This is an open source staking module from SSV Network.
They currently manage 50,000 validators, so they know a thing or two about governance complexities.
SSVLM simplifies the work of operators
Actually, practically standard requirements for security and transparency.
Currently, Lido uses about 35 multisigs for various committees, so they want to make common security requirements for everyone
I support bringing security requirements to a common form
For this, 3 script factories are created - creating, deleting and editing MEV-Boost Relay.
For security, there will be a 72 hour delay to check the executable code
A useful initiative to speed up the process of changing MEV relays with a new voting form Easy Track
Last time we voted to create such a cyber-organization and since it was created, the OP and R&D/development costs go to it.
$35 million for:
Conducting technical R&D for the staking infrastructure
Strengthening the decentralization of the DAO
Promoting the decentralization of Ethereum
Leading protocol research initiatives
The budget will increase by 24% and this is mainly due to Lido v3 (for comparison, last year the budget increased by 80%, so this time not so much)
However, this makes you think hard about the fact that the costs of support and development are constantly increasing. If this is the standard as the project develops, then later it will be necessary to take a closer look at the costs.
In order to better understand the need for an update, for the Russian-speaking audience I recommend a stream from CyberAcademy,
There will be a significant update that directly concerns Lido (EIP-7251, EIP-7002)
Therefore, this update is simply a necessity for the further work of the project
Increase in liquidity maintenance limit from 2100 stETH per quarter to 6000 stETH per half year
The budget increase is due to the agreed BORG budget, which was approved 2 months ago
BORG received $8.5 million in funding for this. The vote is essentially bringing the limits to current funding
In any case, the increase in stETH liquidity will have a positive effect on attracting users to the Lido ecosystem
increase stakeShareLimit from 2% to 3%
In essence, this is permission to stake via CSM and has previously been increased to 2%, but the limit was reached quite quickly.
I understand the cautious increase in the percentage of participation in the CSM, but it is a bit strange to do a vote every 2 months to increase the limit. It would be more effective to vote immediately for some plan for a systematic increase of the limit when this limit is reached
In addition, there are a number of conditions on stakeShareLimit, but if the new CSMv2 comes out, then these conditions are no longer required to increase the limit
reduce keyRemovalCharge from 0.05 to 0.02 ETH
This became possible due to a significant reduction in the commission in Ethereum, in fact, this is bringing the penalty to what is updated in Pectra. This will reduce fines for beginners
The Lido Alliance is a structured collaboration program whereby the Lido DAO provides support and recognition to projects that align with its philosophy. Therefore, in order to decide whether to include Twyne, it is necessary to understand whether Twyne satisfies the core principles:
Deep integration with the Lido ecosystem:
Twyne is developing solutions where stETH gains wide adoption as a base token
Shared focus on decentralization and security:
Twyne’s smart contracts leverage the EulerV2 stack, backed by ~$10M in audits from top security firms.
Decentralization is achieved by increasing demand for stETH
In addition, the protocol itself achieves efficient use of capital in lending, and their goal is to approach redistributes idle borrowing power to where it is needed most, acting as a relief valve for credit markets
Lido will also receive 10% of the project’s tokens after the Token Generation Event (TGE)
It is proposed to lower the incentive threshold for delegates from 2 million LDO to 1 million LDO with a budget of 225,000 LDO per quarter.
Currently, to receive an incentive, you need to have 2 million LDO delegations and there are only 5 such delegates with such delegations.
*Although I am an interested party and in 6th place among official delegates, I still do not have 1 million LDO, so this vote will not affect my incentives
But I see that the number of active delegates with a high limit is not increasing, but even decreasing over time and it is time to lower the threshold to attract more activity in the community and DAO
Based on the experience of other DAOs, we can say that this should lead to increased interest in the DAO and more active actions of delegates. Despite this, this system also has shortcomings, since there are no special requirements for delegates, except for voting and justifying their votes. I think that with the next reduction of the limit it will be necessary to think about activity before the votes
Pectra compatibility update. There was already a vote for this at the Snapshot stage. In fact, this is just an on-chain confirmation of the previous vote.
Verifier contract update in the CSM. It is responsible for the size of the Initial Slashing. With the Pectra update, this penalty has been reduced from 1 ETH to 0.0078 ETH (for a 32ETH stake)
So this is a technical vote to confirm what was accepted, as well as for Ethereum’s Pectra compatibility
This vote is a collection of decisions that were already made at the Snapshot stage with 100% support.
In this regard, we voted FOR.
I have previously raised the issue that increasing the voting period by just 1 day in order to vote FOR is very little.
Most initiatives of the developing community are positive and will collect mostly positive votes, which means that increasing the time for voting AGAINST is also the right approach, but more attention should be paid to the first period. Three days for voting is a very short period and only the votes of the most active delegates are attracted, whose votes are not enough for a quorum.
It is necessary to increase the on-chain voting by at least two days, otherwise this problem will constantly repeat itself
I support positive changes and the implementation of the 2nd version of CSM
Previously, 6% of the staking reward was allocated to node operators. In the new version, the default will be 3.5%, but for the first 16 validators - the same rate of 6%, thus developing decentralization and attracting small operators
Introducing types of operators for which there will be different settings (Permissionless (unknown) participants, community stakers, Professional, etc.) rewards, performance thresholds, deposit queue priorities, etc.
This will make it possible to flexibly configure various parameters for different groups in the future, if such a need arises
3. Added an improved algorithm for accounting for the work of CSM validators
4. For poor work over a sufficient period of time (currently 3 frames of 28 days are planned, but there will also be a vote on this setting), they can be removed without permission. This is mostly necessary to be able to exclude those who have abandoned work with nodes
5. Support for EIP-7002 (validator management extension)
It is proposed to create a committee that will essentially evaluate third-party applications for working with Lido, keep track of them and write reports for the community - how reliable it is to use these tools
A very useful committee, which consists of worthy professionals in their field (6 people):
Gabriella Sofia
Ivan Metrikin
Drew Van der Werff
Fredrik Svantes
Vishal Modali
Sébastien Rannou
Another feature is that the committee’s work is free. However, I assume in the future, if the committee has a lot of work, then it will be necessary to introduce payment. Or the committee will work as much as it can, gradually
Double voting is a very interesting and complex scheme, when the implementation of some proposal is not carried out immediately, but is postponed so that stETH holders can leave the protocol before the implementation itself
The structure and its parameters are described in great detail and it took me a long time to figure out how it will work
But the essence can be described in one sentence:
the more requests for withdrawal, the longer (up to 45 days) the delayed effect of the proposal
A committee is also introduced that will block a crappy proposal (4/7 multisig) in an emergency, as well as disable double voting or implement the proposal (5/7)
An interesting proposal that goes to meet the needs of users who, for some reason, do not agree with the majority. This feature reduces vulnerabilities both from random errors in the proposal or its implementation, and against an intentional attack on the governance
They want to replace Kyber with Caliber.
The developer is the same (at least, he owns both), but Kyber will soon stop functioning, so it needs to be replaced.
To me, this is purely a technical substitution.
One potential solution was to reduce the number of oracles, but that would reduce reliability — which is the foundation of user trust