Kuzmich Delegate Thread

Delegate Platform
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Address: 0xB5cE287a69788DbD66dB96026C38F203F6bF2aAD

Introduction

With over 7 years of experience in crypto, I’ve built a strong understanding of market dynamics through hands-on trading and portfolio management across various DeFi projects. I’ve also contributed to business development in Web3, giving me a well-rounded view of how decentralized ecosystems evolve and scale

Motivation

As an participant in the Lido ecosystem, I bring both strong conviction and long-term alignment with the protocol’s values. I view Lido as one of the most significant and reliable projects in the space—playing a key role in supporting decentralization across Ethereum and other networks.

As a major tokenholder, I believe in the power and responsibility of governance. My voice matters, and I actively use it to support initiatives that strengthen the protocol’s resilience and neutrality. I’m deeply motivated to contribute because the growth and sustainability of Lido directly align with my personal interests as a stakeholder. This shared alignment drives me to stay engaged, vote with intention, and advocate for decisions that benefit the broader ecosystem

Values and Decision-Making Approach

I believe it’s essential to create meaningful incentives for token holders that reflect their role in the protocol’s long-term success. Models like shared revenue or other value-aligned mechanisms can help ensure that those who contribute capital and governance are also beneficiaries of growth.

Too often, token distributions are skewed in favor of early participants, leaving newer holders with limited reasons to stay involved. When tokens offer little more than voting power, the broader community becomes disengaged — and the DAO suffers as a result. Strengthening the economic connection between token ownership and protocol performance is key to building resilient, committed governance

Public Acceptance

I apply and accept [the Lido Public Delegate Code of Conduct] and support [Purpose/Mission/Values of Lido DAO].

Disclosures

I am not a delegate / contributor to any competing staking projects. I have no conflicts of interests contributing to Lido DAO, but will disclose them should they arise.

5 Likes
Establish a Public Delegate Platform and Delegate Incentivization Program
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Delegate information (update):

Introduction
With over 7 years of experience in crypto, I’ve built a strong understanding of market dynamics through hands-on trading and portfolio management across various DeFi projects. I’ve also contributed to business development in Web3, giving me a well-rounded view of how decentralized ecosystems evolve and scale

Address
0x3133e0C65779993d607B2B6d689378A012a05C00

Contact Information (Discord)
kuzmich.dao (945015010072080394)

Motivation
As an participant in the Lido ecosystem, I bring both strong conviction and long-term alignment with the protocol’s values. I view Lido as one of the most significant and reliable projects in the space—playing a key role in supporting decentralization across Ethereum and other networks.

As a major tokenholder, I believe in the power and responsibility of governance. My voice matters, and I actively use it to support initiatives that strengthen the protocol’s resilience and neutrality. I’m deeply motivated to contribute because the growth and sustainability of Lido directly align with my personal interests as a stakeholder. This shared alignment drives me to stay engaged, vote with intention, and advocate for decisions that benefit the broader ecosystem
Values and Decision-Making Approach
I believe it’s essential to create meaningful incentives for token holders that reflect their role in the protocol’s long-term success. Models like shared revenue or other value-aligned mechanisms can help ensure that those who contribute capital and governance are also beneficiaries of growth.

Too often, token distributions are skewed in favor of early participants, leaving newer holders with limited reasons to stay involved. When tokens offer little more than voting power, the broader community becomes disengaged — and the DAO suffers as a result. Strengthening the economic connection between token ownership and protocol performance is key to building resilient, committed governance

Public Acceptance:
I accept Lido DAO delegate Сode of Сonduct (link) and Aligned with Lido’s Vibe (Purpose, Mission, Vision)

Disclosures:
I am not a delegate / contributor to any competing staking projects. I have no conflicts of interests contributing to Lido DAO, but will disclose them should they arise.

1 Like
Establish a Public Delegate Platform and Delegate Incentivization Program
3

Title: On-chain Vote #196

Decision: Vote YES

It is proposed to allow a special contract to manage LDO within the Token Reward Plan (TRP), including vesting for a portion of the grants. This is a technical step necessary to implement the already-adopted decision to move the TRP to the Lido Labs Foundation and change its terms. Without this, the TRP simply will not function under the new rules.

That is, this is the implementation of the decision to Transfer TRP to Lido Labs Foundation and Amend TRP Terms, which was agreed upon in Snapshot.

2 Likes
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Title: On-chain Vote #197

Decision: Vote YES

Vesting for one large wallet is being split across 10 addresses (apparently, in part to diversify the risk of loss of funds).
Interestingly, in addition to the split, vesting will also last a year, meaning that the pressure on tokens will theoretically decrease (I understand the cliff date had already passed before this change).

1 Like
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Title: Shapshot Voting DVT & DVV Incentive Allocation Changes

Decision: Vote YES

I believe the right approach is to ensure that Operators (as well as users) always benefit, which is why this approach is currently the most acceptable.
However, looking to the future, Lido can’t offer incentives forever, and it’s necessary to find an approach and the right profitability for DVT and DVV instruments so that the difference in revenue covers the costs of using the SSV Network.

1 Like
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Title: On-chain Vote #198

Decision: Vote YES

The full launch of Lido V3 (Phase 2) is happening as expected and planned.
I also think the Predeposit Guarantee is a good solution. I don’t know the statistics on how long users waited to fill up to 32ETX, but in any case, it’s a good solution.

2 Likes
7

Title: Shapshot Voting Rewards Share Committee Reform

Decision: Vote YES

It’s simple:
New powers are being granted to implement the requirements of the new 2026 plan (GOOSE-3), namely stVaults Rewards and Node Operator rebates.
The options are either to create a new committee for these purposes or to use an existing one, which is more rational.

2 Likes
8

Title: Shapshot Voting Should Stakin continue in the Curated and DVT sets following its acquisition by The Tie?

Decision: Vote AGAINST

  • Centralization risk
    Stakin was an independent operator.
    It is now owned by the institutional company The Tie.
    There is no information about other validators/operators owned by this company.

  • Regulatory risk
    Since it is an institutional company, it may be under regulatory pressure, which may harm Lido.

1 Like
9

Title: Shapshot Voting Authorize $5M DAO Treasury Allocation to Lido Earn ETH and USD Vaults

Decision: Vote AGAINST

This proposal does not create direct value for LDO holders, as any returns simply flow back into the DAO Treasury without strengthening token economics.

It exposes the Treasury to first-loss risk while offering no mechanism for value accrual, buybacks, or distributions.

Effectively, it reallocates idle capital into Lido’s own product without addressing the core issue of capital efficiency. DAO funds should not be used as a passive growth signal unless there is a clear, measurable return for tokenholders.

2 Likes
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Title: Shapshot Voting Delegate Incentivization Program 2.0

Decision: Vote AGAINST

I understand that this program has many advantages, including for me as a delegate with over 1 million LDOs, but there are significant problems:

  1. Delegates have no incentive to vote for decisions that increase the token’s value. They previously considered this a bit, but now payments will be in USD.
  2. It’s unclear whether the budget will come from the LDOs that will be sold or from stablecoins – I haven’t seen any information about this.
  3. Centralization of control – two members of Agora are proposed to be replaced by members of the Lido Labs Foundation.
2 Likes
11

Thanks for outlining your concerns. I’ll respond here, but it would be more productive to raise these points directly in the relevant threads so they can be addressed in context and in detail.

On Delegate Incentivization Program:
On incentives: compensation in LDO did not meaningfully change incentives around increasing token value. The stronger incentive comes from delegation itself and from staying credible within the delegate set. Delegates who support decisions that harm token value risk losing delegations, as tokenholders can re-delegate or exit. That dynamic is materially stronger than the relatively small amount of LDO distributed as rewards, both relative to quorum and to total supply.

On the budget source: LDO will not be sold to fund this program. Lido’s standard practice is to convert a portion of protocol stETH into stables to cover operational expenses.

On centralization: the program is mature and operates with established processes and transparency. If there is a specific governance risk in the proposed changes, it would be useful to articulate the concrete mechanism by which centralization would increase and the control surface that would shift materially.

2 Likes
12

Title: Shapshot Voting Authorize LDO Accumulation Program for up to 10,000 stETH

Decision: Vote FOR

2 Likes
13

Title: Shapshot Voting Increase Lido Alliance BORG Operational Easy Track Limits to align with EGG

Decision: Vote FOR

I’m against increasing the budget, but this isn’t about increasing expenses, it’s about ensuring that the money already approved can be used properly.
The DAO has already agreed to spend these funds; it would be strange to limit the amount for the period.

2 Likes
14

Title: Shapshot Voting Lido DAO Ops Multisigs Policy 3.0

Decision: SUPPORT

Cases like the Drift Protocol hack show that problems often arise not from smart contracts, but from multisigs and human error.
And policies like these are precisely the protection against this level of risk.

2 Likes
15

Title: Shapshot Voting Introduce an Identified DVT Cluster type in the Community Staking Module

Decision: Vote FOR

This offer makes participation in Lido more accessible and fair for smaller operators. Currently, scaling is difficult unless you’re a major player – you need a lot of collateral.
It’s also a step toward decentralization.

2 Likes
16

Title: Shapshot Voting Redirect DVT & APM Incentives to Current Meta Treasury and LoL

Decision: SUPPORT

The idea itself is a good one, using your new product for reware.
There are some doubts that they will now be less transparent even to the system – everything will be distributed evenly among all users.

2 Likes
17

Title: Shapshot Voting From LNOSG to CMC: Evolving Curated Staking Modules Governance

Decision: SUPPORT

Of course, creating such a committee will ensure efficiency in resolving issues.
However, some power is being transferred to a small group without elections, and this reinforces centralization.
It’s also unclear how this will affect the operating budget (even if there are no changes now, in the future this could become an argument for paying additional salaries to this committee).

I would have voted abstained, but that’s not an option (which is also bad; there should be a choice).

2 Likes
18

Title: On-chain Vote #199

Decision: Vote YES

A large list of changes, primarily related to fixing identified potential minor vulnerabilities and changing some addresses of oracles, committees, and other entities.
There are no significant changes regarding finances or protocol operation – overall, the planned execution of Snapshot decisions and ongoing adjustments based on audit results.

2 Likes
19

Title: On-chain Vote #200

Decision: Vote NO

I outlined my concerns in the proposal thread, as well as the support of other delegates who expressed concerns about equal conditions compared to other participants

3 Likes
20

Title: Shapshot Voting Authorize Lido EarnETH Loss Coverage Below 1% Threshold For The Kelp Incident

Decision: Vote AGAINST

I consistently vote AGAINST decisions that don’t take tokenholders into account.

Despite the positive side of maintaining Lido Earn’s reputation and user trust, there’s an opportunity to take tokenholders into account, specifically:

  • This should have been a simple withdrawal from the treasury, but a temporary loan that would have been returned (no matter the time period) to the treasury from Lido Earn future income
  • This would have necessitated a slight reduction in the income of those investing in this product, but this solution both rectifies the current situation and supports the treasury (and therefore the tokenholders) – win win
2 Likes