@zcf Charlie is looking to join the Delegate Oversight Committee Multisig with address 0x9f89273A038c2B134713dE41b1947217a8d21464
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Great news! The Delegate Oversight Committee multisig is up and running! 
Address: 0x13600b9AEE86f8254969918B1E9ae6ea091b8727
Quorum: 3/5
It will be added to the Lido docs soon 
Delegate Oversight Committee Quarterly Report (19 September – 19 December)
Committee Members: Jenya_K, kadmil, Olga_Kniazeva, Charlie Feng, Marcela Ochoa
TL;DR
- The Delegate Oversight Committee confirmed that all 7 delegates met the 2M LDO on-chain delegation threshold and showed active participation to qualify for incentives.
- All 7 eligible delegates will receive 7,810 LDO each for Q1 of the pilot.
- The next set of eligible delegates will be determined on 23rd of January 2025.
- Lessons learned: We will continue prioritizing on-chain delegations, implement stricter qualitative oversight and communicate deadlines more clearly.
- Next steps: Eligibility for Q2 incentives will be determined at the start of the next voting cycle.
Program Context
The committee considered only on-chain delegations this quarter, as the initial rules were too complex. Anyone delegated over 2M LDO on Aragon qualified, and we plan to keep this simplified approach going forward.
Delegation and Evaluation Criteria
Quantitative:
- Voting Participation: At least 70%
- Delegation Threshold: Over 2M LDO delegated on-chain
Qualitative:
- Community Engagement: Meaningful input in proposal discussions
Delegate Performance Table (19 Sept – 19 Dec)
| Delegate | Aragon Participation | Snapshot Participation | Community Feedback |
|---|---|---|---|
| @Nansen | 4/4 — 100% | 17/17 — 100% | Strong overall participation. Provided clear, timely vote rationales and engaged actively in forum discussions |
| @Ignas | 4/4 — 100% | 16/16 — 100% | Very active, offering transparent vote rationales and engaged on discussions a lot |
| @polar | 4/4 — 100% | 17/17 — 100% | Excellent engagement. Shared detailed, high-quality feedback on proposals and consistently delivered timely insights |
| @Lanski | 4/4 — 100% | 17/17 — 100% | Excellent engagement. Provided thorough, expert-level feedback and regularly contributed detailed rationale |
| @BlockworksResearch | 3/4 — 75% | 10/16 — 62,5% | Participated in discussions and offered rationale on select proposals. Took some time to onboard and became more active toward the end of the quarter |
| @notjamiedimon | 4/4 — 100% | 17/17 — 100% | Participated in discussions and regularly provided vote rationales |
| @degentradingLSD | 4/4 — 100% | 17/17 — 100% | Began the quarter strongly but showed a gradual decline in discussion activity as the quarter progressed |
Notes:
- Ignas and BlockworksResearch received their delegations after the first Snapshot vote had already started, so they could not participate in that vote.
- Although BlockworksResearch’s Snapshot participation was only 62.5%, the committee will still propose to incentivize for this pilot quarter. In future quarters, failure to meet participation thresholds will result in disqualification from incentivization.
Sources: https://dune.com/lido/lido-delegations, https://snapshot.box/#/s:lido-snapshot.eth, https://vote.lido.fi/
Incentive Calculation
Seven delegates met the threshold and engaged actively. Each will receive an equal share.
Quarterly Pool: $75,000
TWAP (19 Dec): 1 LDO = $1.3718 (Dune)
Total LDO: $75,000 / $1.3718 ≈ 54,675 LDO
Per Delegate: 7,810 LDO
Lessons Learned
- On-chain Eligibility: Sticking to on-chain delegations aligns with token holders’ preferences and the DAO’s current state. We’ll keep this approach and apply stricter qualitative oversight next quarter.
- Flexible Scheduling: Fixed dates for determining eligibility don’t work well when voting windows shift. We need a more adaptive timeline to match the DAO’s evolving schedule.
- Clear Communication: We must clearly define and communicate deadlines.
- Stricter Timelines: Future quarters will enforce firm deadlines for reasoning posts and participation, improving accountability.
Next Steps
Refined Requirements: In the next quarter, all delegates must meet the criteria and submit required reasoning posts on time.
Timing for Eligibility: Eligibility for Q2 incentives will be determined at the start of the next voting cycle, planned for 23 January 2025. Every Public Delegate with 2M LDO delegated on-chain will be eligible. Any delay in voting start will shift the eligibility date accordingly.
Conclusion
The first quarter helped us understand how to measure delegate performance better and incentivize meaningful participation. We will continue to refine these processes to ensure fairness, clarity, and sustained engagement in Lido DAO governance.
–
Delegate Oversight Committee Members:
Jenya_K, kadmil, Olga_Kniazeva, Charlie Feng, Marcela Ochoa.
8 Likes
Delegate Incentives for Q1 Sent
All incentives for the Delegate Program in Q1 have been successfully sent!
You can find the transaction details here:
0x0de0a00d2f82e59b5fd0b46c51e46b6004a03d66a95da172910816a704be62c9
Looking ahead, the first voting slot for 2025 is scheduled for January 23rd. If you’re aiming to qualify for incentives in the second quarter, be sure your delegations meet the 2M LDO eligibility criteria.
Happy holidays, and we’ll see you in the new year! 
8 Likes
Delegate Incentivization Program: Q2 Eligibility Update
As the cutoff for Q2 eligibility was set at the start of the Snapshot voting on Thursday, January 23rd, 3 PM UTC, here is the final list of eligible delegates:
@Nansen @Wintermute @BlockworksResearch @Ignas @degentradingLSD @polar @Lanski
Eligibility Criteria:
A minimum of 2M LDO delegated on-chain is required for eligibility.
To receive incentives, delegates must:
- Participate in at least 70% of votes
- Share their rationales for votes on the Lido Research Forum during voting.
- Contribute meaningfully to discussions on the Lido Research Forum, enhancing the quality of discourse and providing their rationalizes when voting
You can verify these names and delegations on our dashboard: https://dune.com/lido/lido-delegations.
6 Likes
Update on @Ignas Delegation Status & Incentive Allocation
The Delegate Oversight Committee acknowledges the recent changes in @Ignas delegation, which has dropped from 2M LDO to 20K LDO. However, based on our current framework, the 2M LDO threshold is evaluated at the time of the first vote in the quarter.
Given this, the Committee has decided that:
-
@Ignas will continue to receive incentives for this quarter, in line with the established rules.
-
We will review and discuss possible adjustments to the framework to ensure alignment with the program’s objectives going forward.
I hope that @Ignas can regain a higher level of delegated LDO shortly.
We believe this approach maintains fairness while upholding the integrity of the program. If there are any concerns or suggestions regarding this decision, we welcome further discussion.
3 Likes
Thank you for the update and continuation of incentives for this quarter.
Will start more active efforts to receive lost LDO ASAP.
I think at the very least I can help sharing the recent Lido updates on my social channels like this post on the v3 but further efforts are needed here.
2 Likes
Delegate Oversight Committee Quarterly Report ( 20 Dec - 24 Mar)
TL;DR
- Six out of seven delegates initially met the 2 million LDO on-chain delegation threshold at the start of the first vote of the quarter (23 Jan) eligible for incentives.
- Three out of seven (Ignas, Blockworks Research, DegentradingLSD) saw their delegations drop close to zero during the period. However, Ignas and Blockworks Research remained engaged in governance discussions, so they remain eligible for incentives. DegentradingLSD stopped participating after losing the delegation, so they are not eligible.
- All 6 eligible delegates will receive 7,915 LDO each for Q2 of the pilot.
- The Committee proposes continuing this program through the end of the year, subject to a forthcoming forum proposal and DAO vote.
Delegation and Evaluation Criteria
Quantitative:
- Voting Participation: At least 70%
- Delegation Threshold: Over 2M LDO delegated on-chain on 23 Jan
Qualitative:
- Community Engagement: Meaningful participation in forum discussions, constructive feedback, and/or additional contributions to DAO decision-making.
Delegate Performance Table (Dec 20 - March 24)
| Delegate | Aragon Participation | Snapshot Participation | Community Feedback | Eligibility |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| @Nansen | 2/2 — 100% | 11/11 — 100% | Consistently active, provides valuable comments and insights | + |
| @Ignas | 2/2 — 100% | 11/11 — 100% | Lost most of the delegation but retained ~20,000 LDO, continued voting and actively engaging in discussions | + |
| @polar | 2/2 — 100% | 11/11 — 100% | Thorough reasoning, provides detailed feedback to the community | + |
| @Lanski | 2/2 — 100% | 10/11 — 90% | Frequently participates in forum discussions, offers transparent reasoning for voting decisions | + |
| @BlockworksResearch | 1/2 — 50% | 5/11 — 45% | Lost nearly all delegation (down to 5 LDO), but remained active in forum discussions and contributed to March proposals | + |
| @Wintermute | 2/2 — 100% | 11/11 — 100% | Long-term participant, consistently votes and contributes | + |
| @degentradingLSD | 1/2 — 50% | 5/11 — 45% | After losing delegation, ceased forum and voting activity, thus failing the participation requirement | - |
Note:
- @PGov and @Leuts received delegations after the quarter’s start and are not included in this incentive round.
- The next quarter is proposed to begin on 1 April (if DAO approves), aligning the program with standard calendar quarters.
Sources: https://dune.com/lido/lido-delegations, https://snapshot.box/#/s:lido-snapshot.eth, https://vote.lido.fi/
Incentive Calculation
Six delegates met the threshold and engaged actively. Each will receive an equal share.
Quarterly Pool: $75,000
90-Day TWAP (25 Mar): 1 LDO = $1.5792 (Dune)
Total LDO: $75,000 / $1.5792 ≈ 47,492 LDO
Per Delegate: 7,915 LDO (for each of the six qualifying delegates)
Additional Retroactive Grant Request: $5,000 for @Tane
In addition to the delegate incentivization program for this quarter, a $5,000 retroactive grant is requested for @Tane’s contribution.
Reason
This retroactive grant is requested in recognition of @Tane’s role in initiating and pushing forward Optimizing Lido On-chain Voting Timelines for Inclusive Governance proposal, which was successfully executed in the latest on-chain vote and is now live.
While @Tane is a consistently engaged and thoughtful delegate — and a valuable long-term contributor to the community — it’s important to emphasize that this grant is not for overall activity or presence. It is specifically for identifying a place for improvement and attracting attention to the topic.
The committee considers this a clear example of what retroactive grants are meant to support: real problem-solving and real execution.
Lessons Learned
-
Handling Delegation Drops
A more explicit framework is needed for delegates who lose a significant portion of their delegated tokens during the quarter but remain substantively involved in governance. -
Fixed Quarterly Schedule
Tying incentive periods to calendar quarters (Jan–Mar, Apr–Jun, etc.) increases clarity and reduces confusion for both delegates and token holders.
Next Steps
-
Proposed Program Extension
The Committee intends to propose extending the program through year-end. The forum discussion will address revised criteria (including how to handle mid-quarter delegation changes and clarify qualitative evaluation). -
DAO Vote
The proposal will be subject to a DAO-wide discussion and vote to either confirm or decline the new conditions and extension.
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Pilot Lessons Learned
Following the completion of the Delegate Incentivization Program pilot, the Delegate Oversight Committee reviewed delegate behavior, budget use, operational mechanics, other aspects. Based on these findings, an updated program structure is proposed to extend through 2025.
Overview
Pilot Goal: To increase active governance process participation, improve the quality of discussions and feedback, and enhance Lido on Ethereum safety by involving new participants in governance through Delegation.
Pilot period: Sept 19, 2024 - March 20, 2025
Incentivized delegates: Q1: 7 incentivized delegates, Q2: 6 incentivized delegates
Pilot results: The Pilot Goal was achieved. The program successfully brought new actors into governance and improved the quality of feedback and voting participation. At the start, public delegates held no delegated LDO. Today, over 24 million LDO is delegated to public delegates — with 19 million LDO delegated to incentivized ones. Voting participation among this group remains consistently high: all incentivized delegates maintained over 70% participation per quarter.
Beyond raw metrics, incentivized delegates contributed actively to governance discussions, shared context and positions on social media, and initiated value-add efforts. While attracting additional delegation remains a broader challenge outside this framework’s scope, incentivizing already engaged delegates with meaningful voting power has proven effective.
Key Findings
1. Delegate Behavior
No evidence of abuse or low-effort participation. Most delegates met expectations.
2. Budget Performance
The quarterly budget was adequate.
3. Threshold Effectiveness
While the 2M LDO threshold served as an effective filter, we believe lowering the threshold to 1M LDO would allow more active delegates without negatively impacting delegate behavior or budget. We will review this change before the next program extension proposal, if there is one to ensure it is working as expected.
4. Platform Limitations
Making both (Snapshot and Aragon) platforms mandatory excludes valid contributors. Onchain participation is the main goal for DIP; however, we recognize some custodial tokenholders are not able to participate this way yet. We are working on these limitations and may change the program (with proper notice and input from the community) to weigh more toward onchain delegation and voting.
5. Timeline Design
Fixed deadlines for eligibility were hard to track and enforce. Rigid timing reduced program clarity.
6. Incentive Mechanism
LDO rewards calculated via 90-day TWAP were predictable and stable. The incentive mechanism worked well.
7. Funding Through LEGO
The LEGO operational rails were low-friction, with no operational overhead and no additional costs for DAO to build a new ET.
8. Interfaces & Information Design
The current setup (Research Forum + voting UI) is adequate for the program’s scale. The committee sees no need to allocate resources to a custom governance platform. Delegate reasoning shared via forum posts and vote comments has also been valuable for transparency and accountability.
9. Delegation impact on active Vopting Power
Public delegates held ~17M LDO in Q1 and ~24M by the end of Q2, despite outflows. The program helped attract and retain significant voting power.
Committee Recommendations
Core Parameters for Continuation
| Parameter | Value |
|---|---|
| Program Duration | Through December 31, 2025 |
| Total Budget | $225,000 in LDO (via 90-day TWAP) |
| Per-Quarter Cap | $75,000, with maximum 15k per delegate cap |
| Reward Currency | LDO (TWAP-based valuation) |
| Evaluation Cadence | Quarterly: eligibility snapshot on 1st day, TWAP on last day |
| Eligibility Threshold | 1M LDO delegated, either on Snapshot or Aragon |
| With anti-sybil rule: 1 address → 1 incentivized delegate, based on past delegation | |
| Gas Reimbursement | Allowed for delegates with 300k+ LDO |
| Funding | Continue via LEGO |
| Committee Update | Replace Charlie & Marcela from Agora with Brennan & Maz from Agora |
Incentivizing Delegates Below the Threshold
Returning to this discussion, the committee does not recommend incorporating sub-threshold delegates into the core incentive program. Including delegates based on participation alone creates a high risk of gaming and dilutes accountability. Instead, meaningful contributions — if they result in clear, implemented outcomes — can be supported outside the Delegate Incentivization Program via retroactive funding.
Proposal: Prolong Delegate Incentivization Program (DIP) for Q2 to Q4 2025
TL;DR
The Delegate Oversight Committee proposes extending the program through Q2–Q4 2025 with a $225K LDO budget, lowering the eligibility threshold to 1M LDO, switching to calendar-quarter evaluations, and updating Agora’s committee members. All core mechanics remain unchanged.
Motivation
This proposal extends and updates the Delegate Incentivization Program to support expert, long-term-aligned delegates in Q2–Q4 2025. It balances cost efficiency, engagement, and accountability — ensuring that Lido DAO governance remains robust and resilient.
Today, approximately 25M LDO are delegated to public delegates. Supporting this group remains essential to healthy DAO governance and ensuring consistent decision-making capacity by engaged actors.
Program Conditions
This proposal suggests extending the Delegate Incentivization Program for Q2, Q3, and Q4 of 2025 under the following conditions:
Total budget: $225,000, allocated evenly across 3 quarters
Up to $75,000 per quarter, paid in LDO at 90-day TWAP
Maximum compensation per delegate: $15,000 in LDO per 3-month period
All eligible delegates will receive equal shares of the budget
Incentivization Criteria
To qualify for incentives, a delegate must:
- Have ≥1M LDO delegated on either Snapshot or Aragon on the first day of the quarter
- Be the only incentivized delegate per address (anti-sybil rule). With a rule: first delegated - first incentivized.
- Participate in ≥70% of votes during the quarter
- Actively engage in proposal discussions and provide a rationale for decisions on the forum. Engagement is assessed by the Delegate Oversight Committee during the quarterly evaluation.
Program Process and Timeline
Eligible delegates will be determined at the start of each quarter based on the amount of LDO delegated, and disbursement that happened at the beginning of the quarter following the reporting quarter.
Eligibility: Taken on the first day of each quarter
LDO price (TWAP): Calculated from the last 90 days of the quarter
Disbursement: Conducted after committee review of delegate participation and public reporting
Committee Composition and Authority
The Delegate Oversight Committee consists of members from the Lido DAO Contributors Group and the Agora team, ensuring both internal continuity and external accountability.
It is proposed to rotate Charlie and Marcela (Agora) out of the committee and appoint Brennan and Maz (Agora) in their place. The composition from the Lido DAO Contributors Group remains unchanged.
Committee responsibilities:
- Oversee program operations
- Maintain transparent communication
- Evaluate delegate performance
- Prepare quarterly assessments
- Approve incentive disbursement
- Authority to exclude a delegate from the program
Exclusion Procedure:
If the committee determines that a delegate fails to meet expectations, it may initiate exclusion. This involves a public announcement, followed by a 7-day open discussion period for community input. After this period, the final decision is communicated publicly.
Funding Process
If approved, LEGO will fund a Delegate Oversight Committee multisig.
Upon program approval, $225,000 equivalent in LDO will be transferred to LEGO committee multisig via Easy Track motions, to be distributed per quarter post-evaluation.
9 Likes
me believes dee most important thang is that Public Delegates should drive the the vision of LIDO DAO Alignment rather than act like bureaucrats. one vision, one love–guide aligned behavior at the core.
Avoid bureaucratic traps me brothas & sistas. free ya’ self from mental slavery
One love.
Respekt.
5 Likes
We appreciate the proposal for continuing the Delegate Incentivization Program. The analysis of the pilot phase provides a valuable foundation for the program’s next steps through 2025, and we recognize the effort involved in developing these recommendations.
Regarding the eligibility evaluation, we have one point for consideration. We observe that the day-one snapshot approach, while clear, might have limitations for delegates whose LDO balance fluctuates around the threshold.
It would be worth exploring eligibility assessment across the entire quarter. This could potentially allow qualification even if below the threshold on day one, perhaps with rewards adjusted proportionally based on the time criteria are met.
We understand this alternative approach may have been reviewed already. Could the Committee share its reasoning for maintaining the day-one snapshot method compared to evaluating eligibility over the full quarter?
5 Likes
wise words. respekt.
3 Likes
Thanks for bringing this up — we did think about it, but landed on prioritizing simplicity. Aiming to avoid multipliers or overcomplicated logic around incentives. The goal here isn’t to create a grant-like system, just to align incentives for governance participation in a way that’s transparent and easy to manage.
As for cases where someone is just below the threshold on day one — I think that’s exactly what the Oversight Committee should be able to handle on a case-by-case basis. No need to over-engineer the whole structure.
And when someone drops below during the quarter, I think it’s fair to give them a bit of time to bounce back. So far, even a full quarter hasn’t always been enough. Maybe over time we’ll see patterns that suggest a better model — but for now, this feels like the right level of simplicity and flexibility.
4 Likes
Thanks Jen,
Suggestions:
- Keep it at $2million → if anything raise the bar, don’t decrease it. Why settle when we have goals to be better?
- Focus on onchain only as the requirement to meet the threshold → meaning you can have delegation of 2+ million across both, or onchain. I don’t see the value in paying someone to vote offchain only as they are taking little to no risk as they have no execution power.
- Keep it simple as you mentioned.
- Remove those off the delegate list with 0 voting power
Questions:
- Is there a reason Charlie and Marcela are being swapped out of the committee?
- One of the main reasons for this program was to reach quorum, how much more successful has that been empirically?
Thanks!
PS. Wise words from @DeuceeDeuce one love. respekt.
4 Likes
Thanks so much for questions — sharing a few thoughts on the points you raised:
- Keep it at $2million → if anything raise the bar, don’t decrease it. Why settle when we have goals to be better?
Voting power is important — but being better also means having more engaged delegates who read, think, and ask hard questions.
In the last two quarters, we’ve seen only a few delegates with delegations between 1–2M LDO. One of them is now over 2M, another is around 1.7M. Lowering the threshold to 1M could motivate serious delegates in the 300–500k range to step up, get more visible, and actively pursue additional delegation. It’s not about lowering the quality. It’s about making the program a bit more accessible.
- Focus on onchain only as the requirement to meet the threshold → meaning you can have delegation of 2+ million across both, or onchain.
I get the preference for on-chain delegation, but some large custodians still don’t support it. That means strong Snapshot support can’t always translate to on-chain due to technical limits. We’re working on this, but until that’s solved, I don’t think it’s fair to exclude delegates chosen by tokenholders.
Also, major strategic decisions — budgets, goals, mission — happen on Snapshot. It’s not secondary governance for Lido DAO.
And to the point that
I don’t see the value in paying someone to vote offchain only
I don’t see the program as paying people to vote. It’s about rewarding those who consistently hold governance context, provide accountability, and are trusted representatives of tokenholders
- Remove those off the delegate list with 0 voting power
We kept delegates visible if they stayed engaged, even with 0 LDO in the delegation. Going forward, we’ll remove inactive ones — it’s in the upcoming update.
- One of the main reasons for this program was to reach quorum, how much more successful has that been empirically?
Based on the Dune report, Active VP might appear relatively stable over time — but that stability is exactly the point.
In the context of continuous LDO outflows, especially in Q1 2025, holding the line on quorum-level participation is already a major achievement. In Q4 2024, quorum was reached faster and more reliably, with stronger early participation and more consistent delegate engagement.
To me, the program remains essential at this stage of the DAO’s development. It sustains quorum and raises the quality of discussion.
4 Likes
Glad to hear the below is working!
For the rest, I don’t personally agree, however I trust your judgement and level of context!
Thanks for the response!
Always happy to share additional context! I think one of the main achievements of the Lido delegate program is having delegates who question the effectiveness of the delegate incentivization program and make sure it delivers real value rather than just existing.
4 Likes
Hi Anthony,
Thanks for the thoughtful feedback and questions.
Is there a reason Charlie and Marcela are being swapped out of the committee?
The Committee’s work aligns more closely with the Customer Success team at Agora, which Brennan and Maz are part of. They’ve already been actively supporting Agora’s role in the Committee by providing strategic input and support.
A bit more on Brennan and Maz: they’ve helped launch governance for 13 protocols, created and verified dozens of proposals, and maintain regular contact with hundreds of delegates.
Grateful to Jen and the Lido community for inviting Agora to continue contributing to this important work!
2 Likes
Snapshot vote started
Please get your wallets ready to cast a vote 
, the Extend Delegate Incentivization Program through 2025 Snapshot has started! The Snapshots ends on Mon, 28 Apr 2025 16:00:00 GMT.
1 Like
Given that the proposal itself was published on April 9th (i.e., after April 1st), and assuming it passes by tokenholder vote it will come into effect in May, we believe it would be reasonable for the token amount snapshot for the next quarter to be taken with a slight delay after the proposal goes into effect.
This would give interested parties a short window to adjust their delegation, especially if their LDO is currently spread across different delegates — or to attract new delegations.
3 Likes