I think you’re missing a big part of what’s been explained here. These people will not have full control over the treasury. The DAO always retains full control of treasury, the only thing that will happen is that certain specific types of pre approved by the DAO actions with certain pre-approved parameters will be “proposable” by this committee, and then executed “optimistically” (like Easy Track) if there are no sufficient objections/vetos.
You’re arguing in circles. You’re asking for ‘someone in charge’, which is exactly what the committee is for (within constraints), but with safeguards in place, and then you’re racing across the spectrum and arguing ‘well they can do whatever they want’. You want to make ONE PERSON solely responsible and in charge for doing all this? That’s bananas.
how many cycles have these people been thru, why is that such a hard question to get an answer to? who are they? what is their crypto experience? are they beta cucks from trade fi that are gonna lose all the $$ in cow swap? u know this project has a rly poor history of financial decisions e.g. jump, alameda, 3ac, defiance, dragon flyetc. etc. all dumping every chance they get, going long eth @ $4,000 per eth LOL after vitalik sold publicly LOL!
so yeah, these are relevant question to be answered
and how do we know these are not malicious actors?
vitalik controls 4/7 because hes very public and we know he was day #1
this committee should at least be delayed long enough until Lido is sufficiently decentralized. its currently highly centralized around giant hedge funds like paradigm (7% control) for which they led the ftx $32 billion scam that almost brought down the industry in one fell swoop both economically and geo politically.
by bringing in actors for which the community has no background on and could be evil operatives, for which the only way they are kicked out is by the entire lido community voting them out, we put the DAO at risk … paradigm owns hte most coins and they have proven an incredible inability to parse ethics and good actors from their incredible hunger for more money and power
Sorry for pointing this out, but you pretty much can and are expected once the thing goes to snapshot dyor. Most (myself included) persons on the list can be cross-checked by this forum and public references.
If you squint hard enough, you’ll see exactly why “let’s just vote on everything” isn’t ideal path forward. Full DAO can’t vote on every movement, and given the guiding lines & safety checks are in place, committee would be a more nimble vehicle for operational decisions.
“Could you noobs trade crypto for profit” is curious question, but tangential to committee’s main task — do ops necessary to achieve goals outlined in the proposal, in case the DAO votes those are the principles and goals worth pursuing. You’ll notice there’s no “profit” or “100x” in goals, and for good reason.
Steakhouse provides financial services to Maker, ENS, and Lido. They have been active in Maker governance for quite some time. DYOR.
Karpatkey is a spin-out from Gnosis. I assume you know Gnosis and their suit of products. Gnosis is also one of the larger stETH holders and a close partner. Karpatkey was their internal treasury management team that did a good enough job to set out independently. DYOR.
The others are contributors to the protocol or have been actively conversing with contributors over a long period.
Open to more participants, please register your interest below
I’m interested in participating as a non-voting committee observer. My background is in cybersecurity and risk management, so I would love to contribute to the conversation. Let me know if that is still possible. Thank you!
I think the principles are great but incomplete. In order for the DAO to create value it needs to produce economic value on deployed capital. In other words the incremental cash flows from investments needs to generate a return above the cost of capital, any return below the cost of capital is value destroying, which creates a doom cycle of increasing the cost of capital for the DAO and therefore operating costs which ultimately puts sustainability of the DAO in question.
The below examples are illustrative.
Let’s say the cost of capital for Lido is 8%. The exact cost of capital can be solved for or polled from LDO holders but that’s beyond the purpose of this example.
Project A is requesting $1m. It estimates to generate an additional $100,000 per year in incremental fees to the DAO in perpetuity and has a 50% probability of success. The net present value of the project is $625,000 = ($100,000/0.08) X 0.50. The value added is -$1,000,000 + $625,000 = -$375,000. Since it’s negative value added this project should be rejected.
Project B is requesting $1m. It estimates to generate an additional $10,000,000 per year in incremental fees to the DAO in perpetuity and has a 10% probability of success. The net present value of the project is $1,250,000 = ($10,000,000/0.08) X 0.10. The value added is -$1,000,000 + 1,250,000 = $250,000. Since it’s positive value added it should be accepted.
One advantage is it gets teams and the DAO thinking about what the drivers of value are. It also will help create a framework for investing in projects VS returning capital to LDO holders.
An issue with buy and burn models (MakerDAO) is it doesn’t discriminate between value. If the DAO is buying and burning LDO above intrinsic value then value is being transferred from long term holders to sellers. However, if buying and burning below intrinsic value than value is transferred from sellers to long term holders of LDO.
A conservative approach to intrinsic value is to use residual value + current assets. Residual value is one year fees of the DAO in perpetuity (or perpetuity with growth if being more aggressive).
As an example: Let’s says fees accumulating to DAO are $100m/year. Residual value is $1.25B = $100m/0.08. Treasury assets are $70M, putting intrinsic value at $1.95B. If buying and burning the return to LDO holders would be (cost of capital)/(1-percentage undervalued). Using the current market cap of $1.6B that implies a 22% undervaluation so an expected return on buy and burn would be 10% = 0.08/(1-0.22). Therefore a buy and burn of $1m can be expected to return an incremental $100,000 to LDO holders. This can now be used to compare against proposed projects. Since project B contributes $250,000 it would be a better use of the $1M in capital, however buying and burning would be a better use than investing in project A.
Finally, once projects are funded the intrinsic value is updated to intrinsic value = funded projects + residual value + current assets. In our example above funding project B would contribute $250,000 to intrinsic value. When projects fail they should be removed from intrinsic value.
Adopting this framework for effective capital allocation would not only help drive economic value to the DAO, but would become a competitive advantage for Lido given that to my knowledge no DAO has implemented a proper capital allocation program.