Thank you for the detailed proposal and having taken the time to put it together. Token holders will vote what they may. However, we’re not favorable to this proposal for a number of reasons.
Having started the discussion around principles for treasury management, what emerged was a much clearer direction focused on empowering a narrow and highly constrained committee to propose and enact proposals to manage the surplus. We will publish some early ideas shortly.
The OUSD proposal is just one of many approaches such a committee could take but in our view it needs to be solved from a first-principles basis around what Lido DAO’s objectives are, not asking token holders to pick out allocations. Finally, in our view, there is no interest in other protocols’ governance tokens, nor in a stablecoin with new dimensions of counterparty or regulation risk, let alone one which is this thinly capitalized ($34m at time of writing).
OUSD has been proposed to numerous protocols a number of times and we echo some of the main hesitations raised in each of those instances:
- Untested smart contract risks
- New counterparty risks Lido DAO may not be in a position to mitigate
- Market risk of collateral backing
- OGV/Origin governance specific risks
- Risks associated with multisigs that govern the protocol
- and so forth
In short, we would prefer to empower a committee to make decisions around principles, rather than ask token holders for their views on individual proposals. In either case, we would recommend not to approve OUSD.
nb. Steakhouse Financial teams contribute to MakerDAO in various capacities