Utilizing Market Opportunities: stETH / LDO trade

Proposals
93

Growth Committee was given a mandate to execute this proposal with certain limitations. One is the batch size of 1k stETH to maintain DAO’s control (ability to pause program during each batch transfer via objecting Easy Track motion). This parameter can be revised via Snapshot vote, but the Growth Committee cannot override it, without DAO’s consent.

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Ref link: Snapshot

On the specific ask of moving the Price Cap up. At the current LDO/ETH ratio of below 0.000150, Growth Committee estimates little practical difference of setting a higher price cap. The objective of this program is to acquire LDO at favorable levels relative to ETH, not to defend a particular ratio. Publishing a number the market can interpret as a level the DAO intends to reach invites precisely the dynamic the mandate was structured to avoid. Paying up to get there, drawing down the treasury quickly, and buying a move in the ratio that does not outlast the buying itself is not intended by this program.

The cap remains a ceiling rather than a target. If conditions shift materially during the window, it can be revised, as it was for this batch or even before the end of the Execution Window, and any revision will be published in this thread before it takes effect with objection rights unchanged.

1 Like
94

This is a great proposal and deserves to be taken seriously. I support it.

3 Likes
95

I think there are two separate issues here: the batch size itself, and how the execution of the approved budget should work across batches.

First, I agree that maintaining a nominal batch size of 1,000 stETH makes sense. The original rationale was clear: it preserves DAO control by allowing the DAO to reassess and

However, I do not think that should necessarily mean unused budget from a previous batch must effectively remain unused indefinitely.

During a substantial part of the current execution window, LDO/ETH was already within the executable range. There was sufficient time to deploy more of the batch budget. Therefore, I do not think it is helpful to treat the remaining budget as purely a market constraint. Execution timing and strategy also matter.

A more reasonable approach would be to distinguish between:

  • the new batch allocation, which remains capped at 1,000 stETH; and

  • the unused balance from previous batches, which can roll forward and remain available for execution in the next batch.

For example, if 680 stETH from a previous batch remains unused, the next batch could begin with up to 1,680 stETH available for execution. This would not change the original 1,000 stETH batch structure or eliminate DAO control over the program. The new tranche would still require DAO approval through the existing process. The only difference is that capital already approved for the accumulation program would not be repeatedly stranded and forced to wait indefinitely.

In my view, this is actually a better implementation of the original 10,000 ETH accumulation mandate.

On the Price Cap, I also support increasing it to 0.0002 LDO/ETH.

I understand the argument that the objective of the program is not to defend a specific ratio or signal a price target to the market. I agree with that principle. However, I do not think setting a maximum executable price of 0.0002 necessarily contradicts it.

A cap is a ceiling, not a target.

The program is being executed over long 40-day windows and across multiple batches. The purpose of a somewhat higher cap is not to force the Growth Committee to buy at 0.0002, but to give the program sufficient flexibility to execute when favorable opportunities arise during the execution window.

Setting the cap at 0.0002 would still be far below the 0.0005 LDO/ETH fair value referenced in the original proposal. It would therefore still provide a significant margin of safety from a valuation perspective.

More importantly, the program should be evaluated over the entire accumulation period, not based solely on short-term movements within a single execution window. A higher ceiling does not require buying at the ceiling. It simply expands the range in which the already-approved strategy can operate.

At the same time, increasing the cap could improve execution flexibility and provide greater confidence to LDO holders that the DAO is prepared to actively implement the accumulation program rather than allowing the budget to remain unused for long periods.

I therefore support the following approach:

  1. Maintain the 1,000 stETH base batch structure to preserve DAO oversight and the ability to pause the program between batches.

  2. Roll unused amounts from previous batches into the next execution batch rather than leaving previously approved capital stranded.

  3. Increase the Price Cap to 0.0002 LDO/ETH, while continuing to treat it strictly as a maximum execution price rather than a target.

This approach does not abandon the original mandate. It preserves its safeguards while making the execution of the already-approved 10,000 ETH accumulation program more practical, flexible, and effective.

3 Likes
97

Great suggestion. The price cap should be set at a level meaningfully above the current market price, rather than being set as low as possible.

Having a reasonable price range would give the execution team much more flexibility, as well as sufficient time and room to complete the task effectively. This would be much better than the current situation, where they ultimately just say, “Sorry, due to external constraints, we were unable to complete this batch.” That gives the community the impression of a dismissive or perfunctory attitude.

A reasonable way to set the price cap could be based on a rule like this:

  • When the current price is 0.000145, the price cap would be 0.0002.
  • When the current price is between 0.0002 and 0.0003, the price cap would be 0.0003.
  • When the current price is between 0.0003 and 0.0004, the price cap would be 0.0004.
  • And so on.

This kind of rule-based approach would provide the execution team with a clear framework while giving them enough flexibility to execute the buybacks effectively.

……

2 Likes
98

For a mature project, allocating $40 million every year for operational expenses is itself a questionable decision. A mature project should not require such a large level of spending

Lido labs needs to cut half the team and make the programmatic buybacks much more aggressive on every parameter

This team is burning, an absurd amount of money relative to their accomplishments and growth

1 Like
99

So? Is that it? Are the buybacks over?

100

You received at least three objections, yet a week later, we see no updates regarding the buybacks.

1 Like
101

Batch 3 will continue under the execution parameters proposed by the Growth Committee. Overall, community feedback supported proceeding with trades using the residual Batch 3 budget, with some comments advocating for greater execution flexibility.

The Growth Committee will continue to monitor market conditions and may propose revised parameters where deemed appropriate and consistent with its mandate. An execution report will be published upon completion.

102

On Buyback Budget Execution and Governance Credibility

The buyback program was originally approved by governance based on the consensus of “acquiring LDO at favorable levels relative to ETH.” However, if successive tranches keep falling through because of “waiting for better ratios,” then the next time the treasury requests a similar budget, the community will have to ask: was the budget approved for execution, or merely to exist on paper?

This is not a criticism of the committee’s judgment. It is a reminder: governance credibility is a consumable resource. A budget that is approved but not executed may damage community confidence more than one executed at a slightly worse ratio. Especially with LDO currently underperforming, holders need predictable execution, not indefinite waiting.

At the same time, I hope Lido DAO can bring in someone who truly understands narrative and expectation management. Good governance requires not only execution, but also the ability to help the community understand the meaning, pace, and boundaries of that execution. We do not lack data or mechanisms. What we lack is the ability to translate governance actions into long-term confidence. When the market is left guessing about the DAO’s intentions, even the best buyback program will be undervalued.

I believe Lido DAO is capable of uniting and genuinely acting in the long-term interest of all token holders. But that requires every governance commitment to be taken seriously — and communicated clearly and honestly to the community. Otherwise, even the best mechanism design will lose meaning through poor execution or unclear messaging.

2 Likes
103

Setting a low price ceiling also tells the market that LDO will not exceed this price ceiling. The ceiling should be set high, but purchases can be made flexibly on one’s own to ensure the monthly target is met. Otherwise, it is just formalism.

1 Like
104

Otherwise, all you will attract are speculators — or are you deliberately trying to suppress the price?

1 Like
105

I don’t quite understand the management process. You state that the budget is recalled and adjusted following objections. You received three objections containing suggestions for improvement, yet you proceeded to do it your own way regardless. Could I get a detailed explanation?

1 Like
106

Setting the buyback cap lower and lower only signals two things to the market:

  1. The LDO price will keep going lower.
  2. It will attract speculators in LDO to dump en masse once the price is above the cap.

The right approach is to split 10,000 ETH across 48 weeks and buy back automatically—about 200stETH per week, regardless of exchange rate. That is what real long-term growth looks like. Combined with our future value capture, confidence among long-term holders will be built and sustained over time.

1 Like
107

This is exactly how we show the market that we are genuinely building confidence and laying a solid foundation for long-term holders.

One year is enough to make it clear to all LDO holders—including technical contributors—that we are truly committed to the long-term construction of Ethereum staking infrastructure. They will have enough time to understand LDO’s future plans. In the same way, when LDO faces any setbacks in the future, everyone will be willing to stand with LDO through thick and thin.

Please do not put the cart before the horse. Our goal is to build a long-term, fair trust system for LDO. If we simply reduce supply, even adding another 10,000 stETH will not solve the core problem.

Remember: we are a DAO. No matter how much external interference there is, as long as we build sufficient long-term trust, even the greatest crisis will not be a problem. And I believe this is the original intention behind the use of the 10,000 stETH—it is fair to everyone.

2 Likes