Currently, Node Operators in the Curated Set within Lido operate without DVT, meaning each NO manages validators independently and holds full control over the keys. This creates a single point of failure, which can lead to slashing or missed rewards due to operator mistakes or downtime.
The proposal aims to allow Curated Set Node Operators to adopt DVT, which will significantly improve validator resilience and contribute to greater decentralization of the Lido protocol
This voting is an on-chain confirmation of the decision to Dual Governance.
As with the Snapshot stage, I think this is an interesting and breakthrough solution that is useful for Lido
his is essentially the final release of CSMv2.
All the key parameters aimed at improving decentralization had already been approved earlier, what I’m fully supporting
Removes Operator Dependency and Improves Security/User Protection
– Ensures validator exits even if Node Operators are unresponsive or compromised
– Allows emergency exits in case of key loss or misbehavior.
Enables Permissionless Staking
– Critical for scaling CSM and future open participation modules.
This on-chain proposal is a confirmation of previous off-chain decisions:
Rotate Kyber Network for Caliber
Increase CSM stake share limit from 2% to 3%. Snapshot
Switch off Easy Track environment for PML, ATC, RCC entities, deprecated after Snapshot-approved transition to Lido Labs and Lido Ecosystem BORG Foundations. Items 2–7.
And minor proposal from Forum
Enable a grace period for CSM Node Operators
Introduce a simplified CSVerifier for CSM
Update the reward address and name for Node Operator ID 2 P2P.ORG - P2P Validator
In short - the system allowed to postpone the execution of the vote and gave users time to withdraw funds (for those who doubted the decision)
However, it turned out that a bug had crept in that could allow the RageQuit period to be extended indefinitely - as a result, the funds of the users withdrawing would be stuck and the vote would never be executed
A quick operational change is a good reaction to such a situation
A temporary committee is being proposed that will adjust the parameters of new stVaults within Lido v3.
This seems like a good solution for setting up the new system, but there are no clear deadlines for this “temporary” committee, and therefore no elections for its members.
It seems like a useful feature, but it lacks decentralization and governance from the DAO.
So, I expect a clearer timeline for the on-chain phase.
A structure is being created where parameters can be set through on-chain voting, specifying how much stETH to sell and in what volumes—through Stonks, a set of smart contracts operating through the CoW Protocol with minimal slippage.
This is an excellent system for future buybacks. It’s great that the team quickly developed a framework based on forum discussions.
This proposal is to give the Foundation the right to negotiate and implement the creation of official bridges for stETH and wstETH with partners.
I see no problem with delegating this part of the work (the DAO will no longer vote on the creation of bridges) – everything will be handled by a special committee elected by the DAO.
I think this will speed up work in this direction, given that the creation of official bridges has never caused any controversy or disagreement within the DAO.
Furthermore, the DAO always has the option to reverse this decision with a subsequent vote.
All payments will now be in USD (although this was almost always the case before) – and this is definitely a positive change – I prefer stablecoins for all projects.
The quarterly budget is also limited to $250,000 (which was also the actual maximum amount, but the limit was $500,000). I wouldn’t say this is a plus – it’s more of a statement of fact, a formal change that doesn’t affect the outcome
They’re proposing to use accumulated stablecoins for profit – converting everything to sUSDS or RWA.
The key is that 15% of the Treasury holdings can be used for these strategies.
I’d be more than happy to support the initiative if it simply allocated 15% of the Treasury holdings to stablecoins, without explicitly requiring the stablecoins to be converted to USDS (as there are many strategies with current Treasury stablecoins).
However, the decision will be made by TMC via EasyTrack, so they may ultimately choose other assets, which is what I hope for.
Curated Module operators are receiving a base fee of 3.5%, down from the current 5%, but it could be higher if they participate in development and use Lido’s new technologies.
The market average is typically 1-3%, so the fee is being reduced to keep them on track.
I think this is a very smart move, which, on the one hand, encourages operators to develop and, on the other, increases the DAO treasury.
A 10% (capped at $2 million) is offered for whitehats.
Other projects have very similar terms, so even despite the large potential payouts, I consider this acceptable for a project as large as Lido.
Especially since the DAO ultimately decides how much to pay or not pay in the event of a breach of the terms.
However, I have a hard time imagining how the delegates will understand the technical complexities of a potential hack.
Currently, BORG (a Cayman Islands firm) can only handle partnerships.
It is proposed to add legal opportunities to develop and stimulate Lido’s growth in accordance with the new GOOSE-3, including new areas, not just the current staking.
Considering that one of these areas is involving institutional investors in staking, this is a necessary step. It would be irrational to create other companies for these purposes (unless they need to be created due to the need for US jurisdictions, depending on the new laws).