We’re in favor because the proposal replaces a brittle fixed split with a cost-aware mechanism that tracks the actual economics of running DVT validators under today’s SSV incentive and fee regime. The core design is straightforward.
We also like how the surplus logic pushes most upside to stakers once costs are covered, which helps ensure the program remains staker-forward in “good” incentive environments. The scenario table makes the behavior intuitive: in low incentive environments, operators are protected up to the cap; in high incentive environments, the operator share compresses toward the floor and most value flows to stakers.
On the main critique raised (“this seems overly complicated; why not just reimburse costs and send the rest to DVV”), the response basically confirms that this is what the mechanism does in practice, while also allowing a small, rule-based upside for operators when network fees are below the DIP-49 implied ceiling. We like that the thread includes concrete worked examples for a CSM operator (10 validators) comparing current vs proposed under both current and targeted incentive rates.