Establish a Public Delegate Platform and Delegate Incentivization Program

Proposals
83

I’ve written about this several times, but I wanted to share my thoughts again, as I’m genuinely enthusiastic about on-chain governance structures and the Lido protocol.

I have no issue with Labs providing incentives to knowledgeable contributors to support their decision-making process.
However, I believe this mentality toward DAO governance could ultimately lead Lido DAO to a structure where the delegate set is concentrated among a few whales, participation rates hover just above quorum, and governance becomes effectively centralized around Labs, with little real representation of token holders.

Token holder representation is the most crucial element, as it directly ties the value of the governance token to the protocol itself. Buybacks are a weak and often ineffective mechanism for aligning token value with protocol success, something the DAO industry has demonstrated many times.

Without incentivizing all active delegates, regardless of size, and without encouraging token holders to delegate, neither the diversity of delegates nor overall participation is likely to grow, resulting in a low-value and misaligned governance token.

And the most promising, yet at the same time unfortunate, thing about Lido DAO is that its governance framework is not being fully utilized, despite being one of the best in the industry for tying token ownership to protocol ownership.

5 Likes
84

I am generally in favor of this proposal and willing to join the Delegate Oversight Committee Multisig with an address 0x6402f26ae319b4edB6c4D459D437Fe274dE29f20.

Although I propose moving the eligibility snapshot date from the 15th of the quarter’s middle month to the day the first voting slot actually begins each quarter, so that the eligibility determination point better aligns with the quarterly voting cadence.

3 Likes
85

Make sence, thank you. updated proposal accordingly

86

I agree with you and also think that direction you describe is the right one

At the same time, I see things a bit differently in a few areas.
I don’t think governance is centralized around Labs. Lido has independent, high-reputation delegates, people like @polar, @Lanski, and @Leuts, who are not controlled by Labs and have their own voice in the industry. That independence is real, and it’s a core strength of the current program.

I’m also cautious about paying all active delegates just for participation. Broad, automatic compensation can create an extraction dynamic and attract actors optimizing for rewards rather than impact. Paying for presence doesn’t guarantee value. I support strong compensation for delegates who deliver sustained, meaningful contributions. But I lean toward recognizing that impact individually, for example, through targeted grants, rather than paying everyone by default.

On incentivizing tokenholders to delegate: I agree participation must grow. But I’d prefer to treat LDO holder incentives as a separate design question from delegate compensation.

I genuinely value you as a delegate and hope you stay involved. The challenge is designing incentives that increase representation without diluting DAO value.

5 Likes
87

I am looking to join the Delegate Oversight Committee Multisig with an address 0xdf87a36f6c753e85f06e3a7a595dbd3f9bcd4937.

1 Like
88

I appreciate the thoughtful response and the work you and the committee have put into strengthening governance stability through DIP. I also agree that broad automatic compensation without safeguards can create extraction dynamics.

My thinking is less about paying for presence and more about how we allow the delegation market (shaped directly by LDO holders through their delegation decisions) to price delegate value over time. I understand that broader LDO holder incentive design is a separate discussion, so I won’t expand on that here.

The ≥1M LDO threshold creates a binary eligibility cliff. A delegate with 800k LDO and strong engagement currently has no path into the incentivized set, while someone just above the threshold fully qualifies. Over time, fixed cutoffs can reduce competitive pressure and slow delegate market evolution.

Rather than expanding compensation indiscriminately, I wonder whether a more graduated structure could be explored in the future, one that preserves strong incentives for established delegates while allowing high-performing mid-sized delegates a clearer growth path.

My main concern is ensuring that mechanisms designed to stabilize governance today do not unintentionally reduce its elasticity over time.

1 Like
89

Snapshot vote started

We’re starting the Delegate Incentivization Program 2.0 Snapshot, active till Mon, 09 Mar 2026 19:00:00 GMT. Please don’t forget to cast your vote!

91

Proposal makes sense to me! It’s been an honor to support the Lido community for the last 1.5 years here on this mission :saluting_face:

For this program, I believe it is at a mature enough stage to pass on the torch, excited to have @Kate_Alekseeva and @nikita.p. This will also be a very healthy proof point to demonstrate continuity of a program like this.

Thanks @Jenya_K!

2 Likes
92

Snapshot vote ended

Thank you all who participated in Delegate Incentivization Program 2.0 Snapshot! :folded_hands:
The results are:
Approve: 59.0M LDO
Reject: 1.2M LDO

2 Likes
93

One process issue I want to flag is that publishing delegate vote rationales mainly in separate delegate threads fragments discussion too much.

Instead of keeping arguments and clarifications under the main proposal threads, opinions get spread across many individual pages. That makes governance harder to follow and weakens deliberation quality.

At ENS DAO, where I am also a delegate, most substantive feedback is posted directly under the relevant proposal threads. I think that structure is more productive and keeps governance discussion easier to follow.

Main proposal threads should remain the primary venue for discussion, while delegate threads can mainly document final positions.

94

Delegate Oversight Committee Quarterly Report (Q1, 2026)

TL;DR

  • Q1 2026 was the first quarter partially operating under the updated Delegate Incentivization Program terms.
  • All seven delegates met eligibility criteria and achieved 100% voting participation.
  • The full reward pool of $75K will be distributed equally among the seven delegates (~$10.7K per delegate), with payouts made in USD-denominated stablecoins.

Overview

The Delegate Oversight Committee reviewed delegate performance for Q1 2026 (January 1 – March 31), focusing on voting activity, delegation thresholds, and quality of governance participation.

This quarter saw peak delegate engagement — many thanks to all delegates for the consistent, reliable, and high-quality participation.

Eligibility Assessment

Q1 2026 marked the first quarter in which the updated eligibility snapshot timing was applied, as approved in the Snapshot vote, with eligibility now assessed on the first day of the first voting slot of the quarter instead of the first calendar day of the quarter.

  • Delegation threshold: ≥1M LDO on Snapshot or Aragon as of the first day of the first voting slot of Q1 (January 19, 2026)
  • Voting participation: ≥70% participation across all votes during the quarter
  • Community engagement: Consistent and constructive participation in governance, including reasoning, feedback, and presence in discussions

All eligible delegates satisfied the criteria and qualified for equal rewards.

Performance Evaluation

Delegate Snapshot participation Aragon participation Eligibility
Anthony Leuts 5/5 (100%) 1/1 (100%) :white_check_mark:
Nansen 5/5 (100%) 1/1 (100%) :white_check_mark:
polar 5/5 (100%) 1/1 (100%) :white_check_mark:
Lanski 5/5 (100%) 1/1 (100%) :white_check_mark:
cp0x 5/5 (100%) 1/1 (100%) :white_check_mark:
PGov 5/5 (100%) 1/1 (100%) :white_check_mark:
Kuzmich 5/5 (100%) 1/1 (100%) :white_check_mark:

Notes

  • Delegate engagement remained consistently high, with all delegates participating in every vote and providing rationale for their decisions.
  • Kuzmich met the required delegation and was therefore included in the delegate set.

Sources: https://dune.com/lido/lido-delegations, Snapshot, https://vote.lido.fi/

Reward Allocation

As approved in the Snapshot vote, program rewards are now distributed in USD-denominated stablecoins instead of LDO.

  • Quarterly pool: $75,000
  • Number of delegates: 7
  • Per delegate: $75,000 ÷ 7 ≈ $10,714

Next Steps

  • Q1 2026 rewards will be distributed within three weeks of this report.
  • The public delegate set will be reviewed, and inactive delegates may be removed.
  • For Q2 2026, eligibility will continue to be evaluated under the current rules, ≥1M LDO delegated on either Snapshot or Aragon. Starting in Q3 2026, participation in the program will require delegation on both Snapshot and Aragon.
4 Likes
95

Introduction & Intent to Participate

We appreciate the initiative led by the DAO Operations Workstream @Jenya_K, @kadmil and the Delegate Oversight Committee. Structuring a public delegate platform was a necessary step to improve both participation quality and accountability across Lido governance.

We would like to formally express our intention to be included in the public delegate platform, and, over time, to position ourselves as a top contributor eligible for the incentivization program.

Who We Are

PRO Delegators (Nuxian Labs) operates at the intersection of validator infrastructure, capital flows, and governance.

On the infrastructure side, we are currently onboarding within the stVault framework as a Professional Operator candidate, bringing a setup built around performance, reliability, and institutional-grade requirements. Our operations span multiple networks, with ~$20M in assets under management and a focus on direct relationships with foundations, DAOs, and structured capital allocators.

This matters in the context of Lido V3, where stVaults are evolving toward a modular staking infrastructure, enabling direct relationships between capital and operators under customizable parameters.

In parallel, governance is not a secondary activity for us.

Governance Track Record

We have built a sustained and structured presence in interchain governance, our most visible participation is attested by being the most engaged contributor of all time on the Cosmos Hub forum, based on participation metrics and community feedback:
https://forum.cosmos.network/u?order=likes_received&period=all

This is not a function of volume alone. Over time, we have:

  • Published numerous governance analyses and research pieces

  • Contributed to key structural discussions (tokenomics, architecture, governance design)

  • Maintained consistent participation across cycles, not only during high-attention phases

This work has received broad support from both community members and core stakeholders, reflecting a level of trust built progressively rather than opportunistically.

Commitment Going Forward

If included in the public delegate platform, our objective is straightforward:

  • Continue publishing structured governance analysis

  • Contribute actively to discussions, especially where infrastructure and risk intersect

  • Maintain transparency in decision-making

Over time, we aim to demonstrate that this level of contribution justifies inclusion in the delegate incentivization program, based on merit and consistency.

Our intention is not simply to be listed, but to contribute in a way that is aligned with the long-term objectives of the protocol.

Happy to provide further context if needed.
PRO Delegators (Nuxian Labs)