Proposal: Curated Module Fee Changes

Proposals
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Summary:

This proposal seeks to adjust the fee structure for Node Operators in the current Curated Module (CM or CMv1) of the protocol in light of (1) proposed changes that will be brought by Staking Router v3 and Curated Module v2 (see “Contributor Thoughts on the Future of Lido Core”), and (2) given increasing competition in the Ethereum staking market. In the current staking market (with some Node Operators offering fees as low as 1-3% of staking rewards) there is a clear need for the protocol to remain competitive while allowing for the funding of growth and decentralization initiatives. As such, it is proposed to adopt the following interim fee structure for the CM for three categories of operators: Standard, Client-Team, Extra Effort.

  • Standard Tier: baseline fee set to 3.50%.
  • Extra Effort Tier: baseline fee set to 4.00%
  • Client-Team Tier: baseline fee set to 4.50%.

The overall Lido protocol fee of 10% of staking rewards would remain unchanged.

Background

As noted in the Future of Lido Core proposal, the Lido DAO has spent significant resources on continuing to decentralize and harden the protocol with new features such as permissionless staking via the Community Staking Module and novel mechanisms such as Dual Governance.

Given a staking market environment with increasing competition, including centralized exchange & single Node Operator share gains, changes to the Curated Module fee structure are essential for the Lido DAO to invest in growth and continue its investments in making staking simple, secure, and decentralized.

Importantly, these changes are intended as an interim measure until an upgraded version of the Curated Module (CMv2) is expected to be added to the protocol in 2026, which will add additional automation to the module including modifiable fee curves, bonding, automated performance monitoring, etc. For more information regarding CMv2, see the Future of Lido Core proposal or presentation on the Lido Poolside Community Call.

Proposal Details

It is proposed that three Tiers of Node Operators are introduced into CMv1: Standard Tier (which the majority of Node Operators will fall under), Extra Effort Tier, and Client Team Tier.

These tiers would receive the following fee share of staking rewards:

  1. Standard Tier: 3.50%
  2. Extra Effort Tier: 4.00%
  3. Client-Team Tier: 4.50%

As Node Operators fees are set at the module level due to a technical limitation in the current version of the Curated Module, the Curated Module fee to Node Operators would be set at 3.50%. In order for Extra Effort and Client Team Node Operators to receive their respective 0.50% and 1.00% of additional rewards, manual operations will be required to send these Node Operators the additional rewards via a manual “rebate” like system.

For Standard Tier operators, the rewards as a Lido Node Operator remain meaningful: at current ETH/USD prices (~ $3500), and the median level of stake across the curated operators, these NOs would receive ~ $812,000 of annual revenue from the Curated Module.

As a result of these changes, it is expected that the DAO’s share of rewards in the Curated Module will increase to over 6% from the current 5%. This would bolster the DAO’s treasury capacity while ensuring that the DAO can continue to make investment in growth initiatives and efforts to further the decentralization of the protocol.

It is also proposed that, in the event ETH/USD prices drastically fall in a significant and sustained manner, the DAO re-evaluate these proposed terms to ensure Node Operator validator operations related to Lido remains a sustainable business.

Node Operator Tier Assignment:

The Node Operator Mechanisms (NOM) workstream reviewed applications submitted by Curated Module Node Operators for the Extra Effort and Client-Team Tiers.

For the Extra Effort Tier, Node Operators were assessed based on a combination of factors including their historical contributions to EL & CL client, geographic, and infrastructure diversity of the Lido protocol, contributions to Lido governance and ETH inflows, as well as their overall Ethereum ecosystem contributions and public goods work. For example, the proposed operators scored highly on a combined set of factors including:

  • Historical ETH inflows to the Lido protocol
  • Participation in Lido DAO governance (holding & voting with material amounts of LDO & participation in community discussion)
  • Contributions to the Lido protocol’s validator infrastructure decentralization (e.g. operating validators from Latin America & Africa, and utilizing minority EL & CL clients)
  • Participation in Node Operator testing programs (e.g. DVT testnets, PERCH APM testing, etc)

Client-Team Tier operators are directly involved in mainnet Ethereum client development (Execution Layer, Beacon Chain Consensus Layer or Validator Client) or maintenance, serving as a resource to other Lido Node Operators, and play a key role in strengthening network level decentralization and client diversity.

Following the assessment process, the Node Operator Mechanisms workstream proposes the following tiers:

Extra Effort Tier: (5)

Chorus One

Launchnodes

P2P

SenseiNode

Stakely

Client Team Tier: (7)

Attestant (BVI) Limited (Vouch)

ChainSafe (Lodestar)

Consensys (Besu / Teku)

Develp (Nimbus)

Prysm Team at Offchain Labs (Prysm)

Sigma Prime (Lighthouse)

Twinstake (Nethermind)

Standard Tier: (24)

The other 24 Node Operators participating in the Curated Module

Next Steps

Another round of assessments are expected to be held in early-mid 2026, where Node Operators will have the ability to demonstrate their contributions to the protocol via stVaults.

With the implementation of CMv2, the upcoming Node Operator Types feature will make it possible to adjust the fee share for specific subsets of a Node Operator’s validators based on factors such as impact to decentralization, DVT usage, etc. More details of the proposed implementation are expected in the CMv2 landscape document. This will likely lead to some portion of Extra Effort Node Operators’ validators falling into a fee structure more similar to Standard Tier, and vice versa for some Standard Tier operators.

This proposal is suggested to be included for voting by LDO holders in the next Lido DAO Snapshot cycle. If approved by voters, it is suggested for inclusion and implementation in the December 2025 on-chain Aragon vote.

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There are many reasons why RockLogic, which I’m the managing partner of, doesn’t get included in the Extra Tier, which we applied to. We got Lido’s validators slashed due to improper processes in combination with a client bug. We emphasize building open source and public goods instead of looking for direct deposits to Lido. And sometimes I’m a pain in the butt. I always recommend solo staking. I also try to avoid conflict of interests, especially getting into politics, specifically government, of a DAO we’re heavily involved with & reliant on. And this is the case here: Being a curated set NO and shaping the DAO we work for falls most definitely in this category.

Nevertheless, I’m out of words to describe how surprised I am about what entities were chosen mostly in Extra Tier. And what entities were left out. Not a single public-goods heavy entity in the Extra Tier despite fitting the description.

CSM was built to decentralize and diversify Lido, helping solo stakers, etc. But then, Extra Tier’s build solutions to centralize CSM, undermining its efforts to incorporate a broader range of operators.

Extra Tier operator got slashed. A successfully passed vote in favor of this proposal would be a strong signal to node operators.

DAO governance is important and rewarding those showing up, propose changes, working actively on understanding those proposals and finally vote! It’s a lot of work. However, these efforts should be rewarded separately. Separation of duties and avoiding conflict of interests is a major part of a DAO, otherwise we’ll see decline in service, increased costs, corruption, basically what we see in most modern first world countries nowadays. Then the DA leaves the O on its own.

I already found it hypocritical to state the strong need for Lido DAO to build up the treasury, currently Lido DAO got USD 227m, in the “thoughts”. There are several operators building a ton of value for Ethereum, indirectly benefiting Lido DAO. These operators lose 30% of their income from Lido. Lido staking is now at over 29%. Even with the vote against restricting Lido’s inflows in the past DAO voters need to be aware of the impact Lido sets with these cuts on the staking landscape and on the funding of current as well as future projects of some of the curated set operators. Lido is more than just a staking pool; it shoulders a huge responsibility of Ethereum.

I recognize the need to lower fees. The staking market has become highly competitive and there are salespeople flooding every event trying to convince potential customers who are wealthy or not to put their capital in their pools. Lowering fees should be done in a safe way.

Give entities time to build up some treasury to handle dips like April 2025 properly. 6 months would help tremendously and would cost a tiny fraction of the treasury. Abrupt cuts can lead to instabilities due to node operators cutting also their costs, resulting in less quality, less security. With less staff it’s difficult to run bare-metal or heavily diverse client combos. Morale as well as loyalty will suffer, given the transparency and reasoning of the current proposal.

Professional node operations done right are costly. Staffing, hardware, regulations, ISO27001/SOC2 costs vary greatly where the company is registered and scale. Medium to small node operators will be hit disproportionally harder than large enterprises, resulting in even more centralization.

As a node operator this sounds more like a threat than a chance. The current proposal wasn’t discussed in any way with us NO other than a form post framed as “thinking openly”. Our Extra Tier application wasn’t discussed with us. Maybe we’d be even fit for Extra Tier, but we don’t even know how the scoring works due to lack of transparency and the questions were left very open to interpretation. I must expect RockLogic to be squeezed in even lower tiers with even less fees very soon. Maybe to a point where it doesn’t make sense for us to continue with Lido, especially evaluating stVaults.

Ethereum is a success because of its integrity. Because of its focus on privacy, inclusion, innovation, security, trustless products, resilience, and I probably come up with 20 more if it weren’t Sunday today (as of time of writing). This proposal is cutting deep into the cashflow of those builders, advocates, hidden champions, technological leaders, …

Vote against this proposal.

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Hi @stefa2k, thank you for taking the time to respond to the proposal.

The goal of this proposal is to bring the Curated Module’s economics in line with the current reality of Ethereum staking where competition has increased, margins have narrowed, and the protocol needs to stay both resilient and adaptable.

Curated Operators have held a uniquely trusted and rewarding position that helped the protocol scale safely. At the same time, the DAO can’t afford to hollow out quality or decentralization by underpricing the real cost of professional operation. The intent here is balance: a baseline that reflects a fee closer to the market rate, with additional recognition for those contributing directly to the protocol’s growth, decentralization, and governance in significant and consistent ways.

The majority of Node Operators would qualify as Standard Tier under the proposal: 67% of Curated Node Operators were proposed for Standard Tier, 19% for Client Team, and 14% for Extra Effort.

I will try to go through and respond to the number of points you made.

What I can tell you with certainty, is that none of the reasons you mentioned are the specific driver of your proposed inclusion as a Standard Tier operator.

As mentioned in the proposal above, the Node Operators that are proposed for Extra Effort were all regarded highly across a combination of different contributing factors by Lido DAO contributors in the Node Operator Mechanisms workstream.

While some Node Operators were quite strong on certain aspects, the ones proposed were generally strong across a number of the factors we considered, as mentioned in the original post.

It’s also worth noting that for the Node Operators that were strong in one area, we gave suggestions as to how they can improve in the communication sent to them (including RockLogic). For example, with stVaults launching in a few weeks, it presents a very strong opportunity for Node Operators to grow their own businesses while also supporting the growth of the protocol.

Recommending solo staking and building open source public goods are positives from my perspective. Solo staking is the gold standard on Ethereum, and you can find recordings of multiple Lido Contributors during presentations suggesting that they hope Node Operators can get their start in things like Simple DVT & CSM as they work up the required 32 ETH to truly solo stake.

Other Node Operators also develop public goods and recommend solo staking, yet also actively seek to drive inflows to the protocol.

In the case of RockLogic and Stereum specifically, the Lido DAO has been supportive with numerous grants, both before CSM was launched and as part of increasing the tooling options available for CSM Node Operators to permissionlessly participate in the protocol.

I have a very different view here personally. I think that as a Curated Set Node Operator, someone that provides services to and receives rewards from the protocol as set by the DAO, Curated Node Operators should be deeply involved in the governance processes related to the protocol.

Many Node Operators participate in governance - this response is participation in governance - and that effort is valued by both contributors and the broader community to understand different perspectives regarding development of the protocol.

If you hold LDO and disagree with the proposal, I would highly encourage you to vote against it - that’s the point of open governance, and one of the reasons I think it is an important criteria to be weighted in terms of a Node Operators’ “Extra Effort” towards the protocol.

The Node Operators suggested for the Extra Effort Tier were considered very strong contributors across the combined set of metrics: historical ETH inflows to the protocol, participation in Lido DAO governance (including voting with LDO), contributions to infrastructure decentralization, participation in testing programs, and ecosystem & public goods work. It’s worth noting specifically here that for Extra Effort, public goods work is one of the factors - not a sole driver of the proposal (whereas the Client Team Tier is specifically designed to support public goods related to Ethereum mainnet EL/BN/VC development).

From my perspective regarding Extra Effort, there are two major components that I would like to see Node Operators do more of: 1. Build & use products that work with stETH at the core, and/or drive inflows to Lido, and 2. Participate in Lido DAO governance (especially via voting).

The protocol has seen significant outflows over the past two years, with much of that moving to more centralized setups, including, in some cases, to Lido Node Operators themselves, who are offering significantly lower fees than they receive from protocol-driven stake.

Node Operators are allocated stake from Lido with very little cost of revenue acquisition - they are onboarded, and then receive stake following the programmatic deposit allocation strategy. This means there is little incentive for Node Operators to support the growth of the protocol, most only benefit from the inflows. While ecosystem participation and development and support of public goods are important in this industry, and are things that Lido DAO has supported throughout the years, both via grants as well as by giving these participants the opportunity to be onboarded to the Curated Set, the “Extra Effort” category is not meant to simply be an extension of this. Rather, “Extra Effort” is an attempt to identify operators who have contributed uniquely to the Lido ecosystem through some combination of public goods work, decentralization efforts, and (very importantly) development of stETH related products and/or protocol inflows.

On the second point, the protocol’s evolution lives and dies with governance participation. Node Operators, as one of the main entities involved in the protocol’s operations, should be actively participating in DAO voting to move the protocol forward. To drive innovatives ideas and product development forward, and to act as a check & balance on initiatives they disagree with.

A large portion of the DAO treasury is held in LDO tokens, something that is not readily accessible for funding operations or investments in protocol development.

The DAO has funded unparalleled spend on decentralization initiatives such as the Community Staking Module, Dual Governance, and now is in the process of significant investments to re-work the accounting structure of the protocol to support MAXEB (a significant update), simply to benefit the Ethereum network. These are initiatives that are deeply important for the network and the protocol itself, however don’t directly lead to any significant financial benefits for the DAO, and are immensely costly.

In addition, Lido’s share of the network stake is actually 23.54% - not 29%. This is a material difference, with stakers generally turning to much more centralized alternatives such as restaking protocols, centralized exchanges, or large business-driven node operators in recent months.

As noted in the August Tokenholder update, the substantial and consistent expenses on protocol improvement and decentralization have led the DAO to not yet have a positive year in terms of income (but is getting close). Improving the financial profile of the DAO via both specific cost reductions and revenue growth is imperative for the longevity of the protocol, and will allow the DAO to invest in growth initiatives while continuing to support the decentralization of the Ethereum validator set.

Regarding your comments around Node Operator sustainability:

I believe that the current fee structure proposed is sustainable for Lido Node Operators. At current ETH/USD prices (~ $3500), and the median level of stake across the curated operators, NOs would receive ~ $812,000 of annual revenue from the Curated Module. After discussions with most of the Node Operators since the original proposal was shared, none of them have indicated that they would withdraw from the Lido Node Operator set due to this change.

Since RockLogic’s onboarding to the beginning of October 2025 (along with other Wave 4 Node Operators), RockLogic has received 1,121 stETH in rewards. The average ETH/USD exchange rate during this time equals rewards of ~ $2.69M.

I think this is an unfair characterization. Following the forum post, a Q&A townhall was held for all members of the Lido Curated Set (which you joined). In addition, a public presentation was given on the last Lido Poolside Community Call. Additionally, all Curated Node Operators have been invited to set up a call with Lido DAO contributors to discuss both CMv1 & CMv2 changes, a booking link was sent to your specific Node Operator chat, and the majority of other Curated Node Operators have already had such discussions over the last weeks.

The Contributor Thoughts on the Future of Lido Core proposal was posted on September 2nd 2025 where it suggested that most Node Operators in the Curated Set should fall into the Standard Tier, along with notice this would be suggested for implementation by December 2025.

In terms of an overall response to the post, I understand that the changes are significant. However, given the current market environment, I believe that it is important that the DAO take actions that allow it to continue to adapt.

I would argue this change is overdue, given market trends and the fact that Node Operators are charging other stakers significantly lower fees in many cases.

Regardless, I am optimistic that with developments on the institutional front, the stVaults launch, and other innovative products in the future, there are many different opportunities for Node Operators to grow their businesses alongside Lido. 2025 was a bad year for protocol inflows, and if we see that trend reverse in 2026 following the aforementioned initiatives, that will lead to greater amounts of staking inflows for Curated Node Operators.

Additionally, this proposal includes additional funding for 7 Client Teams that provide valuable services to the entire Ethereum ecosystem. This is meaningful spending as a share of fees, and continuing to support the efforts of builders like these is very much aligned with the intention of the proposal.

I think being a Node Operator in the Curated Set has been a very positive experience for everyone involved to date. It has driven large amounts of stake at above market fees to Node Operators for the last five years. My hope is that the future will better align Node Operators with the protocol, by contributing via inflows to Core or stVaults, as well as participating in Governance, to more materially support the infrastructure that has supported them over the past years.

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Hi @kimonsh !

Thanks for going through my post, I appreciate receiving an answer. I’m reviewing the proposal from a more neutral point of view with Lido DAO prospect in mind and making suggestions in this post. I try not to iterate points I already made in my first reply to this proposal. I also omit CMv2 and focus on CMv1.

I’m not against lowering fees altogether. I’m questioning the process as well as the proposal (missing details, scoring process, introduction of bureaucracy, intransparency, missing risk assessment, ROI) itself. To make it shorter and quicker to read I’ll keep it focused and direct. Please take no offense in my writing.

RockLogic related

In our chat it was only CMv2 mentioned. Thanks again for responding so rapidly to my call request and answering my questions (I understand the need to time cap this), it was very insightful and cleared a lot of things up! I don’t have a fully detailed picture yet though, but it seems I can work on a path for RockLogic moving forward.

The committee rating the applications are not aware of details about participation in Lido’s different activities. I was not aware of this, I think this should have been stated clearly. I left out a couple of things in our application. This wouldn’t have made a difference as far as I’m aware – but is another example of lack of transparency about this process.

Evaluation of the proposal

Lowering fees for everyone while deploying staff to define arbitrary rules and criteria to encourage specific behaviors mirrors the approach often seen in many governments of developed countries. The effectiveness of such incentive systems is questionable and, in some cases, outright harmful. Inevitably, some groups that would benefit are left out, while others receive support despite already being sufficiently incentivized by other means.

Creating and maintaining these incentive schemes carries a significant cost: employing bureaucrats to design programs, draft application processes and guidelines, assist applicants, review submissions, make recommendations, and oversee implementation only for the cycle to begin again. The proposed initiative within the Lido DAO would introduce yet another layer of bureaucracy following this same pattern.

Lido should continue paying transparently for services instead of coming up with complex and complicated incentive schemes for a small group of people.

Scoring

I found little information on how the scoring for Extra Tier works, luckily @kimonsh and @Aleksandra_G were helpful in explaining. Because the proposal doesn’t explain this, please take this with a grain of salt, this is my understanding:

  • There are 5 spots on the Extra Tier, so curated set operators compete with each other to get into these. Scoring is relative to competition.

  • A committee is rating different topics of engagement with Lido.

    • Who’s the committee?

  • There are 3 priorities with different topics:

    • Top priority: high Lido core/stVault inflows (with former being valued higher), governance (holding substantial amount of LDO, delegation is enough; proposal reviews are not highly valued)

    • Mid priority: Infrastructure setup (cloud less value than bare-metal), decentralization (geolocation), client diversification

    • Low priority: Ecosystem engagement, participation of Lido tests (e.g. Primev), public goods, open source (except clients, they got their own Tier), testing

  • Performance is not an indicator of evaluation

  • Weighting is unclear and wasn’t disclosed to me.

  • Because of the selection of top priorities, it is impossible to get into Extra Tier without bringing in substantial amounts of ETH to Lido core/stVaults as well holding substantial amount of LDO.

  • No exact values of “substantial amount” can be given because of the relative ranking to competitors.

  • There is no negative scoring (e.g. for slashings)

  • There is no objectivity in valuing public goods, no KPIs

  • There is no check or criterion that verifies whether a “Client Team” is overfunded; that is, whether Lido’s additional spending through a higher fee share benefits Research & Development.

Risk assessment

It was mentioned that most of NO had communications about CMv1 with Lido NOM.

  • What were their concerns?

  • What was their positive feedback?

  • Are there patterns in their feedback to CMv1?

What are the risks for Lido and how would you handle them or just accept them? (non-exhaustive list)

  • Distortion of competition

  • Manipulative behavior

  • Competition instead of collaboration

  • Passionate entities becoming drones chasing incentives

  • Impact on morale/resentment

  • Rising cost of bureaucracy

  • Deadweight effect (entities would have done the same thing without incentives, thus making incentives highly inefficient)

What are the risks of first lowering some entities’ fees and then potentially pushing them up again (next evaluation; CMv2)?

Financials

The proposal as well as the initial thread run an example for a NO with current stats.

  • What is the expected savings for Lido (ETH)?

  • How does this affect treasury (+ timeframes)?

  • How does this affect 2025 & 2026 yearly numbers? (profit/loss)

  • How come it’s 4,5%, 4% and 3,5%? What made you end up with these numbers?

  • Are there credible sources for the 1% to 3% claim as “market conditions” for staking right now?

  • How much more does Lido NOM cost because of distribution of top-up fees (from 3,5% to 4% or 4,5%)?

  • What’s the cost of the bureaucratic processes/executions?

There are sources claiming different stages (0-1000 keys x, 1001-3000 keys y, etc.), are there key amount stages now in this proposal? This skipped for a flat fee for all keys of an operator, correct?

What projects are planned?

Is this part of treasury dedicated to these causes? (not spendable on e.g. buybacks)

What ETH/USD price would that be?

Would this also be the case for decreased key count or a combination of both?

What is the expectancy (hard KPIs: e.g. ETH inflows, gov participation, …) towards NO and their behavioral changes because of this new scoring system? When and how will results be checked and reported?

ROI Extra Tier

The costs needed to get into Extra Tier are not even close to the rewards gained by it from the point of view of a NO. This heightens the risk of deadweight effect. I’ll try to run some examples, please keep in mind I’m not aware of all the factors, pretty sure I missed something or got something wrong.

Additional income for Extra Tier in comparison to Standard Tier:

  • 0,5 % equaling around ETH 30 (~ EUR 81k) per year

  • 0,5 % equaling around ETH 10 (~ EUR 27k) for 4 months – timeframe until CMv2 could come live

I left out Restaking because it got extra fees (stETH minting fee, etc.) and risks, making it difficult to predict outcomes.

“Pretty sure Extra Tier”

Costs (total ~ EUR 200k):

  • LDO purchase of 250k: EUR 165k

  • ETH 50k into stVault:

  • 1 % stVault fee: ETH 13,5 (~ EUR 36450)

  • business development costs: vary

Break even heavy LDO – I’d assume not Extra Tier

Costs (total ~ EUR 81k):

  • LDO purchase of 123k: EUR 81k

Break even heavy stVault – I’d assume not Extra Tier

Costs (total ~ EUR 81k):

  • ETH 111k into stVault:

  • 1 % stVault fee for 1y: ETH 30 (~ EUR 81k)

  • business development costs: not included

Governance

What you’re suggesting is a preferred NO led DAO, with more incentives for NO to participate in governance than other collaborators. I’d assume there are reasons why you’d prefer to make NOs participate in governance rather than other (neutral) parties?

I’d expect a strong tendency of NOs in governance to push towards deadweight effects.

General

These kinds of “trust me” proposals are far too common in DAOs and I’ve never understood why they’re tolerated. Lido manages an enormous amount of stake, yet token holders are being asked to approve what appears to be a USD 8m annual budget change, roughly 10 % of the total, based on a four-page document that fails to outline concrete costs, risks, or expected financial impact.

This isn’t a minor adjustment; it’s a major structural change. Decisions of this scale demand transparent, data-backed evaluation. Every voter should know exactly what they’re committing to. Anything less undermines accountability and responsible governance.

Suggestions

I’m critical of if, how and how much the Extra Tier would benefit Lido or Ethereum as a whole and the state/form of the proposal.

Suggestions for improving this proposal:

  • Add a voting option for “Yes, without Extra Tier” to allow for more nuanced voting.

  • Provide a comprehensive risk assessment, particularly addressing potential deadweight effects and competitive implications.

  • Fully outline all projected costs and expected gains, so voters can evaluate the trade-offs transparently.

  • Discuss alternative mechanisms to encourage NOs to acquire and hold LDO, for example, discounts with lock periods or other long-term alignment incentives.

  • Instead of adding bureaucratic layers, lower fees or fund implementation grants, audits, or support programs for stVault + stETH integrations to make stVaults more appealing organically.

These steps would not only increase transparency and accountability but also avoid introducing unnecessary bureaucracy into the DAO’s operations.

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Hi @stefa2k, thank you for summarizing our call.

As things stand, I am comfortable with the current shape of the proposal. I believe making these changes are extremely important in the current environment, and delaying the implementation of the fee changes as proposed would not lead to any significant benefits. After a number of conversations with various stakeholders over the last two weeks, I believe the proposal as it stands is acceptable to move for a vote. We have not heard strong disagreement from any other Node Operators at this point, but would welcome others to voice an opinion publicly if they disagree or support the proposal.

The proposed fee changes would increase the DAO share of Curated Module rewards to ~ 6%, a number more in line with the recently updated CSM, and a 20%+ increase from it’s current rate. These proposed changes are expected to be implemented in the interim before the addition of CMv2, which will provide additional time to make changes in the updated design of the module

Due to the way voting mechanics work, I would continue to recommend two options for LDO voters to consider when the Snapshot vote goes live:

An option “For” which if approved would lead to the next steps for the implementation of outlined fee changes and tiers, and an option “Against”, which would lead to continued discussion with the community to determine which aspects of the proposal may need to be modified.

I believe the Future of Lido Core post, as well as the original post in this thread and my response to you above sufficiently cover the justification of why this proposal should be accepted by LDO holders.

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In general I agree with and fully support Will’s responses here. I think it’s good that you’re voicing your concerns Stefan and that’s welcome as a part of an open deliberative process, but in the interest of not re-hashing each point by point I propose that we try to move forward and see what the DAO says (given that it hasn’t come to our attention that there is a general disagreement or discontent with this proposal), and assess how to move forward based on whether the DAO decides to support the proposal as-is or to go back to the drawing board.

Just wanted to add some information here to respond: these proposed projects and the amounts of treasury that will be dedicated to the different initiatives will be detailed in the upcoming GOOSE-3 submission to the DAO as well as the relevant EGG (funding) request, which I would expect to be published for discussion in the coming 1-2 weeks given the general historic GOOSE + EGG cadence.

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Snapshot vote started

The Curated Module Fee Changes Snapshot has started! Please cast your votes before Mon, 01 Dec 2025 16:00:00 GMT :folded_hands:

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Snapshot vote ended

The Curated Module Fee Changes Snapshot has reached a quorum and completed successfully!
The results are:
For: 58.2M LDO

:white_check_mark: Winning option: For

2 Likes