Establish a Public Delegate Platform and Delegate Incentivization Program

Proposals
62

Hi all, I know it’s ironic given I’m a Lido delegate myself but I think that the current delegate model is not very efficient and could be improved

  1. Most decisions (almost everything voted on snapshot, a good exception is this proposal given it requests funding) should be made by Lido’s core contributors who are experts in the different topics and work full-time on them
  2. Only really important decisions (a threshold could be anything voted on Aragon) should require delegates to weight in

If you implement the above, you just need a few (incentivised) delegates and you maximise the value of their contributions.

I’m not against the incentives, but I think that this is a good opportunity to debate this so I’m leaning towards voting “no” to trigger this conversation.

2 Likes
63

Hi everyone,

We’ve voted favourably on the proposal since we support having an incentivized cohort of delegates that contribute to the protocols growth and security. Nonethless, with the pilot having met the expectations, we think that this new iteration should step up and, as @marcbcs mentioned, trigger a more granular conversation on how/which contributions are expected from delegates, and more so considering the programs budget vs. it’s criteria.

Some thoughts on this end:

  • The ≥70% of votes is certainly subpar as a flat requirement when considering that voting is the bare minimum activity a delegate should uphold. Of course there might be extraordinary situations that prevent this from happening but with the #184 this should be reconsidered into a higher requirement or establish a tiered system.

  • As en example, @Tane’s contribution on the #184 is what is set to be expected as an incentivized delegate and not as a one-off contribution and certainly not a “grant”. In other DIPs this is represented as Bonus Points or even setting proposal presentations as requirements. But the point here is to foster delegate activity within the program itself.

  • VP is always tricky to handle due to it’s dynamism but the idea of the program should be to bootstrap that VP against the delegates activity. Having a single-day endorsement into the program doesn’t seem to contribute to that end. The endgame is always for circulating supply to become delegated supply and a delegates program should look after that happening within it’s design. As mentioned, having an avg VP holding or some other approach could be interesting to explore.

  • The current design shows a fair amount of case-by-case situations that the Oversight Committee resolves whereas the aim should be to reduce discretionality as much as possible. This is shown by the VP fluctuation, and the lack of “activity” or “contributions” standards or rubrics. In that way, discussions would be around the set parameters that allocate the delegates incentive and not about the Oversights Committee judgement. There are several benchmarks on which this is present and we are more than happy to share.

To finalize, the point here is to map out contributions/skills/tasks that the DAO and community values and factor them into the program in order to have a more robust program that captures the nuances that govenance naturally has. Of course simplicity is valuable, but if there’s one thing that Lido has is it’s capacity to navigate complexity.

7 Likes
64

Snapshot vote ended

Thank you all who participated in the Extend Delegate Incentivization Program through 2025 Snapshot, the proposal passed! :folded_hands:
The results are:
For: 68.8M LDO
Against: 79.9k LDO

2 Likes
66

Just some additional post-snapshot feedback from us, as we voted FOR.

We support the extension of this program. From our point of view it has demonstrably improved delegate engagement, brought greater transparency to voting activity, and strengthened Lido’s decentralized governance base as well as accountability of proposers and committee members. The revised structure—lowering the LDO threshold, aligning evaluations to calendar quarters, and maintaining a cost-conscious budget—shows maturity and operational focus.

We also want to acknowledge that this program was a factor in our own decision to step up as an active delegate. The clear framework, public expectations, and emphasis on contribution quality creates a credible path for specialized entities similar to Nansen to engage meaningfully. We believe this approach will continue to attract more domain experts—whether in validator operations, protocol security, DeFi integration, or analytics—which will raise the caliber of governance outcomes across the board.

For the roadmap and to build on what’s already working, we suggest considering the following enhancements:

  1. Incentive Weighting Based on Quality of Participation – Move beyond voting frequency and attendance. Reward thoughtful input, rationale posting, and constructive engagement on high-impact proposals. Some of the significant work we’ve seen from independent groups like Blockworks Research or Gauntlet could be an example here.
  2. Public Reporting Templates – A simple standardized format for delegate disclosures would improve accountability and help tokenholders compare performance more clearly.
  3. Mentorship or Contributor Track – Allocate ~10–15% of the budget to support emerging governance contributors below the LDO threshold. This could foster a stronger delegate pipeline and allow for selective outsourcing of research and proposal analysis.
  4. Delegate Q&A Sessions – Quarterly AMAs or briefings with top delegates would improve context sharing, transparency, and governance literacy.

The program is directionally correct and proving its worth. With continued refinement, it can serve as a blueprint for sustainable and successful governance model.

5 Likes
67

Delegate Incentivization Program — Q2 notes

Q2 has concluded, and the committee is now preparing the evaluation report. As part of that process, I want to share a few updates on scope, committee composition, and how feedback is being integrated.

Eligibility snapshot set to May 21

To determine which delegates are eligible for Q2, the committee will use May 21 as the snapshot date. This is the date of the next vote after the DIP extension passed quorum on Snapshot. It marks the point where the program became active in practice.

This snapshot best reflects the program’s goal: attracting and supporting delegates with real, consistent voting power. Delegates with ≥1M LDO delegated on Snapshot or Aragon as of May 21 will be included in the Q2 evaluation.

No change to committee composition

Although the original proposal included a planned rotation on the Agora side, internal changes within the Agora team led to a decision to keep the current members in place. @zcf and @Marcela will remain part of the oversight committee for Q2–Q4 2025, ensuring continuity and shared context from earlier quarters.

Feedback already shaping next iterations

We’ve received thoughtful input from several delegates and contributors. In particular, @Nansen comments helped crystallize areas for refinement, such as focusing more on quality of participation and introducing standardized reporting. Thank you for the high-quality input. Thanks to everyone who has helped shape the program so far. The Q2 report is in progress and will be published soon.

11 Likes
68

Delegate Oversight Committee Quarterly Report ( Q2, 2025)

TL;DR:

Seven delegates qualified for Q2 incentives based on participation and delegation. Each will receive 12,929 LDO (from a $75K quarterly pool at a 90-day TWAP of $0.8287).

Overview

The Delegate Oversight Committee assessed delegate activity during Q2: April 1 – June 30, 2025.

Since the vote to extend the Delegation Incentivization Program concluded on April 28, the eligibility snapshot was taken at the start of the next vote, May 21. This snapshot reflects the point at which the updated program became active in practice, ensuring that all delegates had a fair opportunity to adjust to the new eligibility threshold, including taking one more step to secure additional delegation if needed.

Eligibility Summary

  • Delegation threshold: ≥1M LDO (on Snapshot or Aragon) as of May 21.
  • Voting participation: ≥70% participation on both Aragon and Snapshot.
  • Community engagement: Constructive, consistent input in governance, including feedback, reasoning, and presence.

All seven delegates met the criteria and qualify for equal rewards.

Performance Evaluation

Delegate Aragon Snapshot Community & Governance Contributions Eligible
Anthony Leuts 5/5 (100%) 10/10 (100%) High-value contributor: sharp on-chain vote analysis, active in forum discussions, consistent public support of Lido initiatives across channels. Provide thoughtful feedback to contributors. :white_check_mark:
Nansen 5/5 (100%) 10/10 (100%) Responsive, insightful, provides ongoing strategic input. Maintains regular contact with the team. :white_check_mark:
polar 5/5 (100%) 10/10 (100%) Detailed reasoning, participation in product/strategic interviews, strong community presence. :white_check_mark:
Lanski 5/5 (100%) 10/10 (100%) Regular forum participant, transparent voter, drives attention to key proposals across channels. :white_check_mark:
Wintermute 5/5 (100%) 10/10 (100%) Long-time Lido participant, fast and consistent voter, willing to engage deeper in expert domains. :white_check_mark:
cp0x 5/5 (100%) 10/10 (100%) Trusted, impartial voice. Joined the set this round. Shares cross-domain expertise and offers open, thoughtful feedback. :white_check_mark:
PGov 4/5 (80%) 10/10 (100%) Snapshot-only delegate. Maintains voting transparency via forum threads. :white_check_mark:

Sources: https://dune.com/lido/lido-delegations, https://snapshot.box/#/s:lido-snapshot.eth, https://vote.lido.fi/

Notes:

Reward Allocation

  • Quarterly pool: $75,000
  • 90-Day TWAP (June 30): 1 LDO = $0.8287 (source)
  • Total LDO distributed: ≈ 90,503 LDO
  • Per delegate: 90,503 ÷ 7 ≈ 12,929 LDO

Next Steps

  • Rewards for Q2 will be distributed till the end of August.
  • Dune dashboard update: adds quarterly participation tracking
  • Q3 evaluation period runs from July 1 to September 30. Snapshot date for Q3 eligibility is July 1st.
  • Delegates must maintain ≥70% participation to remain eligible.

Program Improvements in Progress

Following feedback received during the vote to extend the program, the Oversight Committee is preparing operational improvements. Concrete updates will be published by the end of Q3.

The program goal remains unchanged:
The core objective of the Delegation Incentivization Program is to grow active voting power within the Lido protocol. This remains a strategic priority. To date, the program has been effective in attracting and retaining high-quality delegates with meaningful voting power (over 20M delegated to insentivized delegates) and consistent participation.

Next focus: operational clarity and contributor enablement.
Planned improvements include:

  • Formalizing expectations – We’ll define and publish the types of input that are valuable (e.g., forum engagement, proposal reviews, risk analysis) and how delegates can contribute meaningfully across domains.
  • Richer delegate profiles – The Committee will enhance reporting to include more context on each delegate’s focus areas, past contributions, and expertise.

We recognize that thresholds like 70% voting are minimums, not indicators of strong performance. Delegates are expected to contribute beyond this baseline, as they do now, and the qualitative aspect of their contributions is also subjectively evaluated in the “Community & Governance Contributions” column of the Performance Evaluation table above.

The Oversight Committee continues to collect feedback and welcomes input on standard-setting, eligibility logic, and contributor enablement.

13 Likes
69

@Jenya_K thank you for this update and great job!
I’d like to tell that LEGO has transferred Q2 pool for the Delegate Oversight Commitee.

4 Likes
70

Incentives have been sent to delegates. The Delegate Oversight Committee apologizes for the unforeseen delay this quarter and will make every effort to send incentives promptly in the future.

4 Likes
71

Delegate Oversight Committee Quarterly Report ( Q3, 2025)

TL;DR:

All seven active delegates met participation and engagement criteria. Each will receive 9,493 LDO (from a $75K quarterly pool at a 90-day TWAP of $1.1286). Most provided consistent, accountable input in governance and transparent reporting. While resource constraints delayed deeper program improvements, delegate performance remains strong, and DAO governance continues to function effectively.

Overview

The Delegate Oversight Committee assessed delegate activity during Q3: July 1 – September 30, 2025.

Eligibility Summary

  • Delegation threshold: ≥1M LDO (on Snapshot or Aragon) as of July 1.
  • Voting participation: ≥70% participation on both Aragon and Snapshot.
  • Community engagement: Constructive, consistent input in governance, including feedback, reasoning, and presence.

All seven delegates met the criteria and qualify for equal rewards.

Performance Evaluation

Delegate Aragon Snapshot Community & Governance Contributions Eligible
Anthony Leuts 3/3 (100%) 6/6 (100%) Consistently active, detail-oriented, and transparent. Provides thorough reasoning and maintains public accountability across discussions. :white_check_mark:
Nansen 3/3 (100%) 6/6 (100%) Offers steady, high-value feedback on changes. Reliable presence on the forum; commentary often helps clarify and refine proposals. :white_check_mark:
polar 3/3 (100%) 6/6 (100%) Raises uncomfortable but necessary questions and keeps focus on long-term sustainability. :white_check_mark:
Lanski 3/3 (100%) 6/6 (100%) Demonstrates consistent engagement, thoughtful input, and responsibility in decision-making. Actively ensures accountability in governance processes. :white_check_mark:
Wintermute 3/3 (100%) 6/6 (100%) Maintains consistent participation and transparent in rationale :white_check_mark:
cp0x 3/3 (100%) 6/6(100%) Outstanding engagement. Deeply analyzes proposals, challenges assumptions, and provides feedback. :white_check_mark:
PGov 3/3 (100%) 6/6 (100%) Steady and constructive presence. Offers clear reasoning, aligns with community priorities, and contributes consistently. :white_check_mark:

Sources: https://dune.com/lido/lido-delegations, https://snapshot.box/#/s:lido-snapshot.eth, https://vote.lido.fi/

Notes: Wintermute lost their delegation on July 30. Since eligibility is based on delegation as of July 1, and Wintermute remained engaged in governance throughout the quarter, they are still eligible for the incentive payment this quarter. Eligibility criteria may be revised to consider mid-quarter changes in delegation at the next proposal to renew the incentive program.

Reward Allocation

  • Quarterly pool: $75,000
  • 90-Day TWAP (September 30): 1 LDO = $1.1286 (source)
  • Total LDO distributed: ≈ 66,454 LDO
  • Per delegate: 66,454 ÷ 7 ≈ 9,493 LDO

Next Steps

  • Rewards for Q3 will be distributed within three weeks of this report.
  • Q4 evaluation period runs from October 1 to December 31. Snapshot date for Q4 eligibility is October 1.
  • Delegates must maintain ≥70% participation and ≥1M LDO delegation to remain eligible.

Program Improvements in Progress

The committee continues to refine the oversight framework and clarify expectations for delegates. Progress on deeper profiling and updated conduct guidelines was slower than planned. The committee believes this does not materially affect program effectiveness: delegate engagement remains high, and DAO operations are stable.

The committee also reviewed the quarterly qualitative feedback section and determined it is no longer useful, as delegate behavior is largely stable and the commentary has become repetitive. Going forward, that section will be removed. The committee will instead monitor qualitative contributions directly, address issues with delegates directly as needed, and, if problems persist, reconsider their participation. Delegates and community members are encouraged to flag concerns to help maintain accountability.

As the current incentive program concludes at year-end, the committee plans to propose an extension alongside an update—including reflections, new structural ideas, and concrete improvements—closer to that renewal discussion.

9 Likes
72

I’d like to become a public delegate.
I plan to receive delegations soon and publicly post my assessment of the votes in my delegate thread.
I believe my perspective will contribute to healthy discussion and diversity.

1 Like
73

I agree with the overall direction of this proposal. The Delegate Incentivization Program has clearly improved engagement, transparency, and the quality of governance participation within Lido. I especially support the shift toward valuing the quality of contributions (analysis, discussion, rationale) beyond simple voting metrics.

Question: Are there plans to introduce more standardized and objective evaluation criteria to assess delegate contributions, in order to reduce reliance on discretionary judgments by the Oversight Committee?

74

After you start publishing your assessments and start voting, you’ll be added in the Delegate UI.

1 Like
75

Do you have smth specific in mind? Any good examples?

76

Not yet, I don’t have anything specific to propose at this stage. I’d like to reflect on this further, and if a good example or concrete idea comes to mind, I’ll make sure to follow up.

Appreciate you raising the question.

77

Great point @pjhnocegood. We’ve actually been developing a specific framework solve this exact gap (Objective Quality vs. Subjective Review).

Instead of relying on subjective committee reviews, we would advocate for a more peer-review based system. We actually are building on this framework, it’s called the Peer Recognition Score (PRS). It measures the quality of a delegate’s reasoning based on how other engaged delegates (weighted by their reputation/VP) interact with it.

We aim to introduces a standardized way to score ‘quality’ by leveraging the social signal of other delegates and forum users (weighted by their reputation/VP), drastically reducing the manual workload and subjectivity review from the Oversight Committee.

It’s currently experimental and a work-in-progress so any feedback would be highly appreciated.

3 Likes
78

Delegates who are recognized as worthy by the real owners of the organization (the tokenholders) absolutely deserve compensation for their time and effort. That said, I don’t think it’s right to completely ignore the contributions of smaller delegates who fall below an arbitrary threshold set by a committee.

A DAO’s delegate set is fundamentally different from a traditional board of directors. There are no physical meetings or hard capacity constraints. In an online organization, all delegates can contribute meaningfully and be compensated accordingly. This is actually one of the biggest advantages of running a DAO, and artificially limiting the number of compensated delegates is unnecessary and risks wasting valuable potential.

A more reasonable approach would be to distribute incentives proportionally to the amount of delegated tokens on each delegate. If simple proportional distribution overly dilutes compensation for top delegates, a weighted approach could be used, for example, distributing rewards based on the square of delegated tokens, to preserve stronger incentives for larger delegates while still including smaller ones.

I also don’t believe it’s logical or rational for a committee to evaluate delegates using a metric-based scoring system. Delegate “quality” cannot be measured objectively or concretely. A single concise forum post can be more valuable than dozens of lengthy ones. An abstention vote can carry more signal than many affirmative votes. (As a side note, abstention isn’t even supported in Lido’s governance interfaces today, the only way to abstain is by not voting at all.)

This situation is very different from Ethereum’s validator incentives, which can be enforced through clear, quantitative, and on-chain signals. Delegate contributions don’t fit into that kind of measurable framework.

In my view, incentive distribution should be simple: proportional to delegated token amounts, nothing more. Any evaluation of delegate “quality” should be left entirely to tokenholders through delegation decisions, not to committees or subjective scoring systems.

As an additional note: ENS DAO’s recent pilot program is the most reasonable model I’ve seen across the industry so far. I hope it becomes a reference point for DAOs.

2 Likes
79

I completely agree that a single insightful thread is worth more than ten “filler” posts, and that a “delegate quality cannot be measured objectively” by a static rubric. However, with regards to using token weighting is the ultimate source of truth, it tends to be a lagging indicator. A delegate might write that perfect concise post today, but not see a change in delegation for months. It also disregards the efforts of delegates trying to reach the benchmark of 1M LDO tokens. (since this is the minimum to be a recognized and paid delegate)

If we agree that committees shouldn’t judge quality, but we also want to incentivize active contributors who might not have massive delegation yet, the question becomes: who is best positioned to recognize that value?

80

Delegate Oversight Committee Quarterly Report (Q4, 2025)

TL;DR:

All six active delegates met the participation and engagement requirements. Each will receive 16,276 LDO from the $75k quarterly pool. This was the final quarter of the current DAO-approved program; an updated proposal will be brought to the forum soon. Thank you to all delegates for the depth, consistency, and quality of input during a demanding governance cycle.

Overview

The Delegate Oversight Committee reviewed delegate performance for Q4 2025 (October 1 – December 31), focusing on voting activity, delegation thresholds, and quality of governance participation.

Q4 concluded a cycle with elevated strategic load and above-baseline governance complexity.

Eligibility Summary

  • Delegation threshold: ≥1M LDO (on Snapshot or Aragon) as of October 1.
  • Voting participation: ≥70% participation on both Aragon and Snapshot.
  • Community engagement: Constructive, consistent input in governance, including feedback, reasoning, and presence.

All eligible delegates satisfied the criteria and qualified for equal rewards.

Performance Evaluation

Delegate Aragon Snapshot Eligible
Anthony Leuts 4/4 (100%) 10/10 (100%) :white_check_mark:
Nansen 3/4 (75%) 10/10 (100%) :white_check_mark:
polar 4/4 (100%) 10/10 (100%) :white_check_mark:
Lanski 4/4 (100%) 10/10 (100%) :white_check_mark:
cp0x 5/4 (100%) 10/10(100%) :white_check_mark:
PGov 3/4 (100%) 10/10 (100%) :white_check_mark:

Delegate engagement remained strong across the board. Feedback quality, accountability, and ongoing dialogue with contributors stayed consistently high throughout the quarter.

Notes

  • PGov temporarily dropped below the delegation threshold on Nov 4, 2025, but restored delegation before quarter end and remained eligible.
  • One non-actionable onchain test vote was excluded from assessment. cp0x still participated; this was recorded as a positive signal of attentiveness.
  • ~8M LDO of new voting power was attracted into delegation during the quarter.
  • Kuzmich crossed the delegation threshold at the end of December. They also demonstrated consistently high involvement and will be considered if the program is extended.

Sources: https://dune.com/lido/lido-delegations, Snapshot, https://vote.lido.fi/

Reward Allocation

  • Quarterly pool: $75,000
  • 90-Day TWAP (December 31): 1 LDO = $0.7680 (source)
  • Total LDO distributed: ≈ 97,656 LDO
  • Per delegate: 98,555÷ 6 ≈ 16,276 LDO

Next Steps

  • Q4 rewards will be distributed within three weeks of this report.
  • The public delegate set will be reviewed, with inactive delegates removed.
  • A proposal to extend and update the program will be published on the forum mid Q1, 2026.
  • The extension will likely include Q1, ensuring active delegates in early 2026 are also rewarded.
  • Ongoing eligibility will continue to require ≥70% participation and ≥1M LDO delegation.
4 Likes
81

Delegate Incentivization Program 2.0

upd: 2 Mar, 11:11 CET

TL;DR

This proposal seeks DAO approval to make the Delegate Incentivization Program a standing governance mechanism, funded under the approved 2026 EGG request, with no additional funding required. The proposed program auto-renews annually, pays delegates in USD-denominated stablecoins, removes gas reimbursements, and migrates the operational and payment rails to the Lido Labs Foundation. This extension does not introduce any additional funding for 2026.

Motivation

This proposal extends the previous Delegate Incentivization Program (DIP) as a permanent governance mechanism, supporting expert, long-term-aligned delegates trusted by LDO holders, unless and until Lido DAO explicitly decides the program is no longer needed.

Today, 31M LDO are delegated on Aragon (source), part of that delegated to public delegates. Delegates participate in nearly 100% of votes, review on-chain proposals, track governance timelines, provide structured feedback to contributors, and actively represent Lido DAO interests across public channels.

This group forms an important layer of Lido DAO’s decision-making process. Preserving its capacity, continuity, and sustainability is critical for:

  • stable quorum formation,
  • predictable governance outcomes,
  • reliable contribution of delegated LDO to governance decisions,
  • scalable delegation growth without sacrificing decision quality.

The last year of the program demonstrated that delegate incentivization materially improves governance reliability, with every quorum achieved involving active delegate participation. DIP 2.0 transitions the program from a time-bound experiment into a durable DAO primitive.

Scope of Changes

DIP 2.0 introduces the following updates:

  • The program is open-ended and remains active unless and until Lido DAO decides otherwise. The DAO may terminate, pause, or modify the program at any time via governance, including by discontinuing or not renewing its funding.
  • 2026 Program funding moves under the 2026 Ecosystem Grant gRequest.
  • Budget requests are handled via the standard annual EGG process going forward.
  • To be eligible for compensation delegate should hold ≥1M LDO delegated on both Snapshot and Aragon (with the two quarter transition period).
  • Compensation switches from LDO (TWAP) to USD-denominated stablecoins, to improve budgeting predictability and reduce short-term volatility, while long-term alignment is maintained through delegated LDO.
  • Eligibility snapshot timing updated: delegation snapshots now occur on the 15th day of the middle month on the day of each quarter, first voting slot actually begins, so that the eligibility determination point better aligns with the quarterly voting cadence, replacing the pilot’s 1st-day snapshot
  • Gas reimbursement is discontinued due to significantly lower Ethereum transaction costs.
  • Agora no longer participates in the committee.
  • Qualitative reporting simplified; focus shifts to direct monitoring and intervention.

Program Conditions

  • Total 2026 annual budget (stays unchanged): up to $300,000(determined and approved as part of the annual grant request to the Foundation.
  • Quarterly cap for 2026: up to $75,000, representing one quarter of the approved annual budget.
  • Future-year budgets: the annual budget for each subsequent year will be defined and approved at the time of the corresponding grant request (EGG).
  • Maximum compensation per delegate: $15,000 per quarter.
  • Distribution model: All eligible delegates receive equal portions of the quarterly pool.

Eligibility and Merit-Based Criteria

To qualify for incentives in a given quarter, a delegate must:

  • Hold ≥1M LDO delegated on both Snapshot and Aragon.

    Eligibility Snapshot date: 15th day of the middle month of each quarter

    (February, May, August, November).

    Transition period: Given that the current program required delegation on only one platform, the Snapshot or Aragon requirement will remain in effect for Q1 and Q2 2026. Starting from Q3 2026, delegation on both Snapshot and Aragon will be required.

  • Be the first delegate selected by a delegator address in a quarter (same timestamp that the eligibility snapshot has): delegated LDO from an address counts toward the ≥1M threshold only for the first delegate in a quarter, as an anti-sybil measure, if multiple delegations are made.

  • Participate in ≥70% of all votes during the quarter.

  • Maintain an active public delegate thread, including:

    • vote rationales,
    • feedback,
    • participation in proposal discussions,
    • on-chain votes verification.

Qualitative Oversight

Based on last year’s experience, the committee concluded that formal qualitative scoring has become low-signal and repetitive.

Changes in DIP 2.0:

  • Quarterly qualitative reports are removed.
  • The Delegate Oversight Committee monitors delegate behavior continuously.
  • Issues are addressed directly with delegates.
  • Persistent problems may result in removal from the incentivization program, subject to a decision of the committee.

Delegates and community members are encouraged to flag concerns to support accountability.

Program Process and Timeline

  • Eligibility snapshot: at the 15th day of the middle month of each quarter

(February, May, August, November).

  • Quantitative performance review (Voting Power, participation, reasoning): conducted at quarter end.

  • Incentive distribution:

    executed during the following quarter, after publication of:

    • voting participation,
    • eligibility confirmation,
    • equalized payout calculation.

Operational Rails and Execution

The Delegate Incentivization Program operates as a grant-based program, which Delegate Oversight Committee multisig has been adopted by the Lido Labs Foundation, following Lido DAO approval (see here).

Therefore, funding and execution of the program will follow and be subject to Lido Labs Foundation’s standard payment procedures, including applicable sanctions and AML checks. No individual agreements with delegates are required. Participation in the program and fulfillment of the published eligibility criteria are sufficient to qualify for incentive distribution, which payment is then subject to the above mentioned checks.

No changes to delegate-facing requirements, eligibility criteria, or incentive structure result from this transition.

Delegate Oversight Committee

The Delegate Oversight Committee consists of members from the

Lido DAO Contributors Group.

External facilitation (e.g., Agora) was valuable in the early stages but is no longer required for a mature, ongoing program.
Committee composition:
Rotate:
Charlie to @Kate_Alekseeva
Marcela to @nikita.p
Keep the current 3/5 setup.

Committee Responsibilities

  • Maintain the public delegate registry.
  • Determining delegate eligibility based on the approved criteria,
  • Publish quarterly transparency reports.
  • Submitting the list of eligible wallet addresses for payout,
  • Coordinating with Lido Foundations to execute distributions under established internal procedures.
  • Address delegate performance issues when required.

Summary

  • The program auto-renews every year.
  • DIP 2.0 is funded under the existing 2026 grant request.
  • No additional funding approval for 2026 is required.
  • Parameter changes or program termination require a dedicated DAO vote.
  • Annual funding will be proposed as part of the EGG proposal each year.
  • Eligibility snapshot timing updated: delegation snapshots now occur on the 15th day of the middle month of each quarter, replacing the pilot’s 1st-day snapshot
  • Gas reimbursement is discontinued due to significantly lower Ethereum transaction costs.
  • Agora no longer participates in the committee.
  • Qualitative reporting simplified; focus shifts to direct monitoring and intervention.

Next Steps

Snapshot vote: this proposal will be submitted to a Snapshot vote for Lido DAO approval.

Program continuation: if approved, DIP 2.0 switches to the updated mandate without interruption.

Reporting: the Delegate Oversight Committee will report on a recurring quarterly cadence in accordance with the program.

8 Likes
Pol Lanski Delegate Thread
82

Makes sense without over-engineering anything. Thanks!

2 Likes