Authorize LDO Accumulation Program for up to 10,000 stETH
We voted For: We support this proposal because it represents a disciplined, opportunistic deployment of DAO treasury assets at a time when the LDO:ETH ratio is trading at multi-year lows without a proportional deterioration in protocol fundamentals. Net protocol rewards are down approximately 20% while the LDO:ETH ratio has declined roughly 50% — a dislocation that presents an accretive opportunity for the DAO. The execution framework is well-designed: 1,000 stETH tranches drawn via Easy Track with a ≤3% slippage threshold, a post-batch reporting obligation before each new drawdown, and the ability for tokenholders to object to any subsequent motion. This granular kill-switch structure gives the DAO genuine oversight rather than a one-shot treasury deployment. The Growth Committee’s discretion over execution pace, venue selection (on-chain via CoW Swap, 1inch, Uniswap, and off-chain via Binance, OKX, etc.), and timing is appropriate given the thin on-chain liquidity environment, and we appreciate the explicit mandate to avoid front-running exposure through staggered disclosure.
From LNOSG to CMC: Evolving Curated Staking Modules Governance
We voted For: We support transitioning the Lido Node Operator Sub-Governance (LNOSG) into the Curated Module Committee (CMC) as a necessary governance evolution driven by the introduction of CMv2. The LNOSG served its purpose well in an advisory capacity, but CMv2 introduces on-chain permissions and recurring operational responsibilities — penalty reporting, registry updates, parameter management, and Node Operator type assignment — that require a more structured and execution-oriented body. The CMC’s 6-of-9 multisig threshold with a balanced composition of core contributors and transitioning LNOSG members preserves institutional knowledge while formalizing accountability. Critically, Node Operator onboarding still requires a direct DAO Snapshot vote, preserving tokenholder authority over the highest-impact decisions. The committee’s lifespan is explicitly bounded to the existence of the Curated Modules, and the DAO retains the ability to modify, revoke, or override CMC roles at any time. This is a clean governance upgrade that matches the operational reality of CMv2.
Redirect DVT & APM Incentives to Current Meta Treasury and LoL
We voted For: We support this consolidation of incentive flows as a practical operational improvement that reduces governance overhead without changing the underlying economics for stakers. With Lido Earn ETH now live and the DVV’s standalone role effectively absorbed into its architecture, routing the DVT incentive share (post-Node Operator split) to the Current Meta Treasury multisig centralizes staker-facing reward strategies under a unified operational framework. The separate routing of APM incentives to the Liquidity Observation Lab (LoL) multisig is well-reasoned — APM-derived incentives are more variable, execution-layer-driven, and require faster iteration than DVT flows. The Growth Committee’s existing mandate to drive stETH adoption and liquidity depth makes it the natural home for these flows. Node Operator incentive allocations remain unchanged per the January 2026 Snapshot parameters, ensuring this is purely an operational streamlining, not a redistribution.
Introduce an Identified DVT Cluster type in the Community Staking Module
We voted For: We support the introduction of the Identified DVT Cluster (IDVTC) type as a well-calibrated addition to the CSM that combines the trust guarantees of the Identified Community Staker (ICS) framework with the resilience benefits of Distributed Validator Technology. Allowing clusters of four verified, independent community stakers to operate validators collaboratively through DVT addresses a real gap: there was no capital-efficient path for independent DVT clusters within the CSM. The proposed bond structure (1.5 ETH first key, 0.5 ETH subsequent keys) and the higher capital multiplier above ~2.5 ETH bonded capital appropriately reflect the reduced risk profile that DVT provides — lower downtime risk, slashing mitigation, and execution-layer rewards theft protection. The strict eligibility requirements (each participant must be ICS-approved, one IDVTC per person, approved DVT setup, DKG ceremony, monitoring enrollment) and the downgrade mechanism to default CSM type if requirements lapse are sound safeguards. Targeting the CSM v3 release in Q3 2026 gives adequate development and testing runway.
Lido DAO Ops Multisigs Policy 3.0
We voted For: We support this updated multisigs policy as a measured refresh of operational security standards that reflects the DAO’s current operational scale. The baseline requirements are sensible: minimum 3 signers, 50%+ signing threshold, 5+ signers for roles/permissions multisigs, 7+ signers for multisigs managing over $1M in assets, and hardware wallet requirements for multisigs managing roles or holding over $100K. The addition of the unlimited allowance to the Lido Aragon agent for token holdings exceeding $50K equivalent provides a recovery mechanism, and the key rotation procedures — including verification methods for lost or compromised keys — are practical without being overly burdensome. The transparency requirements (dedicated forum posts for each multisig, public signer verification, announced composition changes) maintain the DAO’s commitment to open governance. The carve-out for ad-hoc multisigs that don’t manage rights, roles, or DAO funds is a pragmatic allowance for operational flexibility. This is a straightforward governance housekeeping vote that we are happy to support.
Increase Lido Alliance BORG Operational Easy Track Limits to align with EGG
We voted For: We support raising the Easy Track limits for the Lido Alliance BORG Foundation operational multisig from $250K per 3 months to $5M per 6 months. This is a necessary operational alignment — under the approved 2026 Ecosystem Grant gRequest and the expanded GOOSE-3 mandate, the Foundation’s funding needs have scaled well beyond the original $250K quarterly limit, which was set when the Alliance’s scope was narrower. The current constraint prevents the Foundation from accessing the full funding within the intended operational timeframe, creating an unnecessary bottleneck for executing the DAO’s own approved strategy. Importantly, this does not introduce any new budget allocation or change transfer mechanisms; it simply raises the on-chain security limits to match the already-approved annual funding. The DAO’s oversight is preserved through Easy Track’s objection mechanism, and this aligns the operational rails with the strategic ambition the DAO has already voted for in GOOSE-3 and the EGG.
Vote 199
We voted For: We are in favor of these operational & technical vote implementations.
Vote 200*
We voted For: We are in favor of these operational & technical vote implementations.
Some further notes after chatting with our team and delegators: We appreciate the move toward more structured reporting and transparency from Lido’s various committees and working groups. The shift to clearer post-execution reporting — whether that’s the Growth Committee’s batch-by-batch disclosure for the LDO Accumulation Program, or the CMC’s commitment to forum-based communication for all operational actions — is a meaningful step forward. Having defined reporting cadences and explicit obligations (rather than ad-hoc updates) makes it significantly easier for delegates and tokenholders to evaluate execution quality and hold contributors accountable. We’d encourage this pattern to become the default across all DAO-funded operations.