Hi all, I know it’s ironic given I’m a Lido delegate myself but I think that the current delegate model is not very efficient and could be improved
Most decisions (almost everything voted on snapshot, a good exception is this proposal given it requests funding) should be made by Lido’s core contributors who are experts in the different topics and work full-time on them
Only really important decisions (a threshold could be anything voted on Aragon) should require delegates to weight in
If you implement the above, you just need a few (incentivised) delegates and you maximise the value of their contributions.
I’m not against the incentives, but I think that this is a good opportunity to debate this so I’m leaning towards voting “no” to trigger this conversation.
We’ve voted favourably on the proposal since we support having an incentivized cohort of delegates that contribute to the protocols growth and security. Nonethless, with the pilot having met the expectations, we think that this new iteration should step up and, as @marcbcs mentioned, trigger a more granular conversation on how/which contributions are expected from delegates, and more so considering the programs budget vs. it’s criteria.
Some thoughts on this end:
The ≥70% of votes is certainly subpar as a flat requirement when considering that voting is the bare minimum activity a delegate should uphold. Of course there might be extraordinary situations that prevent this from happening but with the #184 this should be reconsidered into a higher requirement or establish a tiered system.
As en example, @Tane’s contribution on the #184 is what is set to be expected as an incentivized delegate and not as a one-off contribution and certainly not a “grant”. In other DIPs this is represented as Bonus Points or even setting proposal presentations as requirements. But the point here is to foster delegate activity within the program itself.
VP is always tricky to handle due to it’s dynamism but the idea of the program should be to bootstrap that VP against the delegates activity. Having a single-day endorsement into the program doesn’t seem to contribute to that end. The endgame is always for circulating supply to become delegated supply and a delegates program should look after that happening within it’s design. As mentioned, having an avg VP holding or some other approach could be interesting to explore.
The current design shows a fair amount of case-by-case situations that the Oversight Committee resolves whereas the aim should be to reduce discretionality as much as possible. This is shown by the VP fluctuation, and the lack of “activity” or “contributions” standards or rubrics. In that way, discussions would be around the set parameters that allocate the delegates incentive and not about the Oversights Committee judgement. There are several benchmarks on which this is present and we are more than happy to share.
To finalize, the point here is to map out contributions/skills/tasks that the DAO and community values and factor them into the program in order to have a more robust program that captures the nuances that govenance naturally has. Of course simplicity is valuable, but if there’s one thing that Lido has is it’s capacity to navigate complexity.
Just some additional post-snapshot feedback from us, as we voted FOR.
We support the extension of this program. From our point of view it has demonstrably improved delegate engagement, brought greater transparency to voting activity, and strengthened Lido’s decentralized governance base as well as accountability of proposers and committee members. The revised structure—lowering the LDO threshold, aligning evaluations to calendar quarters, and maintaining a cost-conscious budget—shows maturity and operational focus.
We also want to acknowledge that this program was a factor in our own decision to step up as an active delegate. The clear framework, public expectations, and emphasis on contribution quality creates a credible path for specialized entities similar to Nansen to engage meaningfully. We believe this approach will continue to attract more domain experts—whether in validator operations, protocol security, DeFi integration, or analytics—which will raise the caliber of governance outcomes across the board.
For the roadmap and to build on what’s already working, we suggest considering the following enhancements:
Incentive Weighting Based on Quality of Participation – Move beyond voting frequency and attendance. Reward thoughtful input, rationale posting, and constructive engagement on high-impact proposals. Some of the significant work we’ve seen from independent groups like Blockworks Research or Gauntlet could be an example here.
Public Reporting Templates – A simple standardized format for delegate disclosures would improve accountability and help tokenholders compare performance more clearly.
Mentorship or Contributor Track – Allocate ~10–15% of the budget to support emerging governance contributors below the LDO threshold. This could foster a stronger delegate pipeline and allow for selective outsourcing of research and proposal analysis.
Delegate Q&A Sessions – Quarterly AMAs or briefings with top delegates would improve context sharing, transparency, and governance literacy.
The program is directionally correct and proving its worth. With continued refinement, it can serve as a blueprint for sustainable and successful governance model.
