# Pol Lanski Delegate Thread

**URL:** <https://research.lido.fi/t/pol-lanski-delegate-thread/8155>\
**Category:** Delegate Platform\
**Created:** [August 19, 2024, 2:20pm UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pol-lanski-delegate-thread/8155 "2024-08-19T14:20:55Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Showing post:** 21

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**Author:** ![Lanski](https://dub1.discourse-cdn.com/flex013/user_avatar/research.lido.fi/lanski/32/4846_2.png) [@Lanski](https://research.lido.fi/u/Lanski)\
**Post date:** [September 5, 2025, 4:09am UTC](https://research.lido.fi/t/pol-lanski-delegate-thread/8155/21 "2025-09-05T04:09:43Z")

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## [Nethermind NO Curated Validator set transfer to Twinstake](https://snapshot.box/#/s:lido-snapshot.eth/proposal/0x3f68e9bc69850da419211c3d9f0a76d006ed044abc0f8bc845bc1d1cf3db0a8d/discussion)

Forum post [here](https://research.lido.fi/t/nethermind-no-curated-validator-set-transfer-to-twinstake/10288)

### Vote: Approve the migration

### Rationale:

Nethermind is asking for the migration of around 7400 validators in the Curated Set from their infrastructure to Twinstake’s infrastructure.  
Twinstake is partly owned by Nethermind, and is a specialized staking provider. The idea is that both parties can focus on their core competencies: Nethermind can focus on client development and protocol research, and Twinstake on operating the validators.  
While I do think there is value in keeping Nethermind engaged, I understand their efforts to streamline their work. Moreover, Nethermind still retains DVT infrastructure on the SDVTM.

## [Vote #191](https://vote.lido.fi/vote/191)

Forum post [here](https://research.lido.fi/t/dual-governance-security-upgrade-plan-ragequit-eth-withdrawal-delay-fix/10543)

### Vote: Yes

### Rationale:

After one of the key upgrades for Lido DAO, Dual Governance, an anonymous white hat has reported a griefing vulnerability. A **griefing** attack or vulnerability is one where the attacker doesn’t necessarily gain anything _directly_, but it somehow breaks or stalls the normal functioning of the mechanism being attacked.  
The vulnerability requires more than 10% of stETH to want to RageQuit, which basically means that the Lido DAO has already done something crazy and a lot of stETH wants out of the system before this crazy thing comes into effect. This is unlikely, but if it were to happen, a function that is supposed to be called once and that extens the period that allows for Rage Quitting (exiting the protocol) could be called more than once, and hence extending that period potentially forever, causing a state of gridlock where the LDO proposal wouldn’t pass, nor the Rage Quitters could withdraw their ETH. If this would have happened, a solution (a protocol upgrade with the Tiebreaker committee) could be found, but delays and some chaos would have happened.  
The fix has been audited and this vote implements it.

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_[View the full topic](https://research.lido.fi/t/pol-lanski-delegate-thread/8155)._