Rationale: Support the SNOP v3 proposal as it introduces critical technical safeguards for Node Operators in the block proposal process.
The current policy no longer fits the post-Pectra, MEV-Boost, and Staking Router 2.0 reality. This update brings the clarity and structure that Node Operators need.
SNOP v3 is essential infrastructure for scaling Lido securely and responsibly.
Intra-operator DVT spreads signing across multiple nodes instead of relying on one server. That really lowers the chance of slashing from things like hardware failure or network issues.
It also aligns Lido with Ethereum’s decentralization ethos. A necessary step to avoid centralization risks as scrutiny around MEV and censorship grows.
Rationale: Voting yes with same reason on Snapshot vote. Some of these parameters might seem confusing at first, but Dual Governance can actually make Lido stronger and more stable long term.
Timelocks and veto rights will protect stETH holders from risky proposals. When they feel safe, they will stake more ETH, which grows the DAO’s assets and trust in the long run
Rationale: I’m voting yes. This proposal will meaningfully reduce trust assumptions in the Lido protocol by enabling validator exits through the Execution Layer.
It will improve security, fault tolerance, and lay the groundwork for permissionless modules CSM.
For “Rotate Lido on Ethereum Oracle Set member Kyber Network for Caliber”
→ Support with same reason on Snapshot vote. Caliber has completed their test run with stable and reliable performance. I see no reason to block the transition.
For “Increase CSM stake share limit from 2% to 3%”
→ Voting yes with same reason on Snapshot vote. Lido can activate ~50 new Node Operators if the limit is raised to 3%, which will help diversify and decentralize the network on Ethereum.
For “Enable a grace period for CSM Node Operators”
→ Vote yes. Introducing a grace period by setting keyRemovalCharge = 0 ensures a fair and transparent transition for current CSM Node Operators as we move toward CSM v2.
It allows operators to exit without penalty if they do not wish to continue under the new reward structure.
For “Introduce a simplified CSVerifier for CSM”
→ The simplified CSVerifier removes unused code that would otherwise require unnecessary hard fork maintenance. It has no impact on node operators and helps streamline the upcoming CSM v2 upgrade. Voted yes!
For “ Update the reward address and name for Node Operator ID 2 P2P.ORG - P2P Validator"
→ Voted yes.This is a routine update to reflect the correct name and reward address for Node Operator ID 2.
For “ Switch off Easy Track environment for PML, ATC, RCC entities, deprecated after Snapshot-approved transition to Lido Labs and Lido Ecosystem BORG Foundations.”
→ Voted yes. This aims to clean up the system, remove unused processes, and ensure alignment with Lido DAO’s new governance structure.
Rationale: I voted yes. This proposal ensures the continuity and security of Lido’s validator operations.
Nethermind has played an important role in the Curated Set, the proposed migration to Twinstake comes with a well documented security model and operational continuity plan.
Approving this migration allows Lido DAO to maintain strong validator diversity while minimizing operational disruption.
Rationale: I voted Yes on establishing the stVaults Committee.
This structure is needed to launch stVaults in V3 safely and efficiently. A dedicated group can move faster on non standard requests while still prioritizing protocol security and DAO revenue.
I see the risks of concentrated decisions but as long as the committee disclose any conflicts of interest, and set a review timeline so the DAO can reassess its necessity
With that in place, it’s a simple step to support growth while keeping DAO oversight intact.
Rationale: Voted Yes. NEST is a forward looking step that improves tokenholder confidence in how the DAO manages surplus and long term tokenomics
By automatically converting surplus stETH into LDO, DAO gains a programmatic tool to reduce circulating supply and accumulate assets for future strategic use.
The modular design also gives us flexibility to adapt for example, only buying when prices are favorable, or even reversing the flow if needed in different market conditions.
I recognize risks like treasury power concentration or added technical complexity. However, these risks can be managed with proper parameters, periodic review, and transparent reporting.
Modular vault design allows more flexibility to onboard different operator types and networks.
Risk isolation per vault increases security and resilience.
Opens the door for future innovations without needing a full redesign again.
Howerver, new users may be confused if depositing 1 ETH results in receiving less than 1 stETH, which could create peg pressure if communication is unclear.
Governance will also become heavier with more vault parameters to manage. Still, with the stVaults Committee already in a vote and proper communication efforts, I believe the advantages for Lido’s long term growth clearly outweigh these downsides.
1. For “Upgrade to CSM v2 and increase CSM stake share limit from 3% to 5%”
→ Voted yes with same reason on Snapshot. This proposal strengthens the Lido protocol’s alignment with Ethereum’s decentralization roadmap.
By enforcing a per Node Operator stakeShareLimit, this change will:
Reduce overconcentration risks, ensuring no single Node Operator controls too much stake.
Encourage broader validator participation, boosting resilience and neutrality.
2. For “Activate Triggerable Withdrawals”
→ Support with same reason on Snapshot. This proposal will meaningfully reduce trust assumptions in the Lido protocol by enabling validator exits through the Execution Layer.
It will improve security, fault tolerance, and lay the groundwork for permissionless modules CSM.
3. For”Update the reward address and name for Node Operator ID 25”
→ This proposal ensures the continuity and security of Lido’s validator operations.
Approving this migration allows Lido DAO to maintain strong validator diversity while minimizing operational disruption.
4. Rotate Deposit Security Committee address for Kiln
→ A standard security measure that strengthens key management and reduces risk exposure. Voted yes!
Approving SNOP v3 is a strategic step for Lido DAO to modernize its operations, align with Ethereum’s latest technical advancements, and prepare for a multi module future.
While it may introduce short term pressure on Node Operators, the long term benefits in terms of security and protocol credibility are well worth it.
Rationale: This proposal allows Lido DAO to evolve from a slow, collective decision making model into a more professional and agile structure while maintaining strong safeguards through the Bridge Security Council.
Rationale: I agree with these adjustments to the LEGO framework.
The proposal demonstrates stronger financial efficiency, avoids artificial budgeting, and reduces idle capital temporarily locked in the LEGO multisig.
By adopting this framework, Lido shows governance discipline and maturity, knowing how and when to optimize resources and control spending effectively.
Rationale: I support this proposal as it consolidates the TRP under the Lido Labs Foundation, which now serves as Lido’s main operational entity with transparent bylaws and direct DAO oversight.
This change removes unnecessary layers and puts all contributor rewards under one responsible organization.
The amended TRP terms present a sensible financial adjustment:
Retaining the same 22M LDO cap with no increase in DAO expenditure
Reclaiming 6.99M unallocated LDO for a redesigned TRP aligned with current market conditions
Shortening the vesting period (2 years instead of 4) with lower grant multipliers to improve cost efficiency while keeping contributors aligned through continuous vesting.
The proposed tiered fee adjustments meaningfully recognize Node Operators who contribute extra effort or maintain critical client infrastructure, creating stronger incentives for high quality participation.
At the same time, these adjustments optimize DAO revenue, providing additional resources that can be reinvested into ecosystem growth and long term security.
This is a big shift, gives DAO a coherent, forward looking strategy when Lido is entering a new phase.
With V3, stVaults, institutional access, and rebalancing mechanisms coming, the protocol now has the foundations to move beyond core staking and pursue broader growth.Adopt GOOSE-3 proposal
Rationale: Following what I supported in the GOOSE proposal, I’m voting Yes.
This proposal brings the Labs, Ecosystem, and Alliance Foundations under one aligned plan, gives us clearer ownership of workstreams and avoids the fragmented budgeting we’ve had in the past.
Updating the Alliance BORG’s mandate is a minimal but meaningful fix that prevents operational bottlenecks later and avoids forcing the DAO into unnecessary legal complexity.
Rationale: 1. For “Change Curated Staking Module fee to 3.5%”
→ Support the changes with same reason on Snapshot vote. The proposed tiered fee adjustments meaningfully recognize Node Operators who contribute extra effort or maintain critical client infrastructure, creating stronger incentives for high quality participation.
2. For “Raise SDVT Staking Module stake share limit to 4.3% and priority exit threshold to 4.78%”
→ Support the change. This removes a technical bottleneck caused by net stake outflows and lets SDVT clusters reach the validator capacity already approved by the DAO.
It doesn’t expand scope, change rewards, or add new risk.
3. For “Set A41 Node Operator soft target validators limit to 0”
→ Voting yes. A41 has clearly communicated its plan to wind down, setting the soft target to 0 allows validators to exit in a controlled and predictable way.
4. For “Set Easy Track TRP limit to 15’000’000 LDO”
→ This item simply implements the Snapshot decision by setting the Easy Track TRP limit to 15M LDO. It just applies the parameters already agreed by the DAO.
Voted yes!
5. For “Add sUSDS token to stablecoins Allowed Tokens Registry and sUSDS transfer permission to Easy Track EVM Script Executor in Aragon Finance”
→ This allows the DAO to earn yield on idle stablecoins by adding sUSDS to Easy Track, with limited scope and low execution risk. Voted yes!
6. For “Transfer MATIC from Lido Treasury to Liquidity Observation Lab (LOL) Multisig”
→ This is a simple treasury housekeeping step. Moving MATIC to the LOL multisig so it can be converted to USDC and aligned with the current treasury strategy. Support!
Rationale: This proposal mitigates risk after the loss of control over a vesting address by recovering the allocation, splitting it across multiple wallets, and reapplying a 1-year vesting period.
While unconventional, it improves asset security and reduces near term token pressure, aligning with the DAO’s long-term interests. I support the proposal
Rationale: While I would personally hope to see more room for smaller or emerging delegates to participate in the incentivization program over time, I believe this proposal takes a pragmatic and responsible step toward strengthening Lido’s governance infrastructure.
Rationale: No reason to block the proposal. I voted yes
Based on the information provided and the LNOSG review, there are no material changes to Stakin’s infrastructure, validator operations, geographic distribution, or key management following the acquisition by The Tie.
Rationale: DAO has already decided to expand the Foundation’s role and fund its activities through EGG 2026 and GOOSE-3. But the current cap is clearly too restrictive and creates unnecessary friction, slowing down initiatives that we’ve already approved.
So obviously this makes the proposal necessary. Increasing the limit simply allows for smoother execution and better capital efficiency.
Rationale: This update shifts toward a more practical mode, flexible signer management and risk based requirements, with DAO oversight preserved via transparency and Snapshot veto.
It does mean fewer rigid, rule based guarantees and greater reliance on Foundation processes, but that tradeoff is justified by the need for faster and more reliable execution.
Rationale: By combining ICS level with DVT, IDVTC enables small, independent operators to collaborate.
It directly reduces key operational risks (downtime, single node failure) and improves capital efficiency at scale, creating stronger incentives for serious operators to participate.
Rationale: Routing DVT incentives to Lido Earn and APM incentives to the Growth Committee should improve execution and capital efficiency. The proposal aligns incentive flows with Lido’s current architecture.
Rationale: CMC is a necessary step to align governance with the operational needs of CMv2. It introduces a clear execution layer, enabling faster and more consistent handling of day-to-day operations.
It does increase reliance on a smaller group, but overall strengthens execution while keeping key decisions under DAO control.
Rationale: This is opportunity to deploy treasury capital. Any well governed treasury with surplus capital and a compelling internal opportunity would do exactly this.
For “Deactivate Node Operator A41”
→ Support. This enables a structured and transparent exit for A41, using protocol native mechanisms to minimize disruption.
For “Change name and reward address for Node Operator Stakin”
→ Support. This is an administrative update reflecting Stakin’s rebranding and new reward address, with no changes to validator operations or infrastructure. LNOSG review confirms continuity and no material concerns.
For “Upgrade Lazy Oracle”
→ Support. This upgrade resolves a validation bug that could incorrectly block valid oracle reports, ensuring reliable and continuous oracle updates.
For “Upgrade Vault Hub”
→ Support. This upgrade strengthens the core accounting and validation layer, ensuring VaultHub remains fully aligned with recent oracle changes and continues to process data accurately and reliably.
For “Upgrade and re-enable ZKSync Bridge”
→ Support. The bridge has been fixed, externally audited, and safely upgraded, allowing deposits to be re-enabled and restoring zkSync functionality with proper safeguards in place.
For "Rotate address for Oracle Set member Chorus One”
For “Rotate address for Oracle Set member Stakefish”
→ Support. They are standard and verified address rotation for an oracle member, ensuring continued secure operations and accurate reward routing.
For “Set Node Operator Chorus One soft target validators limit to 0”
→ Support. Setting the target limit to 0 enables a controlled, protocol driven wind down of Chorus One’s validator set, ensuring a smooth and predictable offboarding process.
For “Decrease Gas Supply Easy Track limit from 1000 to 150 stETH per year and reset spent amount for the 2026 period,”
→ Support. This adjustment aligns the gas supply limit with actual usage, improving capital efficiency while maintaining sufficient headroom for protocol operations.
For “Raise Community Staking Module stake share limit to 8.5% and priority exit threshold to 10.2%”
→ Support. Increasing the CSM stake share limit enables continued growth of the most decentralized and permissionless module, while the updated exit threshold ensures balanced and controlled expansion.
For “Rotate Deposit Security Committee address for Stakefish”
→ Support. This is a standard and verified address rotation for a Deposit Security Committee member, ensuring continued secure and reliable operations.
For “Upgrade Curated and SDVT Staking Modules Easy Track factories for validator exit request hashes submission”
→ Support. This upgrade replaces outdated factories with audited implementations, ensuring validator exit requests are processed correctly and reliably across both Curated and SDVT modules.
For “Upgrade stVaults Easy Track factories to register groups and register & alter tiers in Operator Grid”
→ Support. This upgrade streamlines governance by removing redundant checks, enabling parallel execution of tier and group updates, and maintaining proper validation and improving safety with added bounds checks.
Rationale: I support on Lido DAO contribution to coordinated rsETH relief effort
Letting the rsETH deficit sit just pushes losses outward, through liquidations, collateral damage, and pressure on integrated strategies. That path is more chaotic and ultimately more expensive than addressing the gap directly.
The scope is tight for me, fix the deficit only with a hard cap and a strict full funding condition. That avoids paying into a half fix that leaves the system fragile.
