GOOSE-2025 & EGGs-2025 Final Report

GOOSE-2025 & EGGs-2025 Final Report

Executive Summary

This report presents the 2025 execution update following the Snapshot vote GOOSE 2024 cycle: Lido DAO goals for 2025 (GOOSE 2025).

In 2025, Lido DAO reconfirmed its long-term goals:

  • stETH is the most used token in the Ethereum ecosystem
  • Best validator set in the market
  • Effective and decentralized governance

Building on these goals, the execution focus for 2025 was established:

  • stETH: Expansion through a new product line
  • Validator Set: Establishment of a validator marketplace
  • Governance: Aligning tokenholder incentives with Lido’s long-term success

2025 unfolded under a structural shift in Ethereum staking. Network-wide APR compression, capital rotation away from Simple LST toward exchange and institutional staking, and intensified competition reduced the size of the segment where Lido holds category leadership. Gross Revenue declined 18.2% year over year (-17.4% in ETH terms). The decline was driven by net staking outflows and network-wide APR compression (especially in terms of Execution Layer rewards).

Execution focused on expanding beyond a single product and strengthening protocol resilience. Initial progress included the launch of Lido Earn, which by year-end offered three vault strategies (GG Vault (GVV), stRATEGY Vault, and Decentralized Validator Vault (DVV)), the phase-1 launch of stVaults, continued Community Staking Module (CSM) expansion, Curated Module fee revision, and the activation of Dual Governance.

Key metrics and outcomes for the year are summarized below.

Key Developments

Several initiatives were delivered in 2025 to expand the protocol beyond a single product and strengthen its long-term resilience. Key developments included:

stETH & Product Line Expansion

  • Lido Earn launched: 77k ETH TVL by year-end; establishes a product line for APR-maxis.
  • stVaults phase-1 launched: This protocol expansion widens the addressable market and allows node operators to act as builders. It enables configurable staking infrastructure for institutional and specialized use cases, leveraging stETH’s market-leading liquidity and DeFi integrations.
  • WisdomTree ETP live: first liquid staking ETP in Europe; $50M AUM at the launch. Opens a regulated institutional distribution channel for stETH exposure.

Validator Set & Validator Marketplace

  • Curated Module fee revision and CSM economics increased the DAO’s effective share of protocol rewards at year-end, to 6.10% (+23% YoY) (last week of December 2025 actuals), without changing the 10% protocol fee.
  • The set of node operators running validators on Lido has expanded to 700+ unique active node operators, improving the protocol’s decentralization.
  • CSM enabled permissionless validator participation and saw rapid growth following its launch. By year-end, the module included 412 active node operators.

Governance & LDO Tokenomics

  • Dual Governance launched: introduces a protocol-level safety mechanism for stETH holders, strengthening long-term governance alignment and significantly reducing counterparty risk, especially relevant for institutional stakers.
  • Governance transparency improved through quarterly Tokenholder Update Calls, clearer Guided Open Objective Setting Exercise (GOOSE) and Ecosystem Grant Request (EGG) procedures, and annual-style execution and financial reporting.

New Foundations Leadership

Also, during the year, the Foundations introduced new leadership to guide the protocol through its next phase. Executive Director Lido Labs Foundation Vasiliy Shapovalov, with Isidoros Passadis serving as Chief of Staking. Sam Kim served as Chief Legal & Operating Officer until the end of December 2025, when he stepped down and was succeeded by Kate Zueva as Deputy Chief Operating Officer. Under this leadership, the organization increased its focus on execution, product expansion, and financial discipline. In parallel, cost-optimization measures, including a reduction in contributor headcount, were implemented to better align the operating model with market conditions. These changes improved operating efficiency and strengthened the DAO’s financial resilience.

What Comes Next

In 2026, execution will focus on scaling adoption of the expanded product line around stETH, completing the validator marketplace, and advancing LDO alignment under clear treasury-surplus guardrails.

1. Intro

This report provides the 2025 update as mandated by the Snapshot vote, explicitly referencing the GOOSE 2024 cycle: Lido DAO goals for 2025 (GOOSE 2025) proposal.

GOOSE is the DAO’s framework for setting three-year objectives and defining annual goals aligned with those objectives.

The three objectives for 2025 were:

  • Effective and decentralized governance
  • Best validator set in the market
  • stETH is the most used token in the Ethereum ecosystem

For 2025, these were operationalized into three priorities: expanding stETH into a diversified product line, establishing a validator marketplace, and strengthening LDO’s role in governance through improved incentive alignment and protocol safeguards.

This report is prepared by Lido Labs Foundation in coordination with the Lido Ecosystem and Lido Alliance Foundations (together, the Foundations). These entities received grant funding from the DAO to execute GOOSE 2025 initiatives. This report reviews delivery against those objectives and priorities from January 1 to December 31, 2025. It also includes market and execution context, financial data, and treasury position changes for the same period.

2. Market Context and Strategic Reset

Market Environment

The structural shift in Ethereum staking that began in 2024 continued and intensified throughout 2025. Network-wide staking APR compression, driven by an execution layer (EL) rewards drop due to network scaling, and a consensus layer (CL) rewards decrease, predetermined by the issuance curve, plus increased product fragmentation and evolving capital preferences, reshaped demand across segments.

The Simple LST segment, historically Lido’s strongest category, had already begun contracting in 2024 and continued to decline as a share of total staking in 2025. Capital rotated toward exchange staking, institutional low-risk staking, and the APR-maxis segment, where liquid restaking providers heavily incentivized demand with protocol token subsidies. This rotation altered the competitive landscape and compressed market share across liquid staking providers.

In this context, Lido’s market share declined. The compression reflects ongoing market rotation and intensified competition, not a loss of category leadership. Lido remains the largest liquid staking solution with 24.12% of all staked ETH.



Leadership and Execution Reset

Rewards compression and slower staking growth required operational adjustments.

In Q2, the Foundations introduced new leadership. In the second half of the year, cost discipline was enforced across organizations, including a 15% reduction in contributor headcount and Token Reward Plan (TRP) adjustments. After a cost rationalisation exercise, total expenses for the year were $39.1M, excluding TRP costs, well below the approved 77M grant and 8% lower than in 2024 ($42.4M). TRP expenses decreased from $9.7M to $6.4M annually, a 34% reduction. Year over year, total Foundations’ expenses decreased by $6.6M, resulting in a 13% reduction instead of the planned increase.

Strategic Reprioritization

Over the past years, Lido contributors focused on building core infrastructure for secure, decentralized Ethereum staking, strengthening validator decentralization, governance mechanisms, and protocol resilience. By 2025, that foundational phase was largely in place. The strategic priority shifted from building the core system to preparing it for the next phase of growth while making the core staking economics more resilient.

This reprioritization centered on four priorities:

  • Continued strengthening of protocol and DAO resilience.
  • Restructuring staking modules economics.
  • Targeted expansion into APR-maxis and low-risk staking segments.
  • Diversification of revenue streams.

This transition reflects a move from infrastructure consolidation to product-driven expansion, while maintaining leadership in the Simple LST segment.

3. GOOSE-2025 Achievements

3.1 stETH & Product Line Expansion


The primary objective for 2025 was to transition from a single-product staking model to a broader product line that addresses underserved segments, including institutional stakers and APR-maxis. Below is a summary of progress toward this objective.

3.1.1 stVaults (Lido V3) – Phase 1 Launched December 2025

Lido V3 introduced non-custodial, over-collateralized staking vaults (stVaults), enabling stakers to opt into specific operators and strategies while minting stETH. stVaults operationalize the transition from a monolithic staking model to a modular product architecture.

Following the Phase 1 mainnet launch in December, Phase 2 went live on January 29, 2026, fulfilling the GOOSE-2025 goal of product line expansion. The DeFi Wrapper, a reference implementation of an stVault and DeFi strategy combination, is already available for builders and also has custom strategy support. stETH minting in permissionlessly created stVaults is expected in late Q1 2026 as part of the next rollout phase.

Early ecosystem signals include:

Institutional Infrastructure providers such as Kiln, Northstake, Solstice, and Everstake are exploring stVault-based configurations for institutional staking products.

3.1.2 Lido Earn – Launched August 2025

Lido Earn addresses the APR-maxis segment, stakers who prioritize the highest returns, which expanded materially as staking demand rotated toward higher-yield products.

The product launched in August 2025 and provides a structured layer for deploying stETH into curated yield strategies while preserving the liquidity and composability of liquid staking.

By year-end, traction included:

  • TVL: 77,002 ETH
  • Annualized result (30d MA): $1.1M
  • Active vaults: 3

Lido Earn expands stETH utility beyond passive liquid staking and creates an additional revenue source for the DAO Treasury.

3.1.3 Institutional & Low-Risk Staking

WisdomTree Physical Lido Staked Ether (LIST) — WisdomTree, a global Asset Manager with over $140 billion in assets under management and numerous digital asset ETFs and ETPs, chose stETH for its European liquid staking ETP, which it launched in December 2025. This is the first European ETP holding only stETH minted via the Lido protocol and is listed on leading European exchanges, including Xetra, SIX, and Euronext. The product’s launch AUM was about $50M.

VanEck Lido Staked ETH ETF — S-1 filed with the U.S. SEC in 2025.
If approved, the fund would hold stETH and provide regulated U.S. exposure to Ethereum staking through an ETF structure.

Also, in 2025, stETH integrations expanded across custody and institutional venues, strengthening access rails:

  • Hex Trust (Sep 2025) - enabled stETH custody support and ETH staking via the Lido protocol
  • BitGo (Jul 2025) - enabled ETH staking via the Lido protocol and direct stETH minting for users in Europe and Asia
  • Caladan (Jul 2025) - integrated stETH as accepted collateral for institutional OTC and structured products
  • Komainu (May 2025) - introduced multi-jurisdictional stETH custody with support for using stETH as collateral for off-exchange financing and settlement
  • Crypto Finance AG (Jan 2025) - added custody support for stETH

These integrations expand institutional on-ramps and strengthen stETH’s position in regulated capital markets.

3.2 Validator Set & Validator Marketplace

The node operator set expanded in 2025, driven by permissionless and DVT-based modules.


Additional validator and node operator metrics can be found in the quarterly updated Lido Validator and Node Operator Metrics (VaNOM) tool.

Business Impact of Validator Expansion

  • Supply chain diversification: reduced reliance on a single operator or infrastructure provider.
  • Staking rewards protection: lower exposure to correlated failures, slashing events, and operational downtime.
  • Cost leverage: increased competition among operators.

3.2.1 CSM — Permissionless Entry & v2 Upgrade

CSM became fully permissionless in January 2025, lowering barriers to validator participation. CSM v2, launched on October 2, introduced:

  • The Identified Community Stakers (ICS) framework, which has enfranchised hundreds of identified home stakers by allowing them to operate validators at slightly better terms than a normal permissionless user of CSM
  • A more precise Performance Oracle, combined with a strikes system that allows the module to self-heal in the case that node operators underperform
  • Triggerable Withdrawals (EIP-7002) support, increasing protocol security
  • Revised economics for node operators using CSM:
    • Preferential node operator rewards share (6%) for the first 16 validators of an ICS Node Operator
    • 3.5% node operator rewards share for all other validators and for the permissionless node operator type

Permissionless access is now paired with enforceable performance standards and differentiated operator economics.

3.2.2 Curated Module Fee Revision

In response to staking market fee compression, the Curated Module economics were adjusted by tokenholder vote from a 5% blanket node operator share of rewards to a system based on node operator tiers.

New baseline node operator tiers:

  • Standard: 3.50%
  • Extra Effort: 4.00%
  • Client-Team: 4.50%

The protocol-level fee (10%) remains unchanged, resulting in higher DAO net rewards.

Lido Core DAO Share of Staking Rewards Evolution


*Voting on the DAO rewards rate changes took place in mid-December with enactment on December 24, and the actual data resulting from these changes is provided in the table above for December 25-31.

3.2.3 Toward a Validator Marketplace

Work progressed on Curated Module v2 (CMv2) and Staking Router v3 (SRv3), planned for H2 2026. These protocol upgrades aim to introduce:

  • Fee competition between operators
  • More granular stake allocation based on a weights system, with the ability to rebalance stake distribution if needed
  • Operator-type differentiation
  • Performance-influenced stake (de)allocation

Together, these initiatives will be the final steps required to complete the transition to the validator marketplace.

3.3 Governance & LDO Tokenomics

3.3.1 Dual Governance — Activated July 2025

Dual Governance introduced a protocol-level objection mechanism that allows stETH holders, under certain conditions, to delay governance decisions and exit before undesirable changes take effect. By linking opposition intensity to timelock duration, the mechanism increases the cost of contentious proposals and allows time for corrective action.

Strategic impact

  • Reduces governance tail risk for stETH holders.
  • Strengthens protocol-level safeguards.
  • Improves institutional confidence in Lido’s risk framework.
  • Serves as a mechanism to signal stETH user agreement (or disagreement) with proposed protocol changes.

3.3.2 LDO Alignment — Economic Framework & NEST

In 2025, governance work progressed toward stronger economic alignment between protocol performance and LDO. By end-year the alignment framework follows these main principles:

  • Relevant protocol rewards flow to the DAO, not the Foundations
  • Treasury surplus belongs to the DAO
  • LDO tokenholder votes govern the treasury
  • Foundations operate under defined DAO oversight and intervention rights
  • Transparent annual financial reporting is established

The next step is to formalize a direct link between protocol performance and LDO.

NEST (Network Economic Support Tokenomics) – a modular, future-proof system that, when supplied with stETH, enables stETH to be swapped for LDO – establishes the infrastructure.

In December, development of the first manual module was completed. It represents a governance-controlled mechanism enabling manually triggered any-to-any token swaps. Activation requires a DAO vote and is proposed to be launched together with the future automated buyback module.

Building on this infrastructure, forum discussions are ongoing regarding automated treasury surplus–funded liquid buybacks. Under the proposed design, protocol-generated staking rewards would be used to acquire LDO from the open market and deploy the tokens into an LDO/wstETH liquidity position held by the DAO. This structure creates a direct link between protocol performance and LDO while maintaining market liquidity. The intent is to ensure any value-routing mechanism activates only when a genuine treasury surplus exists and scales with improved protocol economics.

The initiative is currently in technical validation and parameter research. Release is targeted for Q2 2026.

3.3.3 Governance Participation & Process Discipline

Quorums were consistently met in 2025, with only a single vote failing to reach the quorum, a significant improvement compared to the three no-quorum votes recorded in 2024. The DAO remained operationally responsive throughout the year with active voting power on Aragon: 87M LDO.

The Public Delegates program continued to support participation. Throughout the year, 10 active public delegates consistently participated in governance, collectively securing roughly 25M LDO. This delegation structure significantly improves decision-making stability by ensuring a reliable base of engaged governance participants, while maintaining open participation for the broader community.

Significant progress has been made in making the work of the Foundations more transparent, understandable, and traceable:

  • Launch of quarterly Tokenholder Update Calls
  • Publication of a preliminary GOOSE 2025 progress report in Q3
  • Clearer procedures for GOOSE 2026 and EGG proposals
  • Added structured annual reporting on GOOSE Goals progress and overall DAO finance.

4. Funding & Financial Overview

2025 unfolded under rewards compression driven by staking outflows and a network-wide decline in staking APR. Total Revenue was $40.5M, reflecting lower net staking fees and APR compression.

At the same time, Foundations’ expenses were reduced year over year from $52.1M to $45.5M, resulting in a 13% decrease. It was below the approved aggregate grants, reflecting cost-optimization measures across the Foundations.

Overview

mUSD 2024Y 2025Y Δ Δ %
Gross Staking Rewards 1,034.5 846.7 (187.8) -18%
Gross Revenue 103.5 84.7 (18.8) -18%
Cost of Revenue (staking rewards to NOs and NOs rebates) (51.9) (43.1) 8.7 -17%
Cost of Revenue (deposit referrals)* (3.1) (4.1) (1.0) 32%
Net Revenue from staking fees (incl. stVaults) 48.5 37.4 (11.1) -23%
Other Revenue
New Product: Lido Earn 0.0 0.3 0.3 100%
Treasury Management (stETH APY, sUSDS, (T)MMFs) 3.9 2.7 (1.2) -31%
Total Revenue 52.4 40.5 (11.9) -23%
Total Operating Expenses (40.9) (40.7) 0.2 0%
Operating Expenses (28.8) (33.0) (4.2) 15%
TRP costs (9.7) (6.4) 3.2 -34%
Lido Ecosystem Grant Organization (LEGO) grants, incl. LDO-denominated (1.5) (1.1) 0.4 -28%
Other income and expenses (0.9) (0.1) 0.8 -84%
Growth & liquidity (11.2) (4.8) 6.4 -57%
Liquidity Rewards (11.2) (4.8) 6.4 -57%
Total Foundations’ Expenses excl. TRP costs (42.4) (39.1) 3.3 -8%
Total Foundations’ Expenses (52.1) (45.5) 6.6 -13%
Total Treasury Surplus 0.3 (5.0) (5.3)

*Deposit referrals were reclassified from Growth & liquidity to Cost of Revenue (deposit referrals)

Approved Grants

​​While the DAO approved up to $77M in grants in 2025, this figure represents the maximum authorized grant rather than the amount actually withdrawn from the Treasury. Actual spending was limited to $45.5M in total Foundations’ expenses. Any balance above the reported $45.5M is not considered available for future use by the Foundations, which no longer have a mandate to spend it. Where such funds remained in the Treasury, they were never drawn. Where they continue to be held on Foundations’ multisigs, they are reported below as part of the Treasury position and would only be used under separate grant mandates.

Additionally, three more grants were approved earlier:

This fragmentation made it difficult to assess total spend, track performance across workstreams, and maintain consistent financial controls. In addition, 2025 brought leadership changes and shifting priorities, leading to a reprioritisation of spend across workstreams and inter-entity cost reallocation. The Foundations have since refined monitoring and mandate-alignment frameworks to ensure better discipline in 2026.
The earlier stated $58.9M was based on a subset of the largest requests. To improve transparency and avoid inflated grant requests and fragmentation, 2026 grants were requested in a consolidated format.

Treasury Position

2024Y 2025Y Δ
stETH in DAO Treasury at the end of the period (amount) 34,161 33,561 (599.3)
stETH in DAO Treasury at the end of the period (value in mUSD) 114.0 99.6 (14.3)
Stablecoins in DAO Treasury, mUSD 25.1 21.9 (3.2)
stETH in Foundations multisigs (amount) 7,323 8,192 869.2
stETH in Foundations multisigs (value in mUSD) 24.4 24.3 (0.1)
Stablecoins in Foundations multisigs, mUSD 3.7 7.0 3.3
Fiat balances in Foundations accounts 0.7 0.8 0.1
LP positions / funds for market making, mUSD 0.0 3.1 3.1
Liquid assets Matic, ZK, mUSD 0.1 0.2 0.1
Liquid assets wstETH, mUSD 0.2 0.5 0.4
stSol in Solana treasury Multisig (amount) 13,819 0 (13,819)
stSol in Solana treasury Multisig (mUSD) 3.3 0.0 (3.3)
Total Treasury in USD 171.5 157.5 (14.0)

Total Treasury closed the year at $157.5M, down from $171.5M in 2024. The change was driven mainly by a reduction in the USD value of the stETH treasury position, not by structural operating deficits.

Basis of Presentation and Accounting Policies

Disclaimer
The financial information included in this report was not prepared in accordance with any major GAAP.

Accounting Policy

The financial report is prepared on an accrual basis. Rewards and expenses are recognized in the period in which they are economically earned or incurred, rather than when tokens are transferred on-chain. To ensure comparability, 2024 figures have been restated for material accrual items.

The primary changes include:

  • application of period cut-off adjustments for 2025Y only (cut-off adjustments were not applied to 2024 figures as the estimated impact of such adjustments is not considered material).
  • accrual recognition of TRP expenses both for 2024 and 2025 due to their significance and for comparability purposes.

Recognition of TRP expenses on an accrual basis means that the monthly expense is calculated based on (i) the amount of tokens vested during the reporting period and (ii) the 30-day average LDO/USD market price used for valuation. TRP compensation is recognized linearly over the requisite service period regardless of cliff structures.

LDO tokens are recognized when expensed. Unallocated LDO tokens held by DAO are excluded from the reported Total Treasury Position balance.

USD Conversion

For accounting purposes, the USD value of transactions and rewards is calculated using the token price recorded at the end of the day when the transaction occurred. Token balances are valued in USD using the end-of-day closing price on the reporting date.

Explanation of Key Financial Items

Gross Revenue represents the protocol’s share of Ethereum staking rewards generated by Lido validators after distribution to stETH holders. These rewards are further allocated to node operator rewards, deposit referral incentives, and node operator rebates. Node operators’ rebates represent adjustments that increase the effective reward share for certain node operators, reflecting differences between the base node operator fee and higher reward levels applicable to specific operator types.

Other Revenue includes additional revenue streams outside the Lido protocol fee. These primarily consist of Treasury Management rewards, generated from treasury-held assets, as well as early-stage rewards from new protocol products, such as Lido Earn.

Operating Expenses represent the grants the DAO provides to develop, maintain, and operate the Lido protocol. These include research and development (protocol upgrades, engineering, monitoring, and validator tooling), general and administrative costs (legal, finance, DAO operations, and shared infrastructure), marketing and communications, and security audits and infrastructure services.

Liquidity Rewards represent expenses aimed at strategically boosting liquidity in crucial stETH applications, supporting potential integrations that can strengthen the stETH ecosystem, and implementing temporary liquidity measures with clearly defined objectives.

5. Conclusion & 2026 Direction

With Lido DAO’s core mission largely complete (see Lido on Ethereum Scorecard), the protocol now stands as a secure, decentralized, and scalable staking platform. The foundational engineering phase focused on validator decentralization, staking infrastructure, and governance safeguards, achieving structural maturity.

2025 marked the completion of that phase, with the permissionless CSM and Dual Governance in place. The protocol operates at scale, with diversified validator participation, embedded governance protections, and structured financial oversight.

Staking remains a durable and predictable source of rewards. The current growth vector is Lido’s product portfolio expansion, including modular staking infrastructure (stVaults), APR-maxis oriented products such as Lido Earn, and institutional staking distribution channels.


This material is for informational purposes only and is not investment, legal, business, financial, or tax advice.

No representation or warranty, express or implied, is made as to its accuracy, completeness, or timeliness. No information in this material should be interpreted as a recommendation or relied upon as a guarantee of any specific outcome. Past performance is not indicative of future results. Any opinions or forward-looking statements reflect the current judgment of the Foundations as of the date of this publication and are subject to change without notice. Parties should conduct their own independent evaluation before making any decisions.

17 Likes

Nansen appreciates the report and the level of financial transparency. We look at this through the lens of an onchain treasury with a focus on capital discipline, risk management, and long-term sustainability, so we value reporting that makes it easier to judge both operating execution and treasury posture.

Financial transparency is strong. Full P&L, treasury position, and actual grant drawdown versus approved budget is above average for DAO reporting.

A few follow-ups that we think could enhance the reporting and assessment.

First, opex detail. The report shows $33.0M in operating expenses, but not enough functional breakdown to assess where spend sits across engineering, BD, operations, legal, and related areas.

Second, Lido Earn. The report cites 77k ETH TVL at year-end, while the February tokenholder update references 61k ETH. It would be useful to understand the main drivers of that decline, and to see a simple breakdown of flows and performance across the three vault strategies.

Third, market share. The report is clear on the pressure from exchange staking, institutional low-risk staking, and APR-maxis, but less clear on the quantified rate of share loss and the milestones that would define a successful recapture through product diversification.

Fourth, the GOOSE scorecard. The report covers what was delivered, but a target versus actual view would make it easier to assess execution against the original mandate.

Fifth, treasury sustainability. The buyback framework looks deliberately conservative, which makes sense. It also means it remains inactive unless market and revenue conditions improve materially. It would be helpful to hear the plan if ETH remains range-bound and revenue stays close to current levels. Some of this of course has been addressed in the new proposal on stETH / LDO trade here.

7 Likes

Appreciate the effort here. This report is clearly an improvement in transparency, especially around actual grant drawdown versus approved amounts.

At the same time, as a tokenholder, I still do not think annual retrospective reporting is enough for a DAO of Lido’s scale. Public monthly tracking has not been reliable enough, and without recurring, consistent reporting it remains difficult to assess fiscal discipline in real time.

What would help most is a regular actual-vs-budget view, with a clearer functional breakdown of operating expenses and a more consistent public dashboard that tokenholders can follow throughout the year, rather than only at year end.

2025 delivery included important progress, but expenses still exceeded revenue, so I think stronger recurring financial transparency should be treated as a governance priority.

2 Likes

Let us address the faster part of your questions first. We’ll return to the first one a bit later, as it needs a more thorough answer.

The difference comes mainly from a calculation mismatch: the February tokenholder update did not include DVV in the Lido Earn summary, while the year-end report did. So there was a decline, but not as large as the two figures suggest at first glance.

Earn TVL dipped in February following the sharp ETH/USD price drop, but has since recovered losses and is now sitting at a new ATH. You can check current data on this public Dune dashboard - https://dune.com/lido/lido-earn-vaults

Over the period, market share declined from 28.3% to 24.12%, a loss of 4.18 percentage points, or 14.8% relative to the starting level. That is the clearest way to quantify the change. That said, the full-period number does not fully capture the pattern within the year. Q4 2025, Q1 2026 showed some recovery, so the decline should not be read as a straight-line indicator of the current trajectory.

More broadly, headline market share is only part of the story. The more useful question is whether core LST share is stable (yes, it is) and whether product diversification is improving Lido’s position in the segments where competitive pressure is strongest. That is generally the lens used in tokenholder calls, and the report could make that framing more explicit.

The report does not include a clean target-versus-actual GOOSE scorecard because no such scorecard existed in a fully specified form at the outset. The 2026 GOOSE proposal is already more explicit on this point, which should make it easier to assess outcomes against the original mandate going forward.

The buyback’s inactivity is a feature of the risk management; it preserves capital when growth slows. If ETH remains range-bound, it is probably necessary to pivot toward curbing operational spend and recalibrating NEST parameters after that, but let’s first have that programmatic & adaptable linkage in place. In the interim, the stETH/LDO trade proposal serves as a tactical lever to strengthen the treasury’s composition.

3 Likes

Thanks for the update! Congrats on a tough but incredibly important year for Lido. As a delegate, LDO holder, Lido user, and Aragon partner here are some thoughts:

I think you are managing a challenging time where $ETH, the EF, and Ethereum itself were “under fire” from a large portion of the crypto community. New competitors like Tempo and Arc are beginning their positioning as well. It might be the first time we see cracks in the Ethereum user-base. This has a direct impact on Lido and LDO because of how integrated the two are. Although I am as “Ethereum aligned” as anyone else it’s extremely clear to me that Lido needs to find a way to hedge against ETH struggling, while still retaining the upside. I think the team already know this.

Congrats on Dual governance → this is the type of initiative that is extremely painful and you see almost no reward as other projects fly by focusing on growth. Hold your heads high here, this is the kind of protection users and probably institutions want. It’s not just about “decentralization” but about safety and security. This pays itself back over many years.

Leadership changes → congrats to all those who’ve moved into new positions and thank you to those who’ve stepped out or down. Don’t ever hesitiate to reach out for help.

Cost → after decreasing Aragon’s costs from $8million/yr to $3million/yr I finally realise the lean methodology only founders understand. Also how you can have a similar output with reduced headcount. It’s not easy but a good thing. I hope fiscal responsibility can continue into 2026/27!

Feedback on the report:

  1. Opex detail could be included → excluding specifics on salaries per contributor, etc.
  2. Where is the decentralization scorecard? Still a thing?

I honestly don’t have much else to say! Keep doubling down. Thanks for the great report!

4 Likes

Hi, @Nansen @BCV @Leuts !
Thank you for your comments and feedback on the 2025 annual report.

In response to your questions about OPEX details we are sharing a breakdown of operating expenses and explanatory notes below.

OPEX structure

Operating expenses are primarily driven by Compensation and Service Fees.

Total Compensation and Service fees for 2025 were approximately $23.2M, and relate to contributor compensation and third-party service providers supporting DAO-funded initiatives. For greater usefulness, a rough breakdown of these costs across their primary initiatives is provided. The total expenses are distributed across three primary categories:

Note: The allocation of these expenses across the categories involves significant judgment. Certain personnel and shared-service resources support multiple initiatives, thus these figures represent a rough indication rather than a strict accounting classification and should be treated as illustrative only.

  • Research & Development: $16.0M (69%)

  • Core Protocol: ~$11.3M

  • New Products (inc. stVaults): ~$4.7M

  • General & Administrative: $4.6M (20%)

  • Ecosystem Growth & Communications: $2.6M (11%)


OPEX dynamics

Operating expenses increased by $4.2M (+15%) in 2025 compared to 2024.

The main driver of this increase was higher Compensation and Service Fees. To understand this dynamic, it is important to consider key developments over the period.

In mid-2024, contributor compensation levels were increased to better align with market benchmarks and expanded responsibilities. Since these changes were implemented partway through 2024, their full-year impact was reflected only in 2025, increasing the compensation cost base year over year.

In 2025, a reorganization was carried out and contributor headcount was reduced by approximately 15%. This partly offset the higher compensation base, but the net year-over-year effect was still an increase of approximately ~$3.4M in compensation-related expenses versus 2024.

The reorganization also resulted in one-off costs, including +$0.6M in exit payments and +$1.1M in cash payouts related to TRP changes. These items are non-recurring and should be considered separately from the ongoing cost base.

The remaining increase in Operating Expenses is primarily driven by higher Audit and Testing, Legal, and infrastructure-related expenses. Audit & Testing costs increased by +$0.7M, mainly due to work on new products such as Dual Governance, Lido V3 and CSM v2. Legal expenses grew by +$0.4M, reflecting efforts related to supporting institutional engagement and readiness.

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Still the thing! And an update is coming — I will share it here when it’s live.

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Thank you for the 2025 annual report and for providing a more detailed operating expense report.

I read it carefully – and I have some questions.

  1. The report states: we conducted a reorganization, reduced the headcount by 15%, and implemented cost discipline. Sounds convincing. But the numbers tell a different story:

    Compensation & Service Fees increased from $18.1 million to $23.2 million – an increase of 28%, or $5.1 million. This is despite the stated reduction in staff. This is the largest expense item, 51% of the Funds’ total budget.

    The report explains: grades were raised in mid-2024, and the full effect was expected in 2025 (one-time severance payments of $0.6 million are only 12% of additional expenses). The logic is clear, but it’s impossible to verify – the report doesn’t list the absolute number of employees, the average compensation level, or the scale of grade increases (I understand the company isn’t required to publish such data). But it turns out that the DAO approved the budget, received a report showing a 28% payroll increase despite the announced staff reductions, and has no way to verify the basic arithmetic, only taking their word for it.

  2. Context is important. All the real savings occurred in three areas: Liquidity Rewards (-$6.4M), TRP (-$3.2M), and Marketing (-$2.1M). A total of -$11.7M in savings. But $5.1M of that was immediately “eaten up” by increased salaries. In other words, 44% of all optimization efforts were offset by an unverifiable item.

    Full-year results: operating expenses grew by 15%, revenue fell by 23%, and treasuries fell $5 million, compared to $0.3 million the year before.

    I’m not claiming anything is being intentionally hidden here. Grade increases and staff reductions could very well produce this result mathematically. But understanding it without the necessary data is quite difficult.

  3. Also, the current financial situation reveals a problem we might not have known about under more favorable market scenarios: current expenses exceed business income.
    The problem is exacerbated by the fact that these are fixed costs – and experience in 2025 has already shown that even a 15% staff reduction didn’t reduce this line item, but actually increased it.
    This is a structural problem, and it would be important to hear a concrete plan.

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Thanks for the detailed report and the OPEX breakdown that followed. And thanks to @Kuzmich, @Nansen, @BCV, and @Leuts for the questions they raised.

I normally don’t get involved in financial governance discussions. Most of you know me from the Node Operator side: I’m the founder and managing director of RockLogic, Curated Set Node Operator since 2022, and we’ve been building Stereum, StereumLabs, and other infrastructure tooling for the Lido ecosystem.

But this report made me look more carefully at the financial picture, and some of what I’m seeing is hard to reconcile with the “cost discipline” narrative. Outside of crypto, I’m also a co-owner of a mid-sized company where I oversee the financials from the ownership side: balance sheets, cost structures, salaries, strategic direction. Not operational, but I see every number and I know what questions to ask when the P&L doesn’t add up. Some of the patterns in this report would trigger those questions immediately.

1. How does Lido’s cost structure compare to peers?

I haven’t seen this comparison in the thread yet.

Aave’s annual operational expenses sit at approximately $18M (per the recent AIP-469 discussion). Their 2025 revenue was around $140M. That’s a revenue-to-opex ratio of roughly 7:1. They run active token buybacks since April 2025. And even when Aave Labs requested $25M in stablecoins (plus token vesting), the community pushed back hard. Marc Zeller publicly challenged the terms and it went through weeks of heated governance debate before passing.

Sky (formerly MakerDAO) cut operating expenses by roughly 63% in 2025 while maintaining revenue in the hundreds of millions. Active buybacks there too.

Lido: $40.5M revenue, $45.5M expenses. Revenue-to-opex ratio below 1:1. The 2026 EGG request asks for $60M against projected revenue that, at current ETH prices (~$2,350), is going to be in the low $40M range according to the February 2026 Tokenholder Update. Different business models, sure. But whether a protocol can sustainably spend more than it earns is not a model-specific question.

2. The stETH/LDO trade in this context

The stETH/LDO trade proposal asks to allocate up to 10,000 stETH from the DAO Treasury to accumulate LDO at what it calls “historically depressed levels.”

I understand the rationale: LDO looks cheap relative to protocol fundamentals. But Warren Buffett has a famous rule: never buy back your own stock while the business is losing money. Buybacks only create value when the business generates surplus cash. If you’re running a deficit, you’re not buying at a discount, you’re borrowing from your own runway.

Lido just closed 2025 with a $5M deficit. The treasury declined from $171.5M to $157.5M at year-end, and at today’s ETH price (~$2,350) the real value is closer to $130M, possibly lower when you factor in Q1 2026 spending. The 2026 budget request exceeds projected revenue. And in that situation, the proposal is to take productive, yield-bearing assets (stETH) and convert them into a governance token that generates no cash flow and no yield, with on-chain liquidity of roughly $90k at ±2% depth.

The 10,000 stETH earmarked for this trade represents roughly 7-8% of the current treasury value. That’s a meaningful chunk of runway, converted into an asset that is, practically speaking, illiquid at any serious size. Token price shouldn’t be the priority when the protocol is not profitable. Getting back to breakeven should be.

3. The transparency gap that hasn’t been closed since 2022

@Kuzmich pointed out that verifying the compensation arithmetic is impossible without absolute headcount numbers. He’s right, and this has been an open issue for years.

Back in November 2022, a community member (Red_Bull) posted “Lido FTE & Contributor Breakdown” requesting the number of FTEs and freelancers per workstream and the funding allocation per workstream. Steakhouse responded: “We will be rolling out regular reporting on the progress of this budget.”

That was three and a half years ago. The DAO still doesn’t know how many people work across the three BORG Foundations. The report says Compensation & Service Fees were $23.2M and headcount was reduced by 15%. But 15% measured how? The absolute number of contributors? Full-time equivalents? Salary-weighted headcount? Without any of these baseline figures, the 15% is unanchored and unverifiable.

In any traditional corporate structure, whether that’s a 10-person GmbH or a listed company, this information is standard. Not individual salaries, that’s not what anyone is asking for. But total headcount, cost per FTE range, allocation across departments. That’s the bare minimum for budget oversight. It was promised and never delivered.

4. “Cost discipline” vs. what actually happened

The report frames 2025 as a year of cost discipline. Total Foundations’ expenses did go down year over year, that’s true. But look at where the savings actually came from.

Liquidity Rewards: down $6.4M. Largely because the market contracted and less liquidity needed incentivizing. That’s not a management decision, that’s market conditions.

TRP: down $3.2M. TRP is valued on an accrual basis using LDO market prices. LDO went down, so TRP costs went down mechanically. If LDO recovers, this line goes right back up. Again, not a management decision.

Events & Marketing: down $2.1M. This one is a genuine cut.

And then Compensation & Service Fees: up $5.1M. A 28% increase. Despite a 15% headcount reduction. This is the one line the BORG Foundations have full discretionary control over.

So the actual picture: roughly $2M in genuine, management-driven savings (marketing). Everything else was either market-driven or price-driven. The one area where the Foundations actively decided how much to spend, they spent significantly more. Calling that “cost discipline” is a stretch.

5. The oversight gap

This is the core structural issue behind all the points above.

In a traditional company, when revenue drops 23% and your largest cost line goes up 28%, the owners get a detailed explanation with verifiable numbers. There are supervisory boards, auditor reports, shareholder meetings. If you can’t justify the numbers, you face real consequences.

In Lido’s structure, LDO holders and the 10 public delegates (~25M LDO collectively) vote on aggregate budgets via Snapshot. The three BORG Foundations receive their grants and execute. The annual report arrives months after the fact. And the report itself admits that grant fragmentation “made it difficult to assess total spend, track performance across workstreams, and maintain consistent financial controls.” That’s the Foundations’ own assessment of their own oversight capabilities.

Delegates can only challenge what they can see. And right now, they can’t see enough.

For comparison: when the Aave community discovered that Aave Labs was routing ~$10M/year in swap fees to a private address instead of the DAO treasury, there was a governance vote within weeks that redirected 100% of revenue to the DAO. That’s what real-time accountability in a DAO looks like.

@BCV’s call for quarterly or monthly actual-vs-budget reporting is the right direction. But frequency alone won’t fix this. The DAO needs to define what the Foundations are required to disclose as a governance baseline: headcount, compensation bands, functional expense breakdowns. Not as a nice-to-have, but as a condition tied to grant approval.

6. What happens if the market bet doesn’t work out?

The February 2026 Tokenholder Update says further headcount reductions are “not the right move at this stage” and would only be reconsidered if ETH drops to around $1,000. At the same time, the same update shows that at ~$2,000 ETH, projected total revenue drops to $40.6M while the 2026 EGG budget request sits at $60M.

What does that mean concretely?

If ETH stays range-bound around current levels and the full $60M budget is executed, we’re looking at an annual deficit of roughly $17-19M. The treasury, which was reported at $157.5M at year-end, is already closer to $130M at today’s ETH prices, probably lower after Q1 spending. And since the majority of the treasury is held in stETH, any further ETH decline compresses the treasury value at the same time as it reduces protocol revenue. That’s a double squeeze: your income drops and your reserves shrink in lockstep.

Now add the stETH/LDO trade on top: another ~$23M in productive assets moved into an illiquid governance token. If ETH doesn’t recover and the budget isn’t adjusted downward, the DAO could realistically end 2026 with a treasury below $100M and a burn rate that gives it a few years of runway, not decades.

The Foundations’ stated position is that this is a temporary setback and it doesn’t make sense to act preventively. Maybe. But you plan for the downside, not the upside. That means having a clear breakeven calculation: at what ETH price and staking APR does the protocol cover its costs? A concrete contingency plan if that price doesn’t materialize within 12-18 months. And an answer to whether allocating treasury reserves to token buybacks is responsible before those first two questions are resolved.

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Heads up for @steakhouse and the team

Will appreciate if you can address points above and they are repeated during some time

Thank you, @Kuzmich , for engaging with the report in detail. These are fair questions and we want to address them directly.

The sequence of events matters here. The compensation increases did not offset the headcount reduction - they caused it. Headcount continued to grow through H1 2025 under an expansion strategy adopted in a stronger market. The Q3 restructuring was a response to the cost trajectory that had already been set - not a simultaneous event, and not something that can be evaluated as if both happened at the same moment.

So it is not the best reading of the 2025 figures to say that “$5.1M was immediately eaten up by increased salaries”, as the timing of the underlying changes was different. Likewise treating TRP savings as fully separate from the broader restructuring overstates the apparent offset (as they are directly tied to headcount reduction).

The report does not publish monthly headcount and compensation dynamics. A complete breakdown would require disclosing individually sensitive data. What we can confirm: ~15% were eliminated between August and December, generating approximately $2M in savings. What you are actually seeing in the 2025 numbers is not a failed cost reduction. But that cost-growth trend slowed.

The headline comparison of total expenses to protocol inflow compounds the misread. A significant portion of the current cost base is not maintenance - it is growth-oriented spend. In traditional financial reporting, such development costs would be capitalized and depreciated, allowing expenses to be matched with the periods when the associated revenue is realized. In this report, that distinction is absent. All expenses (both maintenance and investments in new revenue streams) are accounted for as operating expenses (OPEX) in a single period.

This is also a revenue problem, not only a cost problem. The Simple LST segment contracted in 2025: capital rotated to exchange staking, institutional products, and restaking-subsidized yield. Cutting further does not fix that. Expanding the number of revenue sources does. The products are already in the market:

  • stVaults: Early adoption is limited by ~60-day staking queues and integration timelines — a structural constraint, not a product failure.

  • Lido Earn: ~$305M TVL as of April 16. Two new MetaVaults live since March (EarnETH, EarnUSD).

  • Institutional: WisdomTree stETH ETP.

The goal is not further headcount reduction. It is to demonstrate that staking is profitable as a standalone product and to redirect the surplus into new revenue sources. The products above are the mechanism for that.

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Hi @stefa2k ,
we appreciate the benchmarking instinct, but would urge caution when making direct comparisons. Aave is a lending protocol, while Sky is a stablecoin issuer. Their cost structures, revenue mechanics, and growth levers are fundamentally not comparable, so benchmarking against them produces misleading signals instead of actionable ones

The revenue-to-opex ratio question is legit. But the more useful internal distinction is:

  1. Split OPEX: separate staking maintenance costs from growth-oriented spend, and keep monitoring whether staking-related inflows cover staking maintenance costs on a standalone basis;

  2. Grow new revenue sources: Lido Earn, stVaults, and institutional products are the mechanisms for expanding the revenue, not cutting the costs According to our current estimates, the costs of core protocol maintenance are covered by staking-related inflows.

As for the questions on cost discipline we need to note that significant efforts were undertaken to correct the course following a reassessment of the situation from Q1 2024 through Q2 2025, as well as a broader strategic recalibration.

Cost discipline is a necessary condition in the current environment, but it does not necessarily imply an immediate reduction in spending. In 2025, it implied no further growth. The primary approach has been to reallocate resources toward new priority areas, rather than pursue across-the-board cost-cutting. As noted above, part of the cost base reflects growth-oriented work on new products and adjacent capabilities, rather than only current-period maintenance spend.

As for what has been implemented to improve cost discipline, this includes establishing a spending baseline, introducing OPEX controls (partially manual), and holding quarterly calls to review actual spend against plan.

What happens if the market bet doesn’t work out?

Protocol inflow is meaningfully tied to ETH price, which is currently below the assumptions used in the EGG request. We are monitoring this closely, maintaining spending discipline, and will adjust if the deviation persists.

Your calculation also assumes full budget execution. $60M is a ceiling, while the baseline budget excluding discretionary spend is $43.8M. We agree on the “double-squeeze” risk. That is why cost discipline is the baseline and broadening future inflow sources is the priority. We have clear decision points to scale back growth spend and reduce the cost base if needed.

In addition, we project total 2026 spend based on current/median ETH price levels and a baseline scenario, rather than relying on earlier assumptions embedded in the EGG request, which means we already have visibility into where we land if prices remain at current levels.
We also take a selective approach to treasury management and ETH swaps: not converting at current prices, but instead carefully assessing risks and opportunities, with a strong focus on timing.

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The replies added some useful context, but I still do not think the core oversight issue was addressed. In particular, I do not think @stefa2k 's point 3 and point 5 were resolved in substance. The long-standing transparency gap remains, and the underlying oversight gap remains as well. Internal controls are not the same thing as public oversight. If delegates cannot see enough on a recurring basis, then alignment between the protocol and LDO holders remains weak.

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