Currently, Node Operators in the Curated Set within Lido operate without DVT, meaning each NO manages validators independently and holds full control over the keys. This creates a single point of failure, which can lead to slashing or missed rewards due to operator mistakes or downtime.
The proposal aims to allow Curated Set Node Operators to adopt DVT, which will significantly improve validator resilience and contribute to greater decentralization of the Lido protocol
This voting is an on-chain confirmation of the decision to Dual Governance.
As with the Snapshot stage, I think this is an interesting and breakthrough solution that is useful for Lido
his is essentially the final release of CSMv2.
All the key parameters aimed at improving decentralization had already been approved earlier, what I’m fully supporting
Removes Operator Dependency and Improves Security/User Protection
– Ensures validator exits even if Node Operators are unresponsive or compromised
– Allows emergency exits in case of key loss or misbehavior.
Enables Permissionless Staking
– Critical for scaling CSM and future open participation modules.
This on-chain proposal is a confirmation of previous off-chain decisions:
Rotate Kyber Network for Caliber
Increase CSM stake share limit from 2% to 3%. Snapshot
Switch off Easy Track environment for PML, ATC, RCC entities, deprecated after Snapshot-approved transition to Lido Labs and Lido Ecosystem BORG Foundations. Items 2–7.
And minor proposal from Forum
Enable a grace period for CSM Node Operators
Introduce a simplified CSVerifier for CSM
Update the reward address and name for Node Operator ID 2 P2P.ORG - P2P Validator
In short - the system allowed to postpone the execution of the vote and gave users time to withdraw funds (for those who doubted the decision)
However, it turned out that a bug had crept in that could allow the RageQuit period to be extended indefinitely - as a result, the funds of the users withdrawing would be stuck and the vote would never be executed
A quick operational change is a good reaction to such a situation
A temporary committee is being proposed that will adjust the parameters of new stVaults within Lido v3.
This seems like a good solution for setting up the new system, but there are no clear deadlines for this “temporary” committee, and therefore no elections for its members.
It seems like a useful feature, but it lacks decentralization and governance from the DAO.
So, I expect a clearer timeline for the on-chain phase.
A structure is being created where parameters can be set through on-chain voting, specifying how much stETH to sell and in what volumes—through Stonks, a set of smart contracts operating through the CoW Protocol with minimal slippage.
This is an excellent system for future buybacks. It’s great that the team quickly developed a framework based on forum discussions.