Glad to see budget decreased in half.
Dont’ agree with removing LDO as a form of payment, i’d prefer doubling down on it, or at least doing research on how impactful paying in native token is in the industry. What are the rates of hodl and delegate, etc.
Even though I don’t agree about the LDO change i’m not going to block the proposal moving forward as imo it’s more important to decrease costs and simplify.
Happy to see this proposal move forward and an amicable agreement found between the dissenting contributors of the Lido DAO and Lido Labs who put forward the proposal. More importantly I’m happy to see Labs take ownership of the program.
As the staked ETH market solidifies between the top centralized and decentralized providers, the competition between all of these entities continues to grow and margins continue to tighten. It’s pretty clear that Lido needs to continue to adjust to this changing market. Changing to a curated module fee structure allows for Lido DAO to increase the share of Curated Module rewards to ~ 6% a 20%+ increase from it’s current rate. The program also should incentivize Node operators to increase their general performance in the Lido network including in governance. As mentioned this is temporary anyways until a more automated system can be created with CMv2.
I see no reason not to move this forward to an onchain vote.
There should be no idle capital in the DAO in my opinion beyond what is required for short-term operations. sUSDS is a conservative and battle tested way for stablecoins to accrue yield instead of wasting away to inflation. I see no problem with adding sUSDS to the Lido DAO strategy.
I also don’t see a huge problem with the Foundation to manage these assets on behalf of the DAO to decrease the requirement for voting. If I understand this correctly the Foundation would be bound by law to administer these funds under the “borg” setup and this money could be demanded back at any point by the DAO. @steakhouse could you confirm this more clearly? If there is any change then I believe my onchain vote could move to a no, for now signalling yes onchain.
Resources are needed to fufill the new goals for 2026! I’m glad to see some operational costs decreasing, I believe more work needs to be done in this case and a $10mil short-fall probably isn’t needed to meet Lido’s goals.
It would also be preferable in the future to (after discussing with some other delegates) use the term “opportunistic” instead of “discretionary”. Discretionary funds are typically used for line-items such as “Growth” but clearly growth is under base-line in this proposal. Growth spending should be and is “discretionary” and should be viewed as such to ensure the status-quo is saving money not spending money. Setting the base-line with growth in it creates the expectation that there is a base-line amount of money for growth which there shouldn’t be. Base-line = operational.
I won’t vote no over wording, but setting this precedent might be good in the future.
Seems like an easy, low-risk methodology to broaden the scope of what the BORG can use funds for and accomplish on behalf of the Lido DAO without adding more operational and legal overhead.
Sensible, low-risk methodology to improve Lido’s onchain security. SEAL has a great reputation and after witnessing OG protocols such as Yearn and Balancer fail, we can’t be too careful.
Change Curated Staking Module fee to 3.5%, as per Snapshot decision.
Raise SDVT Staking Module stake share limit to 4.3% and priority exit threshold to 4.78%, as proposed on the Forum. This equalizes the clusters in SDVT, bringing some clusters to 80 keys.
Set A41 Node Operator soft target validators limit to 0, as requested on the Forum.
Set Easy Track TRP limit to 15’000’000 LDO, as per Snapshot decision.
Add sUSDS token to stablecoins Allowed Tokens Registry and sUSDS transfer permission to Easy Track EVM Script Executor in Aragon Finance, as proposed in TMC-6 on the Forum.
Transfer MATIC from Lido Treasury to Liquidity Observation Lab (LOL) Multisig, as proposed in TMC-5 on the Forum.
I have reviewed the payload using the verification tools and all looks good.
Using the SSV Network Fee removes the risk of staking at a loss during market volatility or unfavorable prices. In general I am in favour of dynamic fees, quorums, etc. as they react better to market volitility which is more common in our industry.
Reasoning: Skin in the game is a crucial way to create incentive alignment in our industry. This helps BD work in stVault adoption. Glad to see there was some feedback in the forum and adjustments to the loss trigger.
Reasoning: The delegate incentivization program has gone well. Quorum is more easily reached albeit with some effort, which is good, and there are reputable individuals and projects with skin in the game now actively participating. I am not a fan of a change from payment in LDO to USDC/T, etc. but understand that the amount of LDO given out was not enough to make a material impact on decisions on value accrual, nor helping to reach quorum. Reducing operational overhead is always good. Very happy to see Agora removed as Aragon is the leading governance and tokenomic service and tooling provider in the industry!
Reasoning: We don’t see a change from an independent node operator to being part of a larger organization, especially a credible one, as being a huge centralization risk at this point. The Tie is a credible firm. In fact, it’s good to see a smooth transition rather than losing node operators.