Lido DAO Ops Multisigs Policy (2.0)

Motivation

Operating within a DAO requires striking a balance between flexibility and security. Lido DAO relies heavily on Safe multisig wallets, leveraging them across different operations to enable safe, transparent, and efficient transaction execution.

This proposal builds on the foundational principles set in the Lido DAO Ops Multisigs Policy while adapting to evolving operational needs. The goal is to optimize multisig governance for scalability, enhance security measures, and ensure a clear framework that aligns with the fast-moving nature of Web3 governance.

Additionally, each such multisig or committee should be ready for adoption by a BORG (ex. Lido Alliance, Lido Ecosystem, Lido Labs) if there is alignment on objectives and if the transition introduces synergistic benefits. In such cases, adherence to BORG bylaws and the signing of necessary agreements will be required to ensure smooth integration and governance continuity.

General Rules

To keep operations secure yet agile, all Lido DAO ops multisigs recommended to follow these baseline requirements (please see Special cases for exceptions or additional rules set):

  • Minimum of 3 signers.
  • 50% signing threshold.
  • 7+ signers for multisigs holding 1M+ in assets (USD stable coins equivalent).
  • Minimum 3/5 signer setup for multisigs managing roles and permissions.
  • Signers should use hardware wallets in multisigs managing roles and permissions or holding 100K+ in assets (USD stable coins equivalent).
  • For token holdings exceeding a 50K balance (USD stable coins equivalent) at least once, an unlimited allowance must be set with the Lido Aragon agent as the beneficiary.
  • Adherence to the BORG’s bylaws and multisig participation agreement if a part of any (example - Lido Labs BORG).
  • Signers of multisigs having critical security roles in Lido protocol operations (like GateSeal and Emergency Brakes) are discouraged from using their addresses for other purposes. They should create a brand new wallet for that purpose instead.
  • In the event of loss of access to the keys or their potential compromise, the signer is required to promptly notify the other multisig participants, the community, and BORG (if applicable) by posting a message on the forum and communicating through the relevant channels.

Committee Structure and Responsibilities

  • Lido DAO multisigs are structured across various committees, each executing specific operational tasks.
  • These committees operate transparently under DAO governance, ensuring accountability and alignment with Lido’s mission.

Public Process

Lido DAO contributors, LDO token holders and the wider community must have visibility into multisig operations. To uphold transparency:

  • Each multisig should have a research.lido.fi forum post detailing its purpose, general operating rules, multisig wallet address and the list of signer addresses.
  • Multisig addresses should be documented in the Lido DAO Multisigs section.
  • Prospective signers should verify their addresses by posting proof in the forum and social media.
  • Any changes to signer composition should be disclosed in the forum post with updated verification.
  • Unless explicitly defined as static, signers can be rotated, but a public audit trail should be maintained.
  • Any signer change should NOT:
    1. Reduce the number of signers below the DAO vetted one (if applicable).
    2. Decrease the signing threshold. If such changes are necessary, a DAO Snapshot vote is required.

Multisig Signer Rotation

  • Signers may rotate without a Snapshot vote if a simple majority of the original signers (e.g., 3/5, 5/8) remains.
  • The original signer list is stored in IPFS (please see Original Signers List section for links), ensuring verifiable historical records.
  • Updating an address to preserve the integrity of the multisig is not considered a signer rotation if the owner of the address remains the same. This type of update must be announced and documented in accordance with this policy. Multisigs having critical security roles are to come up with their reasonable process of ensuring such integrity (as an example - GateSeal drill report).
  • Before a rotation, a committee must confirm that a minimum number of original signers remain. If this condition is not met, a new multisig structure must be proposed via a Snapshot vote.

Rotating Multisig Members

  1. The committee announces a rotation at research.lido.fi and the new signer must publicly verify their address.
  2. A 7-day objection period follows. If no objections at research.lido.fi arise, the rotation is finalized by the current signers.

Updating Signer Addresses

  • If the original key is accessible:
    • The signer proves ownership of a new address by signing a message with their existing address.
  • If the original key is lost:
    • The signer must verify their identity to the other signers through alternative methods such as:
      • Authentication via a verified social media account.
      • A video call with other signers for confirmation.
      • Other sufficient methods.

Special Cases

  • Multisigs managed by Lido-on-X (non-Ethereum Lido protocols) are exempt unless otherwise stated.
  • Lido DAO contributors may set up ad-hoc multisigs for specific operations. If these multisigs do not manage rights, roles, or DAO funds, they are not required to follow this policy. These wallets may be used for gas refunding for dev and ops teams, for instance.

Voting Details

  • Proposal: Adopt Lido DAO multisigs policy
  • Voting Platform: Snapshot.org
  • Voting options:
    • For - Adopt proposed multisig operational policy for committees and BORGs.
    • Against - no changes.

Original Signers List (incomplete, will be finalized before going to Snapshot vote)

Committees.md

Emeregnecy-brakes&Gate-Seal.md

Lido-contributors-group.md

UPDATE

Added hw wallets requirement, requirement for critical security multisigs to have a procedure ensuring their integrity (drills, rotation. etc.), reminder to all signers to raise an issue ASAP if the keys are lost or compromised, other small tweaks to the text.

10 Likes

In light of recent multisig hacks this is certainly a timely revision. We are supportive of this policy upgrade with some additional considerations for further enhancement.

  • Consider implementing volume and time-based limitations. For example, increase the number of required signers if the transaction volume from a wallet exceeds $X within a 24-hour period. Such escalation setups for significant or non-business-as-usual movements serve as practical safeguards, offering more dynamic protection than fixed thresholds based solely on account size.
  • Implement periodic key and signer rotations to mitigate the risk of ‘silent takeovers,’ where an attacker progressively compromises signers.
  • The policy states, ‘Signers are discouraged from using addresses for other purposes.’ To reinforce wallet hygiene, this directive should be more assertive. Consider mandating that signers use dedicated addresses (and browser/hardware-wallets) exclusively for their signing roles. Additionally, providing comprehensive training on best practices for wallet management would further enhance security (this could be a grant request itself).
4 Likes

Hi, It’s a bit unclear how it works.
Without access to the original key, does every member of Multisig have to agree to change the address? Or is it decided by a majority by signing multisig?

1 Like

I think it’s should be according to the signing threshold of the multisig, the basic flow is that each participating signer must check transaction details. If the address couldn’t be verified by the standard flow (because old keys are missing), than an alternative procedure should happen, through which every signing member gains sufficient proof before putting their signature.

2 Likes

@Nansen thanks for the input!

Committees have budgets and time-based security limits for Easy Tracks set accordingly, so they request assets in multiple motions during the budget period (to decrease the risk). Major swaps are done via STONKS and TMC committee starting motions there, which are never taking possession of funds. Considering that it seams this temporary threshold changes are unnecessary in my point of view, because processes are having more strict safeguards in place already.

These two points are indeed important and actually DAO ops stream team members have been promoting them for quite awhile already for any new emerging committee. :wink:
But totally worth adding it to the policy imo, ty!

3 Likes

As one of multisig holders - for me is everything clear

3 Likes

Fully supportive of strengthening multisigs management.

3 Likes

General Thoughts

Thank you for this timely piece about increasing the security of Lido DAO. After thoroughly reviewing the Lido DAO Ops Multisig Policy, nothing stands out that requires change.

Question

  1. Of the 36 multisigs that exist today, only the Gate Seal multisig has a sunset date and renewal procedure. Would it be wise to introduce additional similar guidelines in Policy 2.0 for multisigs with significant financial or executive power—such as PML, ATC, RCC, or the oncoming three BORGS multisigs?