DAOplomats Delegate Thread

Delegate Platform
21

Establish the stVaults Committee
Voted: For, a well-designed governance structure that balances operational agility with decentralized oversight. It allows a dedicated, expert committee to manage routine vault configurations efficiently, while the DAO’s ultimate veto power via Easy Track provides a crucial and transparent safety net.

NEST - Network Economic Support Tokenomics
Voted: For, to explore a more credible and automated way to return value to the LDO token. A system like NEST would build long-term confidence by programmatically linking protocol surplus to buybacks, and this research phase is the responsible first step to designing it correctly.

Lido V3 — Design & Implementation Proposal
Voted: For, This is a well-designed evolution that offers the best of both worlds: it preserves the unified liquidity of stETH while introducing much-needed user choice and operator diversity through the new stVaults. The cautious, phased rollout demonstrates a responsible, security-first approach to such a critical and important upgrade.

Vote #193
Voted: No

Proposal for Updating Lido on Ethereum Validator Exits SNOP to v3
Voted: For, This is a sensible and necessary update that brings the validator exit policy in line with current technical realities like Triggerable Withdrawals, providing essential clarity for all node operators.

Empowering Lido Ecosystem Foundation to Lead Bridge-Related Partnerships
Voted: For, It gives a dedicated entity the speed needed to act on strategic bridge partnerships, while the new Bridging Security Committee provides a vital, expert-led safety check on the entire process.

1 Like
22

Transfer TRP to Lido Labs Foundation and Amend TRP Terms
Voted: For, It moves the contributor rewards plan under the Lido Labs Foundation, which already manages the contributor contracts. This puts everything in one logical place under a formal, accountable structure that the DAO actually has oversight of.

Lido Ecosystem Grants Organization (LEGO) — Framework Update 1 October 2025
Voted: The council reviewed two years of real-world spending, saw the budget was oversized and unused programs were creating clutter, and proposed a sensible plan to fix it. It’s a responsible tune-up that saves the DAO money and simplifies operations.

1 Like
23

Conversion of Treasury Stablecoins into sUSDS or TMMFs
Voted: For, With a 15% cap, strict liquidity floors, and manual execution by trusted Foundations, it balances efficiency with prudent risk management.

Curated Module Fee Changes
Voted: Missed vote, we wanted to vote for this proposal to adjust the Curated Module Node Operator fee structure. Lowering the baseline fee to 3.5% in response to a highly competitive staking market ensures Lido remains economically attractive while boosting the DAO treasury’s share of rewards to around 6%.

Adopt The SEAL Safe Harbor Agreement
Voted: For, By standardizing the rules of engagement with a capped 10% bounty, we eliminate the need for chaotic, high-stakes negotiations in the middle of a crisis, ensuring rescuers are motivated to save funds fast.

Lido Alliance BORG – Amendment of Bylaws to Enable GOOSE-3 Execution
Voted: For, Right now, the entity is too restricted to handle the new product lines we want to launch, and fixing this is much faster and cheaper than spinning up a whole new legal structure.

Ecosystem Grant gRequest (EGG): Executing GOOSE-3
Voted: For, It consolidates funding across Labs, Ecosystem, and Alliance, which simplifies oversight and aligns capital directly with our strategic goals. The financial logic holds up, projecting a solid baseline of revenue that justifies the spend while leaving room for significant upside if the growth bets pay off.

GOOSE 2025 cycle: Lido DAO goals for 2026
Voted: For, The strategic move to become a DeFi gateway for real-world businesses positions the DAO to capture the next massive wave of Ethereum adoption rather than just coasting on current TVL. This roadmap gives our Labs, Ecosystem, and Alliance teams the unified direction they need to execute on these high-value targets.

Vote #194
Voted: For, It installs the necessary “Easy Track” rails so we can manage validators and potential bad debt efficiently without constant governance friction. We are simply giving the protocol the technical tools it needs to operate this new architecture safely.

Vote #195
Voted : For, Raising the SDVT cap is a crucial step to scale our distributed validator infrastructure and further decentralize the network. The treasury updates for sUSDS and MATIC are standard housekeeping measures that ensure our financial operations remain efficient.

Vote #196
Voted: Missed vote, we wanted to vote for.

1 Like
24

DVT & DVV Incentive Allocation Changes
Voted: For, because transitioning to a dynamic incentive model accurately reflects the fluctuating real-world costs of operating DVT validators. By automatically scaling the Node Operator share between 15% and 50% based on market conditions, it protects operator sustainability during high-cost periods while maximizing staker upside when incentives are strong.

Rewards Share Committee Reform
Voted: For, updating the Rewards Share Committee’s mandate is a critical operational step to align with Lido’s GOOSE-3 goals and the V3 upgrade. Entrusting the committee with the manual processing of Node Operator rebates ensures that high-contributing operators are properly compensated while we await the full automation of Curated Module V2.

Should Stakin continue in the Curated and DVT sets following its acquisition by The Tie?
Voted: For, the existing Stakin team will maintain all current infrastructure, geographic distribution, and key management practices, this transition introduces zero operational risk or need for validator migration. Furthermore, the thorough review and clearance by the Lido Node Operator Sub-Governance Group (LNOSG) gives us full confidence that this acquisition does not compromise Lido’s security standards.

Authorize $5M DAO Treasury Allocation to Lido Earn ETH and USD Vaults
Voted: For, because allocating $5M of the treasury directly into the new Lido Earn vaults establishes crucial “skin-in-the-game” that completely aligns the DAO with its users. The innovative first-loss mechanism, which allows DAO-held shares to be burned to absorb losses during severe incidents, is a powerful feature that will significantly reduce trust friction for new depositors.

Delegate Incentivization Program 2.0
Voted: For, transitioning the Delegate Incentivization Program from a temporary pilot to a permanent, standing mechanism is essential for maintaining consistent quorum and high-quality governance.

25

Increase Easy Track transfer limits for Liquidity Observation Lab to align with EGG
Voted: For, this proposal because it is a pragmatic operational upgrade that aligns the Liquidity Observation Lab’s (LOL) infrastructure with its current, governance-approved mandate. Following the approval of the LDO accumulation program, increasing the stETH transfer limit to 8K per 6 months and introducing a dedicated $8M stablecoin Easy Track factory are necessary steps to eliminate unnecessary friction and manual swaps.

Should Pier Two continue in the Curated and SDVT sets following the acquisition by Bitmine Immersion Technologies?
Voted: Missed vote, but wanted to vote for as operational continuity is the only metric that matters during a Node Operator acquisition. Because Bitmine is retaining the original Pier Two engineering team, infrastructure layout, and key management practices entirely, there is zero immediate execution risk to the validators.

Transition from GateSeals to CircuitBreaker
Voted: Missed vote, but wanted to vote for as gateSeals were always designed to be an intentional “inconvenience bomb” to force the DAO to build a permanent, scalable solution. CircuitBreaker delivers exactly that.

NEST: Automated LDO Buyback and Liquidity Provisioning
Voted: Missed vote, but wanted to vote for as LIP-36 NEST introduces a disciplined, programmatic model for linking protocol revenue to token alignment without resorting to extractive or inflation-prone buy-and-burn mechanics. By defaulting to LP Mode, NEST converts excess staking revenue above the $40M baseline into permanent, DAO-owned LDO/wstETH liquidity via CoW Swap, deepening secondary market liquidity while keeping underlying assets on the DAO’s balance sheet.

26

Adopt the Node Operator Type Assessment Framework for CMv2
Voted: Missed vote, wanted to vote for as transitioning the Curated Module from a flat, monolithic structure into a granular, behavior-driven tier system is a necessary evolution for CMv2. We strongly support the governance hygiene of separating the categorization mechanism from the actual economic parameters defining distinct criteria for Public Good, Decentralization, and Extra Effort operators now avoids stalling progress on fee debates before the baseline framework is even established.

Galaxy Node Operator Infrastructure Update
Voted: For,this proposal because migrating Galaxy’s validator infrastructure during the mandatory CMv1 to CMv2 consolidation window is the most secure and operationally efficient path forward. Since all Curated Module operators must generate new 0x02 validator keys for the CMv2 upgrade regardless, placing these new keys directly onto Galaxy’s internal SOC 2 Type II-compliant platform eliminates the severe operational risk of a secondary, out-of-cycle key rotation.

Revoke Canonical Status of (w)stETH Bridge Endpoints on Selected Chains and Authorize NEC for Revocations
Voted: For, this proposal because scaling a protocol’s multichain footprint effectively requires knowing when to prune underperforming branches. Maintaining active security oversight, incident response, and integration support on networks with stagnant TVL or competing native assets is a massive drain on Lido’s operational bandwidth. Revoking the canonical label without breaking the underlying bridge contracts perfectly balances user safety with protocol risk management.

Wind Down Simple DVT Module Regular Clusters
Voted: For, Winding down the 72 regular SDVTM clusters early is the pragmatic move from both a unit economics and operational standpoint. With the DAO realizing a margin of just ~2.9% here versus the >6% average across other modules, and operators struggling near break-even levels due to declining per-validator rewards, forcing this module to its original 3-year timeline makes no financial sense.

Lido Labs Board Update: Appointment of Nemo as Director
Voted: For,this proposal because Nemo possesses the exact blend of internal protocol context and external operational expertise required to effectively govern the Lido Labs Foundation. Managing the foundation’s affairs and executing the mandates set out in the 2026 EGG requires directors who understand both deep market infrastructure and the DAO’s strategic direction.