The naive idea is that this committee could itself be automated in the future, considering the narrow scope.
This was just a suggestion of the types of principles the committee could enact.
The idea is that the discussions will still take place in the open with community participation, it is just one aspect of formalized governance that there would be a Committee with the ability to propose on-chain motions and the ability to enact them.
This proposal is considering a Committee with very narrow scope, with a very narrow mandate and with the aim to be automated in the future. Our view is that explicit principles are always better than implicit principles, or principles we invent along the way. It’s easy to ossify a rule that is clear even if some people disagree with it. It’s much harder to ossify a disagreement into a coherent principle.
But of course you are free to disagree, we appreciate your perspective on the topic.
were you not arround for the “DAO hack” ? the more stuff we do on chain, the more we open up from security threats. there will already be enough at stake with likely the entire defi ecosystem being built on top of stETH and wstETH going forward.
No, I take your point–more actions on chain = more attack surfaces. I think the mitigant is that the barrier to bringing any of these live is sufficiently high and the stakes similarly sufficiently high that only very simple motions and only extensively tested motions could make it to production. The idea of this committee is that it should do very very little but what it does do should be abundantly clear and if it makes it through to production, it is a candidate to being a forever rule encoded on-chain.
The other mitigant is that this is outside of the scope of the protocol itself, considering the scope is limited to Aragon treasury funds. It’s true stETH surplus accumulates in this treasury but the extent of the responsibility of the committee is limited to just that ringfence and no further.
Fundamentally I take your point, generally yes more attack surfaces equals more risk. This proposal asks token holders whether they weigh the benefits of more explicit principles, pathway to ossification, etc. over the risk of attack vectors emerging. The upside is not necessarily a monetary one but a choice to do more things in an ossified way rather than off-chain. Personally, I think when it comes to a path to taking human decision making out of the equation, the tradeoffs are generally worthwhile. But of course not at any cost (risk must be mitigated as much as possible etc.).
u realize we’re all about to go to the moon right?
banks are failing, macro back drop is kinda perfect, petro dollar is losing power (probably going to weaken currency soon like china did from 2010 to 2020), and lido is mission critical infrastructure to military grade encrypto p2p money.
the ldo devs managed to do all this which is incredible. introducing new attack surface at this point in time is just only downside. do this later on, not now. we’ve all been waiting for withdrawals to start smoothly and this backdrop since when eth whitepaper first dropped and vitalik talked about money legos …
the downside of this ‘ossification’ is so high at the current point in time
My personal opinion is that subcommittees are formed to mitigate the governance process falling into disarray. If everything is subject to mass voting, similar to a liquid democracy, nothing would come from it.
Often times not everyone has all the context to make an informed decision. The education required to make sure everyone is informed takes time. Time is extremely limited for everyone. Tradeoffs must be made.
So, having the DAO empower a subset of trusted people to have a narrow scope of power allows the DAO to scale operations ever so slightly in exchange for a portion of control being sacrificed. The DAO would never move things forward if everything had to be an on-chain vote and community decision.
Karpatkey and Steakhouse are trusted providers in the ecosystem who I have personally worked with over many months and dozens of conversations. The individuals mentioned are all actively contributing to the DAO and helping build the protocol.
If not this path, are you suggesting every single update to the treasury strategy goes to a vote?
If there is a black swan event, should we deliberate over a forum discussion and hope things don’t go to zero during that time?
The treasury has idle tokens that could be used to extend the operating runway without another sale that would most likely be contentious no matter what vesting was decided on.
how many of these people have been thru multiple bear markets?
ive been in crypto 10 years, never heard of any of these people. how many sold the top 1/3 of 2021 or early 2022 and can prove that?
i see above that they want to exclusively use cow swap. this means they will be in charge of money in some form. you are introducing new governance into mission critical infrastructure for ethereum. what updates to the treasury do there need to be? is there a CFO? should he not be in charge w some leaders of hte DAO?
like u really just want to hire people from the internet to manage the treasury for what is esseitally governance of ethereum? haha wow ya know?
jbeezy - i think this is ur first full crypo cycle, correct me if im wrong. why didnt u sell any part of the treasury before to secure run way? now we are supposed to trust ur judgment that these internet people are legitimate in managing the treasury?
and how do u know these people are not enemies that are infiltrating whats going on?
this is why vitalik has 4/7 votes of the ethereum foundation. b/c people are pieces of shit and u dont know what motives people have etc.
seems insane to do this at this point in time.
“The treasury has idle tokens that could be used to extend the operating runway without another sale that would most likely be contentious no matter what vesting was decided on.”
So why do you need a governance committee to deal w this? i dont understand why there isnt someone in charge. imagine the ethereum foundation every time they wanted to make a budget decision had to ask everyone in ethereum or 7 random people from the internet. woulda been a massive failure a long time ago
I think you’re missing a big part of what’s been explained here. These people will not have full control over the treasury. The DAO always retains full control of treasury, the only thing that will happen is that certain specific types of pre approved by the DAO actions with certain pre-approved parameters will be “proposable” by this committee, and then executed “optimistically” (like Easy Track) if there are no sufficient objections/vetos.
You’re arguing in circles. You’re asking for ‘someone in charge’, which is exactly what the committee is for (within constraints), but with safeguards in place, and then you’re racing across the spectrum and arguing ‘well they can do whatever they want’. You want to make ONE PERSON solely responsible and in charge for doing all this? That’s bananas.
how many cycles have these people been thru, why is that such a hard question to get an answer to? who are they? what is their crypto experience? are they beta cucks from trade fi that are gonna lose all the $$ in cow swap? u know this project has a rly poor history of financial decisions e.g. jump, alameda, 3ac, defiance, dragon flyetc. etc. all dumping every chance they get, going long eth @ $4,000 per eth LOL after vitalik sold publicly LOL!
so yeah, these are relevant question to be answered
and how do we know these are not malicious actors?
vitalik controls 4/7 because hes very public and we know he was day #1
this committee should at least be delayed long enough until Lido is sufficiently decentralized. its currently highly centralized around giant hedge funds like paradigm (7% control) for which they led the ftx $32 billion scam that almost brought down the industry in one fell swoop both economically and geo politically.
by bringing in actors for which the community has no background on and could be evil operatives, for which the only way they are kicked out is by the entire lido community voting them out, we put the DAO at risk … paradigm owns hte most coins and they have proven an incredible inability to parse ethics and good actors from their incredible hunger for more money and power
Sorry for pointing this out, but you pretty much can and are expected once the thing goes to snapshot dyor. Most (myself included) persons on the list can be cross-checked by this forum and public references.
If you squint hard enough, you’ll see exactly why “let’s just vote on everything” isn’t ideal path forward. Full DAO can’t vote on every movement, and given the guiding lines & safety checks are in place, committee would be a more nimble vehicle for operational decisions.
“Could you noobs trade crypto for profit” is curious question, but tangential to committee’s main task — do ops necessary to achieve goals outlined in the proposal, in case the DAO votes those are the principles and goals worth pursuing. You’ll notice there’s no “profit” or “100x” in goals, and for good reason.
Steakhouse provides financial services to Maker, ENS, and Lido. They have been active in Maker governance for quite some time. DYOR.
Karpatkey is a spin-out from Gnosis. I assume you know Gnosis and their suit of products. Gnosis is also one of the larger stETH holders and a close partner. Karpatkey was their internal treasury management team that did a good enough job to set out independently. DYOR.
The others are contributors to the protocol or have been actively conversing with contributors over a long period.