There’s no independent financial control over Labs, but DAO can change the leadership in the organizations if it wants to. The directors are also limited to acting in accordance with Purpose and Principles.
That’s not true: the option to change the devco would quite nuclear expensive in terms of disruption, but it’s completely realistic. All the levers in the Lido protocol are under ultimate DAO control and a group of determined activist tokenholders can boot Lido Labs out and replace with a different devco. There’s also a much less disruptive option of changing the directors of Lido Labs, only changing the leadership but not the whole contractor structure, assets or outside relationships. I do not think it’s good option, obviously, but it is an option on the table that is thoroughly maintained through Lido protocol development.
It could be better for tokenholder to shop around between a bunch of equally competent, eager and motivated devcos (though it leaves an open question of long term vs short term relationships) but building even of these with sufficient level of knowledge and professionalism is not easy.