorum. No concerns.
**[Proposal for Updating Block Proposer Rewards Policy to Lido on Ethereum SNOP on Block Proposals v3](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x8b6addc4be1a9ef4b2a1591be5ac4909aa82c868cd9b7871494b626539a99a8e)**
We voted **For** : The v3 SNOP modernizes Lido’s Block Proposer Rewards Policy so it aligns with today’s Ethereum Pectra’s landscape. We think extending the policy’s scope to Simple DVT, the Community Staking Module and any future staking modules, all within a standardized template will make future audits and upgrades straightforward. We see no good reasons to vote no.
**[Vote #189](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/189)**
We voted **Yes** : Voting to confirm and on chain execute in these prior snapshot votes that we voted Yes for.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [July 22, 2025, 4:37am UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/14 "2025-07-22T04:37:33Z")
**[CSM v2 Final Rollout](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xc3f92bcdf8926cfa7528ca6a979c0fdce1e4d0cfaaa72dd6410a76a2e1e55766)**
We voted **For** : We support the CSM proposal because it significantly enhances Ethereum’s decentralization by enabling permissionless participation in Lido’s validator set. We have expanded upon our support in prior forum discussions and are still aligned and in favor of these finall rollout steps.
**[Triggerable Withdrawals Framework in the Lido Protocol](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x7d7f0e1a6d181310f8752af37e20515a9be258f30b211872f9acca99bc478851)**
We voted **For** : We support the Triggerable Withdrawals Framework as it significantly reduces trust assumptions on Node Operators by enabling permissionless validator exits directly through the Execution Layer. By removing the need for validators to rely solely on operators to process exits, it ensures smoother, more reliable staking withdrawals—especially during chaotic or degraded network conditions. The integration into Lido’s Withdrawal Framework means the community gains both flexibility and security; the validator exits become automated, verifiable, and accessible.
**[Vote #190](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/190)**
We voted **Yes** : Voting to confirm and on chain execute in these prior snapshot votes that we voted Yes for.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [September 2, 2025, 8:32pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/15 "2025-09-02T20:32:11Z")
**[Nethermind → Twinstake Validator Operations Migration](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x3f68e9bc69850da419211c3d9f0a76d006ed044abc0f8bc845bc1d1cf3db0a8d)**
We voted **For** : We support the Nethermind → Twinstake migration because it separates protocol research from validator operations while keeping continuity and security intact. Twinstake is a proven institutional staking provider with a strong track record, and the transition is low risk given Nethermind’s close ties and retention of key custody. This shift improves reliability, transparency, and decentralization while allowing Nethermind to focus on client development, research, and contributions to Lido v3 and DVT. We’re glad to see community concerns about Nethermind’s ongoing role were addressed, with confirmation they will remain active on the research side. The Lido Node Operator Steering Group also endorsed Twinstake’s high-caliber practices, and the updated Snapshot timeline ensures transparency.
**[Vote #191](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/191)**
We voted **Yes** : We are in favor of this operational & technical vote to fix for the Dual Governance RageQuit mechanism, audited by Certora and Statemind. No concerns from our end for this.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [September 23, 2025, 9:54pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/16 "2025-09-23T21:54:00Z")
**[Lido V3 — Design & Implementation Proposal](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x01cd474645cc7c3ddf68314d475d421ef833499297f508fee5f7411fafff3954)**
We voted **Yes** : The Lido v3 proposal brings some really interesting shifts to the protocol’s architecture, and we think the emphasis on modularity is particularly worth highlighting. Several commenters in that thread have pointed out how the separation of responsibilities—such as validators, withdrawal queues, and staking routers—could make the system more resilient and adaptable over time. That kind of layered design not only helps with scaling but also makes it easier to evolve specific parts of the protocol without requiring a disruptive overhaul of everything at once. In decentralized systems, where upgrades can be tricky to coordinate, that flexibility is a real strength.
Also by making staking routes and modules more customizable, Lido opens up space for more diverse participation and experimentation. But with that comes the challenge of ensuring the DAO can still steer effectively without being overwhelmed by too many proposals or fragmented decision-making. A good analogy might be urban planning: giving neighborhoods more autonomy can create vibrancy and resilience, but you still need some central coordination to keep the whole city functioning smoothly. It’ll be fascinating to see how Lido v3 strikes that balance in practice.
**[NEST - Network Economic Support Tokenomics](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x4267fe277e52a3550e82286af96948a258392ddd303df6b479c4d8f4664acdd0)**
We voted **Yes** : What stood out is the intention to create a clear alignment between Lido and an emerging project in its early stages. Several of the initial responses in the thread make good points about how tokenomics can either reinforce or weaken this kind of partnership. On the positive side, allocating support early can foster collaboration and help bootstrap Nest’s growth, which in turn could expand the broader staking ecosystem. It’s somewhat similar to how venture investments in adjacent technologies can create synergies that pay off for both sides if the alignment is strong. Another layer of the conversation is governance optics. Community members are understandably sensitive to how treasury resources are used, especially when it involves supporting external projects. Even if the collaboration makes sense on paper, there’s always a need to demonstrate how it benefits Lido’s stakers and long-term mission. Framing the support as part of a broader strategy, whether it’s diversification, ecosystem building, or resilience, could help win broader buy-in. Otherwise, it risks being perceived as favoritism or mission drift. Clear communication and measurable outcomes will probably be just as important as the technical or financial details of the proposal itself.
**[Establish the stVaults Committee](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x0e8b53944051321d2cedf8881b546427bc6a22c9fe16f7d150af62fd837ff7da)**
We voted **Yes** : We think the stVaults Committee proposal is an important step for scaling responsibly. A few comments in the thread highlight the complexity of managing vault strategies, especially as the range of options expands. Having a dedicated committee to evaluate, monitor, and adjust those vaults could provide the consistency and accountability that’s hard to achieve when responsibilities are spread too thinly. In many ways, this mirrors how investment committees function in traditional finance, ensuring there’s both expertise and a structured process behind capital allocation.
**[Vote #192](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/192)**
We voted **For** : We are in favor of this operational & technical vote to Upgrade to CSM v2 and increase CSM stake share limit from 3% to 5%, as per prior Snapshots. Also agree with other operational decisions.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [October 16, 2025, 6:12am UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/17 "2025-10-16T06:12:07Z")
**[Proposal for Updating Lido on Ethereum Validator Exits SNOP to v3](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x62eb338c6d256d43ee54e2b79e9442b58fcfda4ecdcd817ff6422d564d153e9a)**
We voted **For** : The v3 Exits SNOP is a timely, pragmatic upgrade. It aligns operator responsibilities with the coming triggerable-withdrawals flow, incorporates Pectra-informed terminology, and extends clear expectations across Simple DVT, Community Staking, and future modules. We support retaining explicit service-level expectations around exit responsiveness that were well-received in earlier iterations—operators themselves noted that firm, uniform timelines were workable and fair.
Overall, we’re in favor because v3 strengthens the protocol’s redemption guarantees while lowering operational and coordination risk at Lido’s current scale. Clear procedures for exits, module-aware consequences for non-compliance, and a consistent interface for operators make the system more resilient under stress—especially during periods of elevated exit queues.
**[Empowering Lido Ecosystem Foundation to Lead Bridge-Related Partnerships](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xf842517c2ffba082efac87ec43365e86548adb38e24d1446d850c7d7b979c423)**
We voted **For** : We think giving the Ecosystem Foundation this role is logical. Some more thoughts here: [Empowering Lido Ecosystem Foundation to Lead Bridge-Related Partnerships - #15 by PGov](https://research.lido.fi/t/empowering-lido-ecosystem-foundation-to-lead-bridge-related-partnerships/10794/15)
**[Vote #193](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/193)**
We voted **No** : No description provided on the test vote.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [November 1, 2025, 5:09pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/18 "2025-11-01T17:09:08Z")
**[Transfer TRP to Lido Labs Foundation and Amend TRP Terms](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x16ecb51631d67213d44629444fcc6275bc2abe4d7e955bebaf15c60a42cba471)**
We voted **For** : As we highlighted on the forums, this move strengthens the accountability of the TRP by transferring management to the Lido Labs Foundation, consolidating oversight within a legally structured entity that operates under clear bylaws and is directly answerable to the DAO, reducing the ambiguity that previously surrounded TRP administration. It also introduces better cost structure. By realigning the framework with current realities, the DAO ensures the sustainability of contributor incentives without jeopardizing long-term operational funding.
**[Lido Ecosystem Grants Organization (LEGO) — Framework Update 1 October 2025](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xc87e56b48594d0a5560a959ac32252f86464966a5a9d6ea86ef189d842d9328a)**
We voted **For** : There’s no reason to vote against decreasing this budget and we are thankful to the team for proactively doing so. No concerns from our end.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [November 25, 2025, 4:31pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/20 "2025-11-25T16:31:58Z")
**[Conversion of Treasury Stablecoins into sUSDS or TMMFs](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x4dd947f5e73377b074fd393148b377558179f22ea923d584dd3c718f3bab0687)**
We voted **For** : We support this proposal as it turns roughly 30 million dollars of idle DAO stablecoins into an income-producing sleeve while keeping the operational setup simple and low risk. Converting USDC, USDT, and DAI into sUSDS (and, over time, into tokenized USD money market funds held by the Foundations on behalf of the DAO) taps into a Treasury-grade yield source without introducing complex new contracts or governance surfaces. This is expected to generate over 1 million dollars per year in additional income at current rates, which materially strengthens the DAO’s runway and ability to fund core contributors and ecosystem initiatives, while Easy Track and Aragon Finance are updated so that sUSDS can be used seamlessly for the same operational flows the DAO already relies on.
**[Curated Module Fee Changes](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x3a5d10fcd3fad6d5ccf05f5bd49244046600ad9cbed9a5e07845200b3ae97e09)**
We voted **For** : We support this proposal as it adjusts Curated Module operator fees in a way that keeps Lido competitive in a tightening staking market while increasing the DAO’s own revenue and reinforcing decentralization incentives. By setting a 3.5% baseline for Standard operators and selectively adding higher tiers for other operators who strengthen Ethereum and Lido’s resilience.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [December 13, 2025, 6:50pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/21 "2025-12-13T18:50:55Z")
**[Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x0188ab77d59b11ce589d88c350093faffdb07b3a9c9ba4d8af12755d4b2178c0)**
We voted **For** : Voting in favor of proactively adopting the SEAL Safe harbor agreement. This is something we’ve seen across various DAOs and we believe the Seal team’s work is greatly appreciated and valuable across the ecosystem.
**[Lido Alliance BORG – Amendment of Bylaws to Enable GOOSE-3 Execution](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x5e087c8d53509dd9b55441f9ee6180da21ee5cf8fe68fab9d852b75b35a44a18)**
We voted **For** : We support this vote because amending the Lido Alliance BORG bylaws is a necessary enabler for executing the GOOSE-3 strategic vision, as it aims to expand Lido DAO horizontally into new products and business verticals that diversify revenue and strengthen long-term sustainability. In support of this operational vote.
**[Ecosystem Grant gRequest (EGG): Executing GOOSE-3](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xf263b730f1c64d637ec27227121d7c5bd2189bf456514bad8225e960cf34d7b0)**
We voted **For** : We’re in support of this Ecosystem Grant as it provides a single, consolidated and accountable funding plan that directly ties resourcing to the GOOSE-3 execution roadmap. The proposal is explicit about objectives and separates predictable baseline spend from higher-variance discretionary allocations. It also outlines a clear operational funding path and commits that unused funds will be returned to the DAO treasury.
**[GOOSE 2025 cycle: Lido DAO goals for 2026](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x9504d26771291e011ff54c2e0d7665e79621aa0225c0d573697f1c4061401938)**
We voted **For** : We support Lido’s Next Chapter as it lays out a coherent, strategy-first direction for how Lido can evolve from a largely single-product liquid staking protocol into a broader, more resilient organization with a product portfolio. The proposal explicitly pairs defending and extending the flagship staking franchise via adjacent offerings and ecosystem expansion with selective new product lines intended to broaden demand and diversify revenue streams.
**[Vote #194](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/194)** & **[Vote #195](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/195)** & **[Vote #196](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/196)**
We voted **Yes** & **Yes** & **Yes** : We are in favor of these operational & technical vote implementations.
---
### Author:  [@PGov](https://research.lido.fi/u/PGov)
#### Post date: [January 20, 2026, 3:38pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232/22 "2026-01-20T15:38:54Z")
**[DVT & DVV Incentive Allocation Changes](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x8b8619f09213b868708b25cb2512023234e5e160cba5c291f4e9d944d2ccd3fa)**
We voted **For** : We like the incentive allocation changes and believe concerns were addressed appropriately. More in depth thoughts here: [Proposal: DVT & DVV Incentive Allocation Changes - #25 by PGov](https://research.lido.fi/t/proposal-dvt-dvv-incentive-allocation-changes/11076/25)
**[Rewards Share Committee Reform](https://v1.snapshot.box/#/lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0xb4a35720b03f4c888c2fb41ab66ed324262d7a5b4696ffc3ee20bb35ebb0df6f)**
We voted **For** : We’re in favor because it modernizes the Rewards Share Committee’s mandate to match the DAO’s current operating reality. Operationally, the design is sensible separation-of-duties: the stVaults Committee manages/approves stVaults Rewards Share decisions, while the Rewards Share Committee handles treasury drawdowns and disbursements (i.e., execution). On NO rebates, it’s explicitly framed as a stopgap operational function until CMv2 removes the technical limitation, exactly the kind of bridge responsibility that prevents governance decisions from getting stuck in implementation limbo.
Also, the governance hygiene improvements are a net positive: a smaller signer set and lower quorum (moving from 4/8 to 3/5) should reduce operational friction while preserving multisig safety, and the explicit annual budget inclusion via yearly EGG proposals plus regular reporting via the Lido Ecosystem Foundation creates clearer accountability loops.
**[Vote 198](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/198)**
We voted **For** : We are in favor of these operational & technical vote implementations.
[Next page](https://research.lido.fi/t/pgov-delegate-thread/8232.md?page=2)