Limits for LOL are increasing:
• stETH (from 6,000 to 8,000 in 6 months)
• stablecoins (up to $8M in 6 months)
What’s odd is that buybacks (which are purchased by this LOL) are calculated for 10,000, so there won’t be a quick buyback of tokens. The maximum is 8,000 over six months. It probably shouldn’t have been limited to six months.
Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot
Bitmine acquired node operator Pier Two and is now part of MAVAN (the largest ETH fund).
Standard procedure
Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot
It is proposed to replace Lido’s current temporary emergency contract termination system with GateSeal, a new permanent system called CircuitBreaker.
Essentially, this is a technical change to the contracts without changing their functionality, simply a transition to a permanent contract.
Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot
This is an implementation of the previously proposed automated buyback scheme.
Retained:
• implementation at >$40 million in revenue
• no more than $50,000 per day
• no more than $10 million per year
They removed the ETH=$3,000 limit, but according to their calculations, an average price of 2,700 per year generates 40 million in profit, so the chances of this system working anytime soon are extremely low.
Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot
A new classification system for Node Operators is proposed in CMv2.
Voting and decisions regarding these changes have already been made in previous months.
The following levels will be proposed (revenue percentages remain unchanged):
• Professional
• Professional Trusted
• Public Good
• Extra Effort (Lido support)
• Decentralization
• Intra-Operator DVT Cluster
Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot
What’s proposed
Nothing critical or controversial
Vote: FOR
Platform: Aragon
Galaxy Node Operator Infrastructure Update
It’s good that these changes are happening during the mandatory CMv2 migration.
Considering that the committee checked and found no risks, I also see no reason to vote against this decision.
Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot
A good solution is to remove the burden from the DAO on making decisions that are more technical and formal than those necessary for the development of the protocol.
Gives NEC more authority over bridge status decisions - it’s a right decision.
Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot
Wind Down Simple DVT Module Regular Clusters
It moves operators into a more sustainable and scalable framework, but ends an experiment with simple TDV earlier than initially planned.
There is one more advantage for this solution - it simplifies operations and reduces coordination overhead
Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot
Lido Labs Board Update: Appointment of Nemo as Director
This adds an active contributor with direct experience within the Lido ecosystem and doesn’t require any budget changes. A simple solution.
Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot
LIP-33: CMv2 and CSMv3 Architecture, Key Parameters, Rollout Plan
The architecture of the new CMv2 and CSMv3 modules is being approved.
• CMv2 introduces a semi-automated penalty system.
• CSMv3 increases the stake to 15% of TVL (currently 10%).
The possible validator balance for everyone is being increased to 2048 ETH.
At the same time, within CMv1, the Public Good Operator stake is being reduced from 4.5% to 4.0% to encourage the transition to v2.
Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot
LIP-35: Staking Router v3 Architecture and Key Parameters
Upgrading to Staking Router v3 (SRv3)
The main change is that staking is now measured based on ETH, not the number of validators, and new modules are also being prepared for migration.
Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot
What’s proposed:
Snapshot execution:
Forum requests:
3. Rename Node Operator Pier Two to MAVAN
4. Deactivate Node Operator Chorus One
In fact, this is the implementation of what was already decided.
Vote: FOR
Platform: Aragon
0x02 CSM: New Permissionless Module Launch
A separate permissionless module for validators with 0x02 credentials. This was left out of LIP-33 for a separate rollout.
Per 32 ETH of balance the bond is 4.8x lower than in 0x01 CSM. I checked the calculations, everything matches.
32 ETH for the first key is a lot for a permissionless module. Small operators stay in 0x01 CSM.
Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot
Adopt the CMv2 Penalty Framework
A documented process for how the CMC assesses penalties for CMv2 operators. Case by case, penalties are compensatory, and downtime taken to avoid slashing is judged on the risk avoided.
The CMC locks the bond but the burn only goes through Easy Track with the 0.5% objection window, so it cannot take the money alone. Worth stating more clearly than the text does.
The part I don’t like: the CMC can change the loss calculation methodology without a DAO vote, and the methodology is the penalty size. A DAO vote is only required if a change materially affects the scope of penalties, but it looks like the CMC judges that itself. Easy Track is what makes this acceptable, not the mandate.
Vote: FOR
Platform: Snapshot