yeah, really excited for what is comming next 
Snapshot vote started
We’re starting the DVT & DVV Incentive Allocation Changes Snapshot, active till Mon, 26 Jan 2026 16:00:00 GMT. Please don’t forget to cast your vote!
This proposal is well thought out because it starts from real operating costs instead of assumptions. Running DVT validators can quickly become unsustainable when incentives drop or network fees rise, and this model openly addresses that risk rather than ignoring it.
The variable incentive split creates a fair balance. Node Operators are protected during low-incentive periods through a higher share, while stakers benefit more as incentives increase. The minimum and maximum bounds give operators stability without letting their share grow too large.
Using the SSV Network Fee as a cost reference makes sense under the recent protocol changes, and applying the same rules to both SSV and Obol operators keeps things consistent and avoids unnecessary friction.
Overall, this approach feels practical and fair. It supports long-term operator sustainability while still prioritizing staker value as conditions improve, which makes it a solid candidate for broader community discussion and a Snapshot vote.
We’re in favor because the proposal replaces a brittle fixed split with a cost-aware mechanism that tracks the actual economics of running DVT validators under today’s SSV incentive and fee regime. The core design is straightforward.
We also like how the surplus logic pushes most upside to stakers once costs are covered, which helps ensure the program remains staker-forward in “good” incentive environments. The scenario table makes the behavior intuitive: in low incentive environments, operators are protected up to the cap; in high incentive environments, the operator share compresses toward the floor and most value flows to stakers.
On the main critique raised (“this seems overly complicated; why not just reimburse costs and send the rest to DVV”), the response basically confirms that this is what the mechanism does in practice, while also allowing a small, rule-based upside for operators when network fees are below the DIP-49 implied ceiling. We like that the thread includes concrete worked examples for a CSM operator (10 validators) comparing current vs proposed under both current and targeted incentive rates.
I voted FOR.
The incentive scheme for using DVT/DVV is changing.
Now the SSV Network fee is deducted first, and only then are the incentives distributed between the staker and the NO.
This means that if costs are high and incentives are low, the NO will not go into the negative (as could happen previously).
A proper, flexible approach to DVT/DVV incentives.
I have a question about this changes.
I understand the approach to solving the problem.
However, looking to the future, Lido can’t offer incentives forever, and it’s necessary to find an approach and the right profitability for DVT and DVV instruments so that the difference in revenue covers the costs of using the SSV Network.
Considering that Obol doesn’t charge any fees at all (different approaches, but they both solve the overall problem of decentralization), we’re essentially encouraging SSV Network to painlessly increase the price of its services without facing competition.
How do you plan to move away from DVT incentives in the future?
They charge fees. Source: We’re a curated set NO and will need pay Obol fees in order to use their tech.
However, I think your question is still important to ask.
/E: typo
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Happy to offer my thoughts here.
However, looking to the future, Lido can’t offer incentives forever, and it’s necessary to find an approach and the right profitability for DVT and DVV instruments so that the difference in revenue covers the costs of using the SSV Network.
Lido doesn’t offer incentives. The incentives are coming from DVT providers (Obol and SSV). What this proposal refines is how these incentives are allocated between users (stakers) and node operators, to try to find a more sustainable equilibrium given that utilizing these DVT technologies incurs a cost to operators.
Considering that Obol doesn’t charge any fees at all (different approaches, but they both solve the overall problem of decentralization)
This is partly accurate. While the Obol technology itself does not technically mandate a fee to use it (because it’s a network in a loose sense of the word, i.e. a network of nodes and users who utilize the technology, but not a shared networking layer/protocol apart from on a per-cluster basis, and thus there’s no usage fee tied to network usage), when you go to set up an Obol cluster via the Obol launchpad, if you are setting up a cluster with > 1 validator, an automated fee-split is configured in the Obol launchpad to include sending 1% of staking rewards to Obol Collective, which funds are then used in the RAF. This can in theory be technically circumvented, but that’s against the expected usage of the technology. Finally, in special cases, node operators, protocols, etc might reach different agreements with Obol as to the size of the fee or how it should be paid. In the case of Lido all modules – SDVT, CSM, and Curated Module – there are staking rewards being accrued by Obol Collective as a result of validators run using Obol technology.
we’re essentially encouraging SSV Network to painlessly increase the price of its services without facing competition
What this proposal says is that up to 50% of SSV incentives (plus more but only in cases that this is 50% ends up being more than the network fee required) that the SSV DAO is offering can be allocated towards Node Operators to help them pay for the SSV Network Fees. IMO it does the opposite of what you’re claiming; it’s essentially putting downward pressure on network fees in relation to the incentives (which, again, don’t come from Lido), otherwise it ceases to be economically feasible for operators to utilize SSV to run the validators.
Going back to what I think is your larger point, which I think is “given that DVT is an incremental cost, to what extent should its use be subsidized or incentivized by the Lido protocol”? In Lido, currently, this kind of “decentralization premium” ascribed to DVT takes a few forms:
- increased node operator rewards in SDVT (and eventually perhaps in CMv2 for inter-operator clusters)
- reduced bond requirements (basically none in the case of SDVT even though the clusters aren’t solely made up of professional NOs), and contributors are looking for ways to extend this idea to CSM as well (given inter-operator clusters and DKG)
- the operational cost of coordination of SDVT clusters, and
- incentives (provided by the third DVT infrastructure providers).
In general, this is a broader markets and value of decentralization question. We can think of DVT as a cost that’s a part of the validator stack (e.g. node operators who run multiclient setups, such as with dirk and vouch or vero also incur additional costs for this robustness), so therefore should consider “how much is it worth paying for DVT compared to other forms of running validators in terms of the additional risk mitigations and/or operational efficiencies that it offers?”
Personally I believe that DVT is quite a valuable technology in reducing operational risk and slashing risk (mostly in the case of inter-operator DVT assuming DKG), but it’s hard to price exactly how valuable this mitigation is because disastrous slashing events haven’t occurred (which is great, we shouldn’t wish it to happen to realize this value).
In the case of SSV (which this proposal focuses on), discussions have started for the tokenomics of the network to be changed (i.e. where SSV is staked and network fees will be paid in ETH instead of SSV), which should be easier to align usage of the technology as its cost will be denominated in ETH (basically like how Obol is now from a practical perspective). I think and hope both infrastructures can find some way to balance incentives with their respective network/technology tokenomics, as at the end of the day it’s good for a protocol like Lido to have access to multiple sources of validator robustness (both DVT and non-DVT based).
3 Likes
Snapshot vote ended
The DVT & DVV Incentive Allocation Changes Snapshot has reached a quorum and completed successfully!
The results are:
For: 54.5M LDO
Against: 205 LDO
Winning option: For
1 Like
This is exactly the right path forward to encourage DVT usage. a) cover the costs for the NO, b) a small profit, c) remainder goes to the vault.